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 No theory of social change can circumvent the task of specifying the process that 
transforms the existent order into a different order, and determining that which accounts for 
the difference between those two orders. This thesis examines whether the theories of social 
change found in the works of Alain Badiou and Ernesto Laclau succeed in fulfilling this task. 
Badiou contends that a political process transforms the situation in which it unfolds in so far 
as what it produces is a ‘truth’. Certain implications of the set-theoretical ontological discourse 
through which Badiou conceptualizes truths, however, prevents an unambiguous appraisal of 
their socially transformative character. Although Badiou stipulates that the transformative 
potential of a truth lies in its ‘generic’ universality, this universality becomes indistinguishable 
from particularity when its transformative effects are limited to a situation—but it is precisely 
the interplay between situations, in the plural, that is not adequately reflected in set-theoretical 
ontology. Whilst Laclau’s theory of hegemony can be interpreted as providing an account of 
this interplay between pluralities of situations, it has its own shortcoming: the transition 
between different social orders cannot be thought under hegemony theory as anything other 
than a transition wherein the to-come is conditioned by the present to an extent that is 
theoretically underdetermined, resulting in the blurring of the distinction between social 
transformation and social reproduction. The final part of this thesis explores the possibility of 
bringing together the Laclauian notion of the ‘simplification’ of the social space through 
hegemonic articulation and Badiou’s theorization of truth procedure, in an attempt to conceive 
the particular kind of situation in which a political process would potentially have far-reaching 
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In ‘Tactics and Ethics’, George Lukács writes that vacillating ‘aimlessly between 
Realpolitik devoid of ideals and an ideology without real content’ is a perennial risk of a 
revolutionary practice whose ‘ultimate objective’ is ‘socio-transcendent’.1 Lenin addresses the 
issue of revolutionary tactics and their actual efficacy in Left-Wing Communism. While 
acknowledging that it may appear ‘extremely “dangerous”, incomprehensible and wrong to 
“permit compromises”’ as it would seem to undermine revolutionary purity, Lenin 
nevertheless notes—in a section titled ‘No Compromises?’—that ‘the entire history of 
Bolshevism, both before and after the October revolution is full of instances of changes of tack, 
conciliatory tactics and compromises with other parties, including bourgeois parties’.2 The 
maintenance of revolutionary purity at the cost of refusing engagement with existing social 
forces runs aground on a practical contradiction because the revolutionary objective is 
unachievable without such engagements. This point can be schematically expressed as follows: 
a process of radical social change must take place across both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ axes. 
The former is characterized by attentiveness to historical circumstances and attempts to 
mobilize social forces within the existing social order. But if a process of social change were 
to work only across the horizontal axis, it makes itself vulnerable to the possibility of missing 
the socio-transcendent objective. On the other hand, a process that takes place solely across 
the vertical axis is characterized by a singular commitment to its cause—it neglects existing 
social forces and its historical situatedness, and risks practical inefficacy. 
                                                            
1 Georg Lukács, ‘Tactics and Ethics’, in Tactics and Ethics: Political Writings 1919-1929, ed. by Rodney 
Livingstone, trans. by Michael McColgan (London: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 3–11 (p. 4). 
2  V. I. Lenin, Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, 1920 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/lwc/> [accessed 2 September 2014]. 
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This thesis proposes to examine the works of two theorists, Alain Badiou and Ernesto 
Laclau, in the context of the problem of integrating the vertical and the horizontal axes in an 
account of social change. What makes—in addition to their shared theoretical background and 
commitments that allow for a productive a comparative reading—the examination of the 
accounts developed by Badiou and Laclau in terms of this problem particularly interesting is 
the fact that each account can be construed as emphasizing one of the two axes while leaving 
some aspect of the other axis undertheorized, as indicated by the responses that the different 
visions of politics presented in the works of Badiou and Laclau have elicited. 
Observing an affinity between the approaches of Badiou and Laclau in their 
theorization of social order and politics which transforms it, Oliver Marchart has placed their 
approaches (along with those of Claude Lefort, Jean-Luc Nancy, and others) under the rubric 
of ‘post-foundationalist political thought’. This label points to the premise shared by Badiou 
and Laclau that no social order is a transparent realization of a harmonious whole—there is 
something that escapes it, potentially creating disruptive effects.3 Slavoj Žižek has similarly 
remarked that there is a ‘deep homology’ that unites the theoretical edifices of Laclau and 
Badiou in their attempt to think the dimension that undermines the order of being—a positive 
social order—as a self-enclosed consistency.4 Yannis Stavrakakis has placed Žižek, Laclau, 
and Badiou under the broad heading of the ‘Lacanian Left’, finding influences of Lacanian 
theory in Laclau’s theorization of the limits of discourses and Badiou’s theorization of the 
ethical and political implications of an event, to name just two.5  
However the theoretical background Badiou and Laclau share may be construed, what 
remains the case is that theoretical affinities have not translated into affinities in their vision 
                                                            
3 See: Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and 
Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
4 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), p. 172. 
5 Yannis Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2007). 
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of political practice. Reflecting the experiences of Latin American populism into his political 
thought, Laclau holds that social change requires forming ‘a common project’ out of different 
social elements—with identities and demands taking primacy in his analyses—through a 
process of linkage that he terms ‘articulation’.6 The structure that emerges from this process 
of articulation is called a ‘hegemonic formation’, and Laclau maintains that any process of 
social change—irrespective of its particular normative orientation—will involve the 
construction of hegemonic formations. Badiou, on the other hand, regards politics as a process 
of annulling the prevailing stratification of a social order on the basis of particularistic 
properties and qualifications conferred on individuals. Politics is a matter of actively applying 
a universal and egalitarian maxim that, in its most general formulation, reads: whoever belongs 
in a situation belongs in exactly the same way as anyone else. Badiouian politics, then, is one 
of de-relating, or the undoing of whatever identitarian classifications the ‘state of a 
situation’—a regime of representation, which Badiou often associates in his ostensibly 
political writings with the empirical state—has imposed on a social order.  
The kind of criticisms that each political vision has elicited already provides a hint as 
to which of the two axes is inadequately reflected in the theories of Badiou and Laclau. Oliver 
Marchart argues that what is missed by Badiou—who prefers, according to Peter Hallward, ‘a 
politics of disciplined purification […] over a politics of alliance and negotiation’7—is the fact 
that politics takes place ‘between a multiplicity of struggling actors (or subjects), all placed at 
different positions on an uneven, intransparent and power-ridden terrain’.8 Marchart suggests 
that Badiouian politics is sustained by an ethics of pure conviction—and he is not alone in 
                                                            
6 David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis’, in Discourse 
Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemoni, ed. by David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis 
Stavrakakis (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 1–23 (p. 15). 
7 Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 36. 
8 Marchart, p. 129. 
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making this point. Daniel Bensaïd, who has forcefully asserted this point against Badiou, 
writes: 
‘God preserve us from socio-political programs!’ exclaims Badiou […]. 
Carried by a pure maxim of equality, [the Badiouian politics of truths] is 
entirely concentrated in the present of its declaration: ‘The only political 
question is: what is it possible to achieve in the name of this principle 
through our militant fidelity to this declaration?’ Such a politics is supposed 
to be a matter of ‘prescriptions’ rather than programme, prescriptions 
illustrated by unconditional commands such as ‘every individual counts as 
one’; ‘the sick must receive the best care without conditions’; ‘one child 
equals one pupil’; ‘anyone who lives here belongs here’. These maxims, 
which have the dogmatic form of religious commandments, provide 
principles of orientation that counter the unprincipled accommodation of 
Realpolitik or naked opportunism.9 
In lieu of engaging with ‘profane politics, with its impurities, uncertainties, and wobbly 
conventions’, Badiouian politics issues ‘prescriptions’ and ‘dogmatic commandments’ that, 
for Bensaïd, ultimately is akin to a Kantian morality that allows ‘one to keep one’s hands 
clean’. 10  But ‘[w]ouldn’t such ethicization of politics prove to be politically disabling’, 
Marchart asks, ‘if only for the reason that one will always be sure to find oneself on the right 
side, the side of an ethical, emancipatory politics?’11  
Laclauian hegemonic politics appears to avoid the potentially disabling ethicization 
that abovementioned commentators note apropos Badiouian politics. It accepts the premise 
that ‘in the so-called real world politics cannot simply be about fidelity’, and that ‘compromise, 
strategy, and a political realism in the Machiavellian […] sense’ are necessary dimensions of 
                                                            
9 Daniel Bensaïd, ‘Alain Badiou and the Miracle of the Event’, in Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of 
Philosophy, ed. by Peter Hallward (London ; New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 94–105 (pp. 102–3). 
10 Daniel Bensaïd, ‘Permanent Scandal’, in Democracy in What State?, by Giorgio Agamben and others (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. pp.16-43 (p. 42). And: Bensaïd, ‘Alain Badiou and the Miracle of 
the Event’, pp. 102–3. 
11 Marchart, p. 130. 
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political practice.12 Yet, it is also for its ‘Machiavellian’ political realism that Laclau’s thought 
has come under criticism. Geoff Boucher, for example, offers the following judgment: 
Hegemonic politics is theorized in radically “Machiavellian” terms, as a 
neutral technology of manipulation and domination that the Left would be 
well advised to learn to control. Because all social formations are 
fundamentally constructed upon exclusion and marginalization, the real 
question becomes one of how to swap the leading personnel, rather than 
whether to transform the social order.13 
Even a more sympathetic reader of Laclau such as Simon Critchley has questioned Laclau’s 
reluctance to advance any concrete normative ethical claims even though certain normative 
commitments (for instance, a commitment to the so-called ‘radical democracy’) underlie his—
as Critchley perceives it—mostly ‘descriptive’ theoretical endeavour.14 But if Laclau’s theory 
of hegemony is in fact, as Boucher claims, ‘an ethically indifferent political calculus designed 
to secure ascendancy for any group prepared to utilize this political technology’,15 it is, for 
better or for worse, one that has achieved the rare feat of having actually been taken up by 
political movements with mass support.16 
It is not difficult to see which of the two axes the readers of Badiou and Laclau named 
above would find to be inadequately reflected in their political visions: the horizontal and the 
vertical, respectively. However, the construal of the problem of integrating the two axes in 
practical or ethical terms—as a tension between Badiouian Gesinnungsethik and Laclauian 
                                                            
12 Marchart, p. 130. 
13  Geoff Boucher, The Charmed Circle of Ideology: A Critique of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler and Žižek 
(Melbourne, Australia: re.press, 2009), pp. 231–32. 
14 See: Simon Critchley, ‘Is There a Normative Deficit in the Theory of Hegemony?’, in Laclau: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 113–22. 
15 Boucher, p. 111. 
16 Perry Anderson, ‘The Heirs of Gramsci’, New Left Review, II.100 (2016), 71–97 (pp. 80–81). One such 
movement which has made explicit use of Laclauian thought is Spain’s Podemos.  
In the introduction to the 1998 edition of The Retreat from Class, Ellen Meiksins Wood wrote that ‘post-
Marxism’—Laclau being one of its representatives in the book—is a ‘now defunct intellectual tendency’. In 
retrospect, that judgement appears to have been hasty, given the political effects that Laclau’s work has generated 
in the years after. See: ‘Introduction to the New Edition’ in Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Retreat From Class: A 
New True Socialism, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 1998). 
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Realpolitik—as the abovementioned readers have done in the passages that have been cited is 
neither the only way to construe the problem nor the most productive one. The problem can 
be construed differently, in a way that makes the advances made by Badiouian and Laclauian 
approaches toward the theorization of the two axes clearer, as well as opening a path toward 
a more interesting comparative examination of the two approaches.  
Politics, for both Badiou and Laclau, emerges as a process of change from a disruptive, 
dislocating ‘event’ in the ‘social’—the regime of existing norms, institutions, and practices. 
Jason Glynos and David Howarth write that ‘insofar as political movements are successful in 
challenging norms and institutions in the name of something new, political practices bring 
about a transformative effect on existing social practices’. 17  Accepting the Laclauian 
proposition that a political process articulates into a common project the potential for change 
‘across a variety of social spaces and sites of struggle’, the authors assert that a political 
process that succeeds in doing so will be able to ‘exercise a transformative effect on an entire 
regime of practice resulting in the institution and sedimentation of a new regime and the social 
practices that comprise it’.18 If this is whatever that merits the name ‘revolution’ must at least 
be, the contention of this thesis, to state it succinctly, is that the Laclauian approach, despite 
theorizing the conditions of the extensiveness of change, leaves the newness of the 
transformed social order ambiguous, whilst the Badiouian approach, despite developing an 
elaborate conception of the novelty that a political process carried by ‘the name of something 
new’ produces, leaves the extensiveness of its transformative effect undertheorized. The 
difference between the Badiouian and Laclauian approaches construed in this way pertains not 
to the kinds of political practice advocated by Badiou or Laclau, but to a theoretical problem 
of conceptualizing social change arising from, in the case of Badiou, an underdeveloped 
                                                            
17 Jason Glynos and David Howarth, Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2007), p. 105. 
18 Glynos and Howarth, p. 105. 
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account of how a transformative process could reach beyond—under a concrete historical 
circumstance—the initial situation or site of struggle from which it originates, and, in the case 
of Laclauian theory, the persistence of an ambiguity between socially reproductive aspects and 
socially transformative aspects of a political process. The contributions and shortcomings of 
Badiouian and Laclauian accounts of social change thus illuminate the challenge of theorizing 
a political process that produces socially transformative effects that are both extensive and 
new—the challenge, in other words, of theoretically integrating both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
axes. As should be expected, granted that thinking social change that merits to be called 
‘revolutionary’ must at least answer to this challenge, the problem of integrating the two axes 
is not at all alien to the discourse of radical politics. Two instances in which the problem posed 
in this thesis via the works of Badiou and Laclau is clearly discernible are the account of group 
praxis elaborated by Jean-Paul Sartre in Critique of Dialectical Reason and Jacques Rancière’s 
reflections on ‘democratic’ politics. A brief overview of the two shall thus serve to both 
highlight the strengths of Badiouian and Laclauian accounts of social change and prefigure 
the claims that this thesis will advance apropos their shortcomings. 
 
I. Sartre, group praxis, and the totalization of history 
The solipsistic vision of praxis and its disconnection from material conditions—which 
Merleau-Ponty had found to be the limitations of Sartre’s early political thought—were what 
Sartre attempted to rectify in Critique of Dialectical Reason. Reflections on material 
conditions take centre stage in the first volume of the Critique. There, ‘scarcity’ is proposed 
to be the basic material condition that shapes social relationship. While acknowledging that it 
cannot be asserted that scarcity will be an eternally untranscendable human condition, Sartre 
nevertheless observes that ‘the whole of human development, at least up to now, has been a 
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bitter struggle against scarcity’ and that a human being ‘is a practical organism living with a 
multiplicity of similar organisms in a field of scarcity.’19 Beginning with this premise, Sartre 
proceeds to describes everyday being-with-others as a scene composed of individuals who are 
at best indifferent to each other and at worst antagonistic, as a situation wherein others are 
competitors under the condition of scarcity that entails that the satisfaction of everyone’s needs 
cannot be guaranteed. In one of his characteristically illustrative examples, Sartre explains that 
a collective of people waiting to board a bus at a bus stop consists of no more than atomic and 
isolated individuals who are gathered there simply due to the contingent fact that they need to 
board the same bus. Reciprocity of recognition is absent at the bus stop, a place wherein one 
has his back turned ‘on his neighbour, who, moreover, has not even noticed him’.20 Whilst the 
purpose of each individual standing at the bus stop is the same, there is no common purpose, 
because under the condition of scarcity, an individual has to regard the others as competitors, 
not as someone with whom he can cooperate to achieve his purpose. 
The kind of gathering described above exhibits the characteristic of what Sartre calls 
a ‘series’, which he contends is the dominant mode of human gathering in everyday situations. 
And for Sartre, ‘in order to achieve even the smallest common result’, seriality must be 
overcome.21 The overcoming, or in Sartre’s terms, ‘dissolution’, of seriality may occur when 
some stimulus, an exigency of circumstances, brings individuals of a series to the realization—
to quote the dramatic formulation from Sartre’s account of the storming of the Bastille—that 
‘the impossibility of change is the very object which has to be transcended if life is to 
continue’.22 In those circumstances to which a series cannot adequately respond, there is a 
chance for the emergence of a ‘group-in-fusion’, in which freedom, mutual recognition, and 
                                                            
19 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume I: Theory of Practical Ensembles, ed. by Jonathan 
Rée, trans. by Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: Verso, 2004), p. 735. 
20 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, p. 256. 
21 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, p. 687. 
22 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, p. 350. 
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common praxis replace un-freedom and non-recognition that are the definitive characteristics 
of serial collectives. Yet, according to Sartre’s analysis, the ‘apocalyptic’ dissolution of 
seriality does not persist. Although the Critique places freedom within the context of historical 
conditions such that its expression becomes circumstantial, freedom continues to remain for 
Sartre an irreducibly individual freedom. Freedom is both what makes the dissolution of 
seriality possible, but also introduces in the fused group the perennial possibility of its 
disintegration. Whatever unity that is achieved in a group is fragile and contingent, sustained 
by the commitment of individual members. The long-term sustenance of a group depends on 
its becoming an ‘institution’ or an organization, but Sartre could only see this as a return of 
aspects of seriality, and was led to conclude that ‘[t]he group whose origin and end reside in 
an effort by the individuals who are gathering to dissolve seriality in themselves will, in the 
course of its struggle, actually reproduce alterity in itself and freeze into the inorganic’.23 The 
results that a group may have achieved within its lifetime inevitably congeal into the ‘practico-
inert’, or into reified social norms and institutions that come to impose themselves as obstacles 
to freedom. As Mark Poster writes, for Sartre, ‘the group-in-fusion was no more than an island 
of humanity in a sea of inert series, and it eternally faced dispersion into mechanical unity’.24 
The first volume of the Critique leaves one significant issue unelaborated. Sartre 
suggests that groups are formed in the face of ‘mortal danger’. One of his prime examples of 
a group is the Parisian populace on the fourteenth of July, 1789, which Sartre argues was a 
group-in-fusion formed in response to the threat of military action by Louis XVI. But a mortal 
danger is not the only kind of stimulus that induces the formation of fused groups, for Sartre 
considers more mundane dissolutions of seriality in a football team, an angler’s association, 
and a system of swopping books set up by old ladies as the emergence of groups that ‘in any 
                                                            
23 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, p. 591. 
24 Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), p. 262. 
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case respond to some very real exigencies and whose objective meaning relates to the total 
situation’.25 The stimulus and common purpose that generates and orients a group, then, may 
range from the most mundane to the most revolutionary. Thus, although the dissolution of 
seriality is a necessary condition for any social change, it cannot be concluded that the 
dissolution of seriality is a sufficient condition of significant social change, in so far as some 
substantive difference can be assumed to exist between the mundane and the revolutionary. 
What seems to be in need of elaboration is the difference that makes one group formation 
mundane and the other the origination of significant social change—but there is little that is 
intrinsic to the dissolution of series and the emergence of a group that could serve as a basis 
for that distinction, not least due to Sartre’s decision to sharply distinguish human activity 
between that which is confined to the repetitiveness of the everyday and that which is needed 
for achieving any transformative ends. 
There is a plurality of groups that respond to the exigencies of their particular situations, 
but no determination of the sense in which any of them would contribute to lasting and far-
reaching, or indeed, revolutionary transformation, rather than remaining as local and 
ephemeral expressions of human freedom that eventually disperse into another series. What 
had to be fulfilled in order to avoid the profoundly repetitive view of history that this result 
seems to imply was nothing else than the final objective that Sartre had set for the Critique as 
a whole, namely, to demonstrate ‘that there is one human history, with one truth, and one 
intelligibility’. 26  Stated with simplification, the meanings of particular groups and their 
discrete praxes are to be apprehended in terms of their place in the broader historical process 
within which they are parts expressive of the whole. For this to be possible, it had to be shown 
that an apparently disjointed plurality of praxes compose a single movement of ‘totalization’, 
                                                            
25 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, p. 350. 
26 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason I, p. 69.  
11 
 
but without—and this was what Sartre regarded as his crucial contribution—positing a 
transcendental ‘totalizer’. Through the demonstration of this point, Sartre’s project of 
reconciling existentialism and Marxism was supposed to be brought to consummation, 
establishing finally that no ‘law’ of history needs to be posited to understand the emergence 
of class struggle—Sartre writes early on in the second volume that ‘Marxism is rigorously true 
if history is totalization; it is no longer if human history is decomposed into a plurality of 
particular histories.’27 However, whether the demonstration was eventually offered in the 
second volume, which Sartre left unpublished, is dubious. Although Sartre begins to develop 
an elaborate account of intricate intra-group dynamics in the second volume of the Critique, 
as Ronald Aronson has observed, he ‘never begins his account of how a multiplicity of hostile 
or unrelated praxes cohere’.28 On the reasons that may have led to the abandonment of the 
Critique, Martin Jay suggests that Sartre may have found it difficult, perhaps due to his 
intellectual dispositions and historical events of the twentieth century, to present history as a 
totalization toward any end that could be regarded as emancipatory.29  
 
II. Rancière’s democratic politics 
In an essay that clarifies his approach (written entirely in the third person), Rancière 
remarks that he ‘does not say what politics is but what it might be’.30 Although his notoriously 
anti-systematic style sets him apart from the system-building approach of the theorists whose 
works with which this thesis is concerned, both Badiou and Laclau have acknowledged a 
                                                            
27 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume II: The Intelligibility of History, ed. by Arlette 
Elkaïm-Sartre, trans. by Quintin Hoare (London: Verso, 1991), p. 25. 
28 Ronald Aronson, Jean-Paul Sartre: Philosophy in the World (London: Verso, 1987), p.285. Quoted from: 
Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1986), p. 354. 
29 Jay, pp. 359–60. 




certain affinity between their reflections on politics and Rancière’s.31 Moreover, as subsequent 
chapters of this thesis will draw from Rancière’s works to illustrate several ideas, his political 
reflections are of special interest to this thesis.  
Rancière proposes that every politics worthy of the name is egalitarian. But for him, 
equality is not a goal to be reached (equality cannot be instituted, or become a principle by 
which a society is ordered), nor has it anything to do with an ontological claim about human 
beings. Rather, equality, Rancière suggests, is a ‘presupposition’ that enables political action 
that challenges what he terms ‘police [la police]’, the rule of propriety or the assignment of 
objective social identities by which society is configured, which relates ‘ways of doing, ways 
of being, ways of saying’ to certain ‘places and tasks’, establishing an order that he describes 
as a ‘partition of the sensible [le partage du sensible]’.32 Politics [la politique] is diametrically 
opposed to police: whereas police ‘counts’—gives an account of—the parts (individuals and 
groups) of society in terms their qualification, social function, and so on, politics challenges 
the supposed exhaustiveness and naturalness of the police count by asserting a principle that 
is radically heterogeneous to it, namely, the simple equality of everyone and anyone. ‘Every 
politics’, Rancière suggests, ‘is democratic in this precise sense: not in the sense of a set of 
institutions, but in the sense of forms of expression that confront the logic of equality with the 
logic of the police order’.33 
Although Rancière refuses to distinguish equality in this way, there are two senses in 
which equality functions in his text: firstly, as the ‘transcendental’ condition of social order as 
such and in a more contingent or historical sense, in which the conditions that allow for 
                                                            
31 See, for example: Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 244–48. And: Alain Badiou, 
Logics of Worlds, trans. by Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 560–61. 
32 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. by Julie Rose (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 29. 
33 Rancière, Disagreement, p. 101. 
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specific disputes against a police order to be articulated are implied. In the first sense, the 
construal of equality as the transcendental condition of the possibility of social relations, 
features in a line of thought that might be summarized as follows. Any hierarchical relation 
between two parties presupposes that those who are ruled are able to understand the orders 
issued by those who rule—hence, any affirmation of inequality is presupposed on the basic 
equality of speaking beings prior to differences in rank and qualification. If so, both inequality 
and equality are necessary conditions of hierarchy, social relations, and therefore order. 
However, inequality and equality are contradictory conditions, which makes it impossible for 
any social order to be the expression of a final rational articulation of its conditions of 
possibility. From this, Rancière draws the conclusion that any particular social order is 
contingent and disputable. The second sense of equality is prominent when Rancière describes 
concrete political action, in which equality is enacted or activated to polemically challenge the 
police count in a particular context. In Rancière’s writings, specific instances of politics are 
often illustrated with reference to historical cases, such as working-class struggles in which 
workers constructed their disputation against the police count on the basis of an equality that 
had been declared (for example, the Charter of 1830, which decrees that all French people are 
equal before law) but remained merely formal.34 But the ur-illustration that captures the 
paradigmatic form of politics goes further back in time to the birth of Athenian democracy. 
After Solon’s reform that prohibited enslavement for debt, the ‘poor’, who have nothing and 
are in debt, had no entitlement apart from their freedom. Freedom, however, is not a positive 
qualification to have a share in the community, but an ‘empty’ qualification, that is, a mark of 
the lack of any other qualification to partake [avoir-part] in communal decision-making 
procedures and in the distribution of material goods. Yet, for no qualitative difference can be 
made between the freedom of one person and the freedom of another, the freedom possessed 
                                                            
34 See: Jacques Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, trans. by Liz Heron (London: Verso, 2007), p. 45. 
14 
 
by the ‘poor’ could be turned into an affirmation of their equality with anyone and everyone 
in the community. On the basis of an empty qualification of freedom, those excluded from the 
community in any practical sense identify—in a metonymic substitution of a part for the 
whole—with the communal whole and presents a case against the prevailing count of parts of 
the community that excludes them. 
In its most paradigmatic form, then, politics exists when a ‘part of those who have no 
part [une part des sans-part]’, those who are excluded because they are deemed to lack the 
qualifications needed to partake in the community, disputes this count—hence the identities 
assigned to them—in the name of an enabling equality. Through the enactment of a dispute 
over the police count, those without a part constitute themselves as a ‘figure of a specific 
subject, a supernumerary subject in relation to the calculated number of groups, places, and 
functions in a society’,35 as a collective formed on the basis of equality that has not been 
accounted by the police. The sharp dichotomy between those who have a part and those who 
have no part, or between the interruptive politics and institutionalizing police, presupposed in 
the paradigm, however, is qualified. Rancière explains that the distinction between politics 
and police ‘takes effect in a reality that always retains a part of indistinction’. Accordingly, 
‘there is never any opposition between two opposed sides, with the realm of police institutions, 
on one side, and the forms of pure demonstration of authentic egalitarian subjectivity, on the 
other’.36 Rancière writes: 
From the moment that the word equality is inscribed in the texts of laws and 
on the pediments of buildings; from the moment that a state institutes 
procedures of equality under a common law or an equal counting of votes, 
there is an effectiveness of politics, even if that effectiveness is subordinated 
                                                            
35 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. by Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 51. 
36 Jacques Rancière, ‘The Use of Distinctions’, in Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, ed. by Steve Corcoran 
(London: Continuum, 2010), pp. 205–18 (p. 207). 
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to the police principle of distribution of identities, places and functions.37  
One might ask whether, by admitting this much imbrication of politics and police, Rancièrian 
account of politics loses some of its edge by opening the door to the ubiquity of politics, as 
something that is always already there. Although the valorisation of momentous insurrections 
may be a temptation to be resisted, one may nevertheless wish to avoid the other extreme that 
would render politics mundane or even inconsequential. And it is on the matter of 
consequences that Rancière appears to have the least to say. Politics, as Rancière sees it, is 
essentially a process of dis-identification from identities to which individuals are assigned—
but despite its being a process in which a different ‘ways of doing, ways of being, ways of 
saying’ is glimpsed, politics itself cannot be a process of instituting another order, for that 
remains strictly the remit of police, not of politics. Although more sensitive readers of Rancière 
have explored the implications of the intertwinement of politics and police, 38  at least in 
Rancière’s text—including Disagreement, wherein the category of police features prominently 
(the term ‘police’ appears far less frequently in Rancière’s interventions in the years following 
Disagreement, such as The Hatred of Democracy)—the process of establishing an order as 
reconfigured remains largely unexplored. Although he writes that ‘police’ is a term that is used 
‘nonpejoratively’ and ‘there is a worse and a better police’, 39  he leaves without much 
explanation how ‘better’ and ‘worse’ police are to be distinguished, and indeed, whether a 
better (or worse) police is an achievement of politics. 
Nothing is in and of itself political for Rancière, and he insists that there is no 
predetermination of where politics takes place and who the political subject will be. But 
precisely because politics has no condition other than that it is a disputation of a police count 
by an egalitarian count in some given context, anything can become political. Politics can be 
                                                            
37 Rancière, ‘The Use of Distinctions’, p. 207. 
38 See, for example: Samuel Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
39 Rancière, Disagreement, pp. 29–31. 
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‘a popular uprising staging the manifestation of a still unheard of subject; but it can also be a 
modest meeting of nine persons creating in a London tavern a “Corresponding Society” open 
to unlimited number of members’. Alluding to his archival study of nineteenth-century worker 
writings, Rancière remarks that ‘even a slight modification of the timetable of a worker’s 
evening’ is politics, in as much as this transgresses the normally assigned division between 
day and night, times that are tied in the police partition of the sensible to labour and sleep 
respectively, by replacing them with labour and writing works of literature.40 However, by 
confining politics almost entirely to the negative moment of disruption and dis-identification 
without a predetermined place and objective while leaving the lasting transformative effects 
of disruption rather undertheorized, Rancière’s position comes close to endorsing the 
following proposition: that some group of people challenge the police count and the identity 
to which they are currently tied is the end of politics.  
 
III. Synopsis 
 The issues apropos the theorization of social change that have been identified in 
Sartrean and Rancièrian approaches can be expressed in terms of the schema of vertical and 
horizontal axes. In Sartre’s Critique, the distinction between mundane and revolutionary 
change remains ambiguous because the position from which that distinction could be made 
has been left without determination. In this respect, the vertical axis is undertheorized. But if 
this outcome is tied, as it has been suggested, to the ambiguity of whether Sartre has succeeded 
in providing an account of how ‘a multiplicity of hostile or unrelated praxes cohere’, or more 
generally, to the incompleteness of its theorization of totalization, it can also be said that the 
weakness of the theorization of the horizontal axis is implicated in the weakness of the 
                                                            
40 Rancière, ‘A Few Remarks on the Method of Jacques Rancière’, p. 117. 
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theorization of the vertical axis. Rancière proposes that equality, as a principle that is 
heterogeneous to police, is able to support the creation of an internal distance within a given 
order, between what is and what can be, which is manifested by the emergence of a political 
subject that cannot be subsumed under any established social identity—the vertical axis is to 
be located here. And there is a place for the horizontal axis in proposing that politics exists in 
the activation of equality that allows a part to identify with the whole under a particular police 
order. However, absent in Rancière’s reflections is the thought of a process by which the 
distance between what is and what can be is closed, such that the order that will have been 
reconfigured could be said to be one in which the effects of politics (egalitarian by definition) 
are realized.  
Given the characterization of Sartrean and Rancierian approaches above, the aspects 
of the Badiouian and Laclauian approaches that harbour the promise of overcoming some of 
the issues that are identifiable apropos the integration of the two axes can be summarized in 
the following manner. Badiou’s Being and Event may be seen as providing an account of the 
vertical axis, via a conceptual determination of both the distance between the existing order 
and the transformed one, and the process that leads from the former to the latter—something 
that is arguably missing in Rancière’s approach. Despite the formidable theoretical distance 
between Sartre and Laclau, it might nevertheless be said that latter picks up on the issue of the 
horizontal axis that the former had left unresolved. For Laclau’s theory of hegemony 
elaborates an account of how the plurality of social forces cohere to shape a social order as a 
systematic totality, based on which a transformative process that acts on the social space as a 
whole, thus a kind of change that is significant, far-reaching, or extensive, may be conceived. 
But despite their having moved toward a theory of change that better reflects the two axes, this 
thesis hopes to show that there is in each approach an aspect of one axis that is undertheorized, 
which potentially undermines the account of social change that it proposes.  
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The first two chapters will engage with the Badiouian approach. In the first chapter, a 
reading of Being and Event from which implications of Badiou’s intricate system for thinking 
social order and social change can be drawn shall be offered. Some of the methodological 
questions that are involved in transposing the propositions of Being and Event onto concrete 
social situations shall be discussed in the first chapter. It will be shown over the course of the 
first two chapters that although the Badiouian theory of an interruptive event and the process 
of unfolding its consequences—termed a ‘truth procedure’—is able to conceptually determine 
a process of transformation as the production of something new in a situation, the extent of 
transformation this process is able to achieve is made ambiguous in face of questions that can 
be raised concerning the distance between situations as conceived under Badiou’s general 
ontology and particular, concrete, specifically social, situations.  
By the end of the second chapter, it will have been shown that accounting for how 
particular, concrete, social situations are structured, related, and sustained—in short, for the 
‘interplay’ of a plurality of situations that Badiou himself states is a feature of concrete 
situations—requires theoretical resources beyond what set-theoretical ontology alone provides. 
It is precisely this aspect that Laclau’s theory of hegemony attempts to theorize. In the third 
chapter, hegemony theory will be presented in a way that retains a sense of continuity with the 
reading of Being and Event in the first chapter. It will be seen how Laclau’s social ontology 
elaborates the constitution of a social order as a totalization of different elements into a 
hegemonic formation, which pays explicit attention to the issue of how different elements are 
constituted, related, and sustained. This foregrounding of relationality and totalization allows 
the account of the process of social change offered by Laclau—as the construction of an 
alternative hegemonic formation—to be in a better position to respond to the question of the 
extensiveness of socially transformative effects. Laclau’s view that there is ‘no place for 
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Lycurguses of the social order’,41 thus, that there is no total break and complete reconstitution 
of society, has its strengths: it reflects in the process of change the limits of what is decidable, 
thinkable, and achievable under a particular historical circumstance. The fourth chapter further 
examines the way in which this view is incorporated in hegemony theory, namely, in the 
postulation that the ‘content’ of any hegemonic project is constrained by a sort of reciprocal 
circuit between a political project and the prevailing order, which can be construed variously 
as power, social imaginary, or Sittlichkeit of the community. It will be argued that hegemony 
theory leaves an ambiguity concerning the newness—precisely that singular quality to whose 
conceptualization the Badiouian theory of truth is devoted—that is achieved in the transition 
between hegemonic formations, and renders the conceptual determination of a process that 
leads to a transformed social order difficult under its theoretical framework. 
 The fifth and final chapter is more hypothetical and tentative in nature: it will explore 
the possibility of addressing some of the issues that have arisen in the course of investigating 
the Badiouian and Laclauian approaches by attempting to co-articulate their insights. By 
incorporating certain insights of hegemony theory, the specificity of a situation wherein a truth 
will have consequences that is not confined to just any one situation amongst an infinite 
plurality of situations. The Badiouian account of truth procedure allows the vertical axis that 
is underdetermined in hegemony theory to be determined. For this co-articulation to deliver 
the benefits that it promises, it will be suggested, the configuration of social situations need to 
be made further analysable through the introduction of ‘pre-evental’ subjectivity—modelled 
after the Laclauian subject—that accounts for the construction of situations and identities. In 
part, the attempt to bring the two approaches together is inspired by a remark that Laclau had 
made in his essay on Badiou, that set-theoretical ontology can be ‘absorbed and described as 
                                                            
41 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics’, in 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, by Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto Laclau, 
and Judith Butler (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 44–89 (p. 82). 
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a special case’ within his theoretical framework. 42  Laclau never offered such a 
demonstration—and it appears implausible that there is a way to achieve a total systematic 
cohesion of the two theoretical approaches, for this would be only possible either by 
completely reducing one approach to the other, or by creating a new theoretical framework 
that encompasses both. Nevertheless, the degree to which the two approaches may be made 
compatible to yield a productive result toward conceptualizing social situations and social 
change is perhaps a matter that is worthy of exploration. In the end, it will be suggested that it 
is possible to conceptualize, by drawing from both approaches, the production in a social 
situation of an element that is radically new as something that will have established itself as a 
new social identity, but the transformative effect of its establishment ripples across a plurality 
of social situations. It is hoped that the steps taken toward the demonstration of this possibility 
will carve a path toward the integration of the horizontal and the vertical axes beyond the 
extent to which they have been in either Badiouian or Laclauian accounts of social change.
                                                            
42  Ernesto Laclau, ‘An Ethics of Militant Engagement’, in Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of 
Philosophy, ed. by Peter Hallward (London ; New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 120–37 (p. 137). 
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Chapter 1. The ontological schema of society and its transformation 
 
1.1 From the ontological to the social  
The objective of this chapter is to show that Being and Event provides a theoretical 
framework for understanding the structure of social situations as well as a conceptual 
determination of both the distance between the existing situation and a transformed situation 
and the process by which that distance is traversed. As is the case with any highly systematic 
text, it is not possible to discuss aspects of Being and Event without referring to the entirety 
of the system that it builds. Although a thorough reconstruction of set-theoretical ontology 
will not be attempted, a synopsis of its fundamental premises shall be provided in section 1.2. 
This will be followed by an interpretation of set-theoretical ontology as providing a schema 
for analysing social situations, wherein terms such as ‘social identity’ and ‘social imaginary’ 
will be redefined by drawing from the resources of set-theoretical ontology. Sections 1.3 and 
1.4 outline—or rather, apply to the account of social situation developed in 1.2—the theory of 
event and post-evental transformation. It will be shown that the theoretical framework of Being 
and Event enables a conceptual determination of a process that introduces something new into 
a situation. Some methodological disclaimers with regard to the approach that this thesis takes 
with respect to Badiou’s work should be offered before proceeding, since Badiou’s political 
interventions, of which are legion, will not feature prominently in this chapter despite the fact 
that politics and social change are its central themes. A brief discussion of Badiou’s philosophy 
shall be offered to defend this approach.  
Badiou asserts that ‘[w]hat can rationally be said of being qua being, of being devoid 
of any quality or predicate other than the sole fact of being exposed to thought as entity, is 
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said—or rather written—as pure mathematics’. 1  The claim is not that being equals 
mathematical objectivities. Rather, mathematics ‘is the discourse of Being, not Being itself, 
and it is the discourse of mathematics, not mathematical objectivities, that Badiou 
hypothesizes to be identical’.2 This means that what can be said of being-qua-being varies with 
the development of the resources of mathematics. In Being and Event, it is the standard ZFC 
axiomatic set theory that serves as the ontological discourse—Badiou proposes that Cantor, 
Gödel, and Cohen are his Hölderlin, Trakl, and Celan.3 Since mathematics is the discourse of 
being-qua-being, strictly speaking, there cannot be Badiou’s ontology, and whenever that 
expression is employed hereafter, it shall denotes the ‘metaontological’ attempt carried out in 
Being and Event to determine, based on what ontology speaks of being, philosophical concepts 
of multiplicity, void, situation, truth, and subject. But if the proposition that mathematics is 
ontology is ‘not a thesis about the world but about discourse’,4 this means, strictly speaking, 
taking Badiou’s set-theoretical theorization of ontological structure as describing ‘the way 
things are’ would elide the distinction that Badiou makes between ‘thesis about the world’ and 
‘discourse of being-qua-being’. What arises, then, is an ambiguity concerning what to do with 
the concepts elaborated in Being and Event once one steps outside the system of rational 
immanence that Badiou’s theoretical discourse is, and into extraontological situations, such as 
the socio-historical situation wherein any actual political processes take place.  
For any transposition of the insights of ‘set-theoretical ontology’—this expression 
shall be used hereafter to refer to the entire system elaborated in Being and Event, with the 
                                                            
1 Alain Badiou, ‘Being and Appearance’, in Theoretical Writings, trans. by Alberto Toscano and Ray Brassier 
(London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 163–76 (p. 168). 
2 Burhanuddin Baki, Badiou’s Being and Event and the Mathematics of Set Theory (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 
pp. 24–25. 
3 Badiou acknowledges that set theory is neither the ‘most “interesting”’ nor ‘significant in the current state of 
mathematics’ as mathematics has already ‘followed its course well beyond it’ (Alain Badiou, Being and Event, 
trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 14.). To give a short answer as to the reason why Badiou 
opts for ZFC set theory: he sees it as having tackled the same problems with which philosophy has struggled in 
thinking being. 
4 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 8. 
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caveat mentioned above—to socio-historical situations to be legitimate, it needs to be 
established, minimally, that those extraontological situations are such that their being could 
be thought under the intricate architecture of being-qua-being conceived within Being and 
Event. It is precisely this linkage, which pertains to what could be called the quid juris question, 
proves difficult to conceive. This is a difficulty noted by both highly critical and more 
sympathetic readers. Peter Osborne observes that Badiou’s decision to sever ontology from 
‘all phenomenological relations to objects’ leaves him with ‘the awkward task of restoring the 
connection between his set-theoretical mathematical entities, philosophically received 
ontological concepts (like nature and history) and the world’.5 It is not clear whether there is 
a place for ‘ordinary ontic reality’ in the universe conceived under the set-theoretical universe 
of ‘multiples of multiples’. The problematic relationship, or lack thereof, between ontological 
and extraontological situations in Badiou’s speculative philosophy leads Ray Brassier to 
pronounce, after delivering a series of trenchant criticisms, that ‘[Badiou’s] philosophy simply 
stipulates an isomorphy between discourse and reality, logical consequences and material 
causes, thinking and being. Thinking is sufficient to change the world: such is the ultimate 
import of Badiou’s idealism’.6  
As the question of whether concepts of Badiou’s metaontology (metamathematical 
concepts) can be legitimately ‘applied’ in extraontological situations admits of no 
straightforward answer, delving into the corners of his philosophy that concerns politics calls 
for an interpretive choice apropos the weight placed on set-theoretical ontology. In the 
introduction to Badiou and Politics, Bruno Bosteels remarks that ‘as soon as we exit the 
                                                            
5 Peter Osborne, ‘Neo-Classic: Alain Badiou’s Being and Event’, Radical Philosophy, 142 (2007), 19–29 (p. 24). 
6 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 113. 
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domain of strict ontology […] the role of mathematics becomes heuristic at best’.7 Bosteels 
writes: 
Metamathematical concepts are rigorously formal, and they hold true 
according to an intrinsic rationality only within the ontological situation; 
anywhere else, they are just helpful tools that by analogy, through a 
symptomatic reading of mathematical names […] or in a metaphorical 
transposition, may help us formalize situations that are not in and of 
themselves ontological in the strict sense.8 
The choice by Bosteels to regard set-theoretical ontology as ‘helpful tools’ or ‘heuristic’ for 
thinking transformative processes that must unfold in situations that are not strictly ontological 
is no doubt one—and perhaps the only—way to approach aspects of Badiou’s philosophy that 
pertain to politics, political events and political truth procedures. Although more sophisticated 
ways to understand the relationship between ontology and extraontological situations have 
been proposed by readers of Badiou, this thesis will avoid a direct engagement with this 
matter.9 Instead, it proceeds by assuming a certain interpretation of the following remark from 
Badiou: 
We have a concrete [i.e. extraontological] situation. We can think the 
ontological structure of that situation. […] It is very difficult sometimes, but 
we can. So we can think about infinite multiplicity, something about the 
natural multiplicity, something about the historical character of the situation, 
something about the evental site and so on. There is an ontological schema 
of the situation. With this schema we can understand the situation.10 
                                                            
7 Bruno Bosteels, Badiou and Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. xviii. 
8 Bosteels, p. 35. 
9  See, for example: Tzuchien Tho, ‘The Consistency of Inconsistency: Alain Badiou and the Limits of 
Mathematical Ontology’, Symposium, 12.2 (2008), 70–92. 
10 Alain Badiou, ‘Ontology and Politics: An Interview with Alain Badiou’, in Infinite Thought: Truth and the 




It shall be proposed that ‘thinking’ the ontological structure of a concrete situation is to assume 
a certain perspective from which the situation is analysed. What that situation concretely is, 
set-theoretical ontology is indifferent. Just as semiotics, as the viewpoint from which the 
totality of social life could be redescribed was made possible by the liberation of abstract 
system of formal rules governing the combination and substitution between elements from any 
particular substance that was still present in Saussure’s concept of sign (as the distinction 
between ‘conceptual mass’ and ‘acoustic substance’), the formalism of set-theory, its non-
reference to a particular object, is what allows it to be the basis of an ontology that is ‘perfectly 
general, nonspecific theory of what is, inasmuch as it is, and inasmuch as it is nothing in 
particular’ that is ‘as valid for nature as it is for culture’.11 
Subsequent sections of this chapter will outline how set-theoretical ontology could be 
interpreted as providing a way to understand social situations and social change. The aim of 
the first and second chapters taken together could be described as that of examining what set-
theoretical ontology allows to be said about social situations and social change, or the extent 
to which set-theoretical ontology is able to support a thought of far-reaching, extensive social 
change. The interpretation of set-theoretical ontology that will be offered in this chapter, as a 
schema by which social situations can be understood, is not something that is reached from a 
completely immanent point of departure, and it will bring presuppositions that are not 
Badiou’s. It is unavoidable that some preconceived idea of social situations condition the 
particular way in which the ontological schema is formulated, because any attempt to 
transpose the insights of Being and Event onto an extraontological domain will require 
postulations that allow for a ‘translation’ between ontology and concrete situations that are not 
inferable from the text. But if the admission of certain presuppositions in the translation 
                                                            
11 Patrice Maniglier, ‘The Structuralist Legacy’, in After Poststructuralism: Transitions and Transformations, ed. 
by Rosi Braidotti, The History of Continental Philosophy, 8 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 
VII, 55–81 (p. 69). 
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attempted in this thesis is nonetheless permissible, it is because—owing to the fact that there 
is no unproblematic means of transition from the ontological to the ontic—the insights of set-
theoretical ontology can be brought to bear on analyses of extraontological situations in more 
than one way. The theoretical innovations of Logics of Worlds, the sequel to Being and Event, 
will be left aside. Logics of Worlds opens the possibility of engaging with greater 
sophistication a number of questions and criticisms that can be advanced against Badiou’s 
prior works, including the question concerning the relations between situations (or ‘worlds’) 
that will, in fact, be pursued in this thesis. While it can be noted that its innovations may not 
ultimately resolve the kind of questions that will be posed in this thesis, and that the 
compatibility of set-theoretical ontology developed in Being and Event and ‘objective 
phenomenology’ developed in Logics of Worlds has not been unchallenged,12 there is, in the 
end, no philosophical justification for limiting the scope of this thesis largely to Being and 
Event. The choice to focus on a particular phase of Badiou’s thought is primarily motivated 
by aims of this thesis, namely, to examine the extent to which set-theoretical ontology supports 
the thought of social change and to explore the possible confluence of set-theoretical ontology 
with the Laclauian theory of hegemony, as well as the practical limitation that a detailed 
examination of both works is a task that would be difficult to fulfil.13 
 
1.2 Drawing an account of social situations from set-theoretical ontology 
1.2.1 Presentation, representation, void 
This section will outline some of the basic categories of set-theoretical ontology, with 
the aim of illustrating a social situation—one that is mundane and normalized, and in this 
                                                            
12 See: Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism. (London: Continuum, 2013), pp. 
xxiii–xxvi. 
13 Although the present thesis will not engage with Logics of Worlds, Colin Wright’s ambitious study of Jamaica’s 
anti-colonial revolt is worth noting for bringing the insights of Logics of Worlds in an analysis of actual historical 
sequences. See: Colin Wright, Badiou in Jamaica: The Politics of Conflict (Melbourne, Australia: re.press, 2013).   
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respect close to a ‘natural’ situation in Badiou’s typology of situations—based on those 
categories in section 1.2.2. In later sections of this chapter, the normalized social situation, 
which is essentially static, will be set into motion in accordance with the theory of event and 
post-evental change. 
That ‘the one is not’ an inaugural metaontological decision of Being and Event.14 
Badiou stipulates that whatever oneness—determinacy or objectivity—there is, it is a result of 
an ‘operation’ of what he calls ‘count-as-one’. If oneness is an operational result, not-one must 
be posited as anterior to the one-effect of the count-as-one. In Badiou’s theoretical approach, 
that which is posited as preceding oneness is called ‘inconsistency’. Inconsistency is sheer 
being, and it is called ‘multiplicity’ in as much as it is not one: ‘inconsistent multiple is 
solely—before the one-effect in which it is structured—an ungraspable horizon of being’.15 
The operation of count-as-one is an ordering into a minimal order of sheer inconsistent being, 
about which nothing can be said except that it must precede any determinate objectivity, 
difference, and order. The resultant of a count-as-one is termed ‘consistent multiplicity’ 
(which the ontological discourse inscribes with the strokes of { and }), or presentation. A 
situation is defined as ‘any presented multiplicity’, and Badiou proclaims that ‘[t]here is 
nothing apart from situations’.16 There does not appear to be an intrinsic distinction between 
a presentation and a situation. However, the present interpretation proposes that a semantic 
distinction between a situation and a presentation be introduced. The proposal implies a 
divergence from the strict definition of structure and the primitive status accorded to the 
relation of belonging in the discourse of being-qua-being, but this divergence is defensible 
when thinking about social situations, due to the fact that that every extraontological situation 
                                                            
14 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 23. 
15 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 34. 
16 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 25. 
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is doubly structured by presentation and representation—a point that will be elaborated later. 
To begin with Badiou’s remark: 
Granted the effectiveness of the presentation, a situation is the place of 
taking-place [le lieu de l’avoir-lieu], whatever the terms of the multiplicity 
in question. Every situation admits its own particular operator of the count-
as-one. This is the most general definition of a structure; it is what prescribes, 
for a presented multiple, the regime of its count-as-one. […] When anything 
is counted as one in a situation, all this means is that it belongs to the 
situation in the mode particular to the effects of the situation’s structure.17 
‘To exist’, Badiou says, is ‘to be an element of. There is no other possible predicate of 
existence as such’.18 And ‘being an “element”’, Badiou explains, ‘is not a status of being, an 
intrinsic quality, but the simple relation to-be-element-of, through which a multiplicity can be 
presented by another multiplicity’.19 If a situation is a ‘place of taking-place’, a kind of field 
of objectivity, then it shall be said that it is so in the following sense: a situation is an order—
that is, a multiple that has its own regime (or rules) for presentations therein. The particular 
regime of count-as-one is the structure of a situation that makes a situation extensionally 
different from other situations. To exist is to be presented in a situation, which is also to say 
that whatever that exists in a situation belongs therein as an element. Allow it to be said, then, 
that every presentation—every objectivity—is situated. 
Inconsistent multiplicity is not presented in a situation and therefore does not exist for 
the situation. But it cannot be the case that inconsistent multiplicity is simply non-being, given 
the philosophical stipulation that it is from inconsistency that any situation as a consistent 
                                                            
17 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 24. Every situation is ontologically infinite, because ‘[w]hat belongs to a multiple 
is always a multiple’. A situation is an infinite multiplicity of multiplicities. In the end, however, the decision to 
regard the being of a situation as infinite is an axiomatic decision. See: Badiou, ‘Ontology and Politics: An 
Interview with Alain Badiou’, p. 182. 
18 Alain Badiou and Peter Hallward, ‘Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou’, Angelaki, 3.3 
(1998), 113–33 (p. 130). 
19 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 45. 
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multiple must have arisen. In the structured presentation that a situation is, the inconsistent 
being from which it has emerged lingers as what Badiou describes as a ‘phantom remainder’. 
To phrase this in a Heideggerian manner: the occlusion of being—pure inconsistent 
multiplicity—in its disclosure as beings—consistent multiples, presentations, situations—
does not annihilate the former. Inconsistency subsists in the situation as unpresentable. Every 
situation, in so far as it admits into itself the inconsistency that it unpresents, is 
simultaneously—to borrow an expression employed by Roland Végső in his rendition of set-
theoretical ontology—a ‘failed presentation’. 20  This failure is not a failure to present 
something that could have otherwise been presented, but is a necessary and constitutive failure. 
In so far as a situation is always an operational result of count-as-one, no situation can be a 
situation without the subsistence of the inconsistency of which it is an operational result within 
itself. Because it is unpresented, inconsistency is nothing from the perspective of the 
situation—the ‘inhabitants’ of the situation do not register inconsistency. But its unpresentable 
subsistence in a structured presentation can be thought, and be inscribed in the discourse of 
ontology, not as inconsistency as such (as it precedes any ‘set-ness’), but as the letter ∅, the 
empty set. To this letter, Badiou confers the name ‘void’. The void thus designates the point 
through which a situation comes to be a particular situation—hence the void is said to be the 
‘suture’ of a situation to its being—but that which must be unpresented, thus count as nothing, 
for the consistency of the situation. A unique characteristic of the empty set allows the key 
implications of the void to be thought under the ontological discourse. The empty set is a set 
that is included in (that is, it is a subset of) any set, even if it is not an element of (that is, 
presented in) that set. This characteristic allows to capture in set-theoretical ontology the 
thought that although inconsistency is unpresented and excluded (or ‘subtracted’) from 
                                                            
20 Roland Végső, The Naked Communist: Cold War Modernism and the Politics of Popular Culture (New York: 
American Literatures Initiative, 2012), p. 21. 
30 
 
presentation (or situation), it is nonetheless ‘included’ as the underlying pure being of every 
presentation. Badiou writes, the ‘insistence of the void in-consists as de-localization’. 21 
Though it is never locatable in a situation because it is unpresented, the void of that situation 
is nevertheless dispersed everywhere in that situation. In extraontological situations, what the 
void is for a situation will depend on what the situation is, or of what it is a structured 
presentation. Apropos social situations, Rancière’s reflection on equality may serve as an 
example of the void—though it should be acknowledged that Rancière himself rejects any 
‘transcendentalization’ or ‘ontologization’ of equality, and calls his reflections on equality a 
mere ‘opinion’. According to Rancière, what is concealed by social distribution of places and 
functions is the simple equality of humanity qua beings with the capacity to speak rationally, 
on which, he argues, makes possible every social order and whatever hierarchical relations it 
imposes. Equality in this sense can be seen as the void of the social situation. It is universal in 
as much as it is empty, it is what remains when all the particular differentiating features of 
different individuals and groups are bracketed—as Badiou puts it,‘[t]he law of the void is in-
difference’.22 Closer to Badiou’s own vocabulary, the void of any social situation can be 
termed ‘generic humanity’, an infinite multiple that is not marked by any qualification other 
than being human. The void, in either case, is that from which any social order is woven, but 
simultaneously that which is subversive, thus must remain foreclosed from presentation if 
order—or the consistency of a social situation—is to be preserved.  
It had been mentioned earlier that every extraontological situation is doubly structured. 
One way to understand why Badiou proposes that a situation is structured again through a 
second count, a ‘count-of-the-count’, is to see the second count as an operation that makes the 
aforementioned ‘failure’ of presentation to continue to remain undisclosed, such that the 
                                                            
21 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 77. 
22 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 203. 
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situation may persist in its oneness, as a consistent multiple. The second count reduplicates 
the oneness of a situation by re-counting, firstly, the presented elements of the situation, thus 
affirming the initial count-as-one by which those, and only those, elements are situationally 
presented. Secondly, the second count counts all the ways in which presented elements of the 
situation could be arranged, thereby rendering the situation complete or whole, assuring that 
nothing more can be made out of the situation. The count-as-one is the operation of situation. 
But what maintains the consistency of the situation by keeping inconsistency unpresented, 
hence what accounts for the sustenance of a certain regime of count-as-one , is the second 
count, which is the operation of what is called the ‘state of a situation’.23 What comes to fore 
with the state is the structuring of a situation beyond the minimum that it, conceived simply 
as structured presentation, itself does not impose. For example, a plate on which there is a 
variety of fruits is a situation whose regime of count-as-one is such that its presented elements 
are fruits. But seeing that there is nothing apart from certain number of fruits on the plate and 
categorizing those fruits into different types of fruits call for additional work—it is this 
additional work that is performed by the state. What the state of the situation, itself conceived 
as a set, admits into itself is not the presented elements of the situation as such—which pertains 
to of what the situation is an order—but subsets (or ‘parts’) of the situation. For a situation S, 
its state is its power-set ℘(S). If S were a three-element set, {α, β, γ}, its subsets, in addition 
to ∅ (which is a subset of every set, thus universally included) and itself, would be the 
following: {α}, {β}, {γ}, {α, β}, {α, γ}, {β, γ}. Therefore, the set of all existing parts of S, 
℘(S), is: {∅, {α}, {β}, {γ}, {α, β}, {α, γ}, {β, γ}, {α, β, γ}}. About the element γ of the 
situation S, the following can be said: γ belong to S—this is to say that γ is counted-as-one in 
S; but γ is also included in S, in so far as it is re-counted by the state of the situation, which 
means: {γ} is an element of, hence belongs to, ℘(S). A multiple (an element) that both belongs 
                                                            
23 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 97. 
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to and is included in a situation is said to be both presented and represented in that situation. 
In Badiou’s typology, such a multiple is called ‘normal’. It will also be said that any multiple 
that belongs to the state of the situation is a representation. Already from the example of a 
three-element set, it can be observed that there are always more parts of a set than elements of 
that set. Set-theory teaches that the cardinality (number of elements of a set) of ℘(S) exceeds 
the cardinality of the initial set S, and immeasurably exceeds, in the case that the initial set is 
an infinite set. And as Badiou stipulates that every situation is indeed ‘ontologically infinite’,24 
the cardinality of the state of any situation immeasurably exceeds the situation of which it is 
the state. The excess of inclusion (representation) over belonging (presentation), however, 
leaves the door open for anarchy—if the number of possible arrangements of a situation is 
immeasurable, it defies the goal of the state, which is to render a situation complete. If the 
necessity of the state of the situation derives from the need to secure the consistency of the 
situation, it will need to police—the Rancièrian reference is suitable here—the excess of 
representation by imposing certain constraints on the ways in which a situation could be 
ordered. It could be said, then, that the space of representation needs a regime of 
representation—or a ‘law’, as Badiou might prefer—that ensures both that the void remain 
unpresented and the excess of representation over presentation be tamed. Let it be said, then, 
that every extraontological situation, in as much as it is an order and not chaos, is under the 
influence of a regime of representation unique to it that maintains the situation as it is.  
 
1.2.2 An illustration of a normalized social situation 
The task in this section is to illustrate how social situations could be understood in 
terms of the ontological categories outlined in the preceding section, as well as to define the 
                                                            
24 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. by Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2006), p. 143. 
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terms to which this thesis will continue to refer beyond the present chapter. There is no 
intrinsic definition of ‘social’ derivable from set-theoretical ontology. To proceed, then, a 
concrete situation that can reasonably be qualified as social must simply be selected. Although, 
strictly speaking, it does not matter how ‘large’ or ‘complex’ the situation is, for the purpose 
of exposition, let it be supposed that Indonesia is a social situation. This situation requires that 
there be at least one unique membership criterion which would ensure that it be a structured 
presentation extensionally different from other situations. There is at least one uniquely 
ascribable regime of count-as-one to the social situation chosen, such that it will be possible 
to say that whoever that belongs to the situation, in so far as he or she belongs, is an Indonesian 
citizen.  
An ‘inhabitant’ of the Indonesian situation would be placed in a situation where there 
are infinite number of multiples populated by other inhabitants of Indonesia (such as families, 
universities, baseball teams), which are themselves a multiple of multiples (a university, for 
example, will have classrooms, offices, and so on). The relationship between the social 
situation and the various multiples—which, figuratively, might be seen as ‘smaller’ social 
situations—encountered in the social situation, is that the latter are subsets, or parts, of the 
former. A baseball team, for example, would be a part of, or be included in, Indonesia if all 
the individuals that belong to the baseball team also happen to be Indonesian citizens, hence 
belong to the Indonesian situation as well. In this case, the baseball team, which in the typology 
of multiples is a ‘normal’ multiple, is a presented multiple that is also represented, and the 
same can be said of all its individual members. 
The arrangement of the parts of a situation is regulated by the state of the situation, in 
accordance with a particular regime of representation. Badiou’s usage of the word ‘state [état]’ 
alludes to the empirical state, but the terminological resemblance should not be taken too far. 
It is implausible to regard the Marxist projection of the withering away of the state as a social 
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institution to be an ontological impossibility—but it would be, if the state of a situation were 
simply the ontological schema of the empirical state. In his mathematically-oriented reading, 
Burhanuddin Baki suggests that the state should be seen as ‘Badiou’s version of the Lacanian 
symbolic’.25 The comparison not is unjustified: the particular arrangements of parts proceed 
through the deployment of an apparatus that Badiou calls the ‘language of the situation’—to 
be discussed below—that mediates presentation and representation. It might also be added that 
the goal of the state is to foreclose the situation’s ‘encounter with its own void, the 
presentational occurrence of inconsistency’26  through governing the relationship between 
presentation and representation in a particular way to produce an illusion of completeness or 
wholeness of the situation, and that in this respect, it is comparable also to the Lacanian 
imaginary, with the void, unnameable by the situation’s language and foreclosed from 
presentation, comparable to the Lacanian real. The state of the situation regulated by a regime 
of representation is the closest that the ontological discourse is able to offer as a schema for 
what may be called a ‘social imaginary’, understood as the set of representations of what the 
inhabitants of the situation can become, but whose actualization would not disrupt the 
situation’s apparent harmony in so far as they can be anticipated from how the situation already 
is. The significance of the second clause shall be further developed in the rest of this section.  
The primary sense given to the term ‘language’ by the ontological discourse is the 
‘language of the situation’—this, in the present interpretation, can be understood as the 
mechanism by which a regime of representation works to constrain the space of representation. 
The two operations constitutive of the language of the situation are ‘discernment’ and 
‘classification’. Discernment, Badiou explains, ‘concerns connection between language and 
presented or presentable realities’, whereas classification concerns ‘the connection between 
                                                            
25 Baki, p. 105. 
26 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 93. 
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the language and the parts of a situation, the multiples of multiples’.27 In the illustration of 
social situations, the mechanism of language may be understood as follows. As Badiou’s 
ontological discourse is extensional set theory, a property cannot be defined without prior 
existence of a multiple whose extension just is the extension of that property. Badiou regards 
as the materialist postulate of his ontology that ‘[b]eing is anterior to language’28—it is a 
prescription of set-theoretical ontology, ensconced in the axiom of separation, that ‘language 
cannot induce existence’ and that ‘a predicate only determines a multiple under the supposition 
that there is already a presented multiple’.29 This means, in turn, that the existence of at least 
one baseball team in the social situation guarantees an extension for the property of being a 
baseball player: it is simply all the individuals that belong to baseball teams. In so far as a 
property can be defined extensionally, that is, in so far as a property ‘discerns’ a multiple in 
the situation, it is legitimate to mobilize that property, along with other definable properties, 
to then predicatively define some other set. This allows all presented multiples and inhabitants 
of the situation to be defined in terms of certain set of properties—this is what Badiou is calling 
‘classification’. A regime of representation does not induce presentations, but names, defines, 
and classifies already presented multiples, and these determinations serve as the basis on 
which statements about the situation that can be verified as veridical or erroneous are made. 
Such statements, made possible with the language of the situation, are statements of 
‘knowledge’. An additional proposition shall be made in the present interpretation. 
Classifications might be based on gender, race, occupation, religion, and so on, but as every 
predicate in the language of the situation is liaised with presentation, every classification can 
be traced to whatever is already presented in the social situation, which, in the broadest sense, 
would be the material practices of human individuals. Multiples that are defined via the 
                                                            
27 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 328. 
28 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 501. 
29 Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 47, 34. 
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language of the situation, through operations of discernment and classification, are said to be 
‘constructible’. These multiples can be understood as providing the ontological schema of 
subject-positions or social identities (there is no theoretically salient distinction to be made 
between social identities and subject positions—objective social identities—in the set-
theoretical account of normalized social situations, as there are no subjects but only objects 
determined by the externally imposed counting operation in such situations). 
The state of the situation of the social situation, S, is its power-set ℘(S), which is an 
infinite multiple whose cardinality is greater than the cardinality of S. But, importantly, in so 
far as it has as its elements subsets of S that are definable using the language of the situation, 
the state of the situation will only contain multiples that can be discerned and named in the 
situation with its language, its discursive resource, namely, multiples that are constructible. 
Thus, although the number of ways of arranging the situation—the space of representation—
always exceeds, immeasurably, what is presented, it is possible for a specific regime of 
representation to keep the excess to a minimum by governing what enters into the space of 
representation. Badiou elaborates: 
It is […] this proximity that language builds between presentation and 
representation, which grounds the conviction that the state does not exceed 
the situation by too much, or that it remains commensurable. I term 
‘language of the situation’ the medium of this commensurability. Note that 
the language of the situation is subservient to presentation, in that it cannot 
cite any term, even in the general sense of ‘there exists…’, whose belonging 
to the presentation cannot be verified. In this manner, through the medium 
of language, yet without being reduced to the latter inclusion stays as close 
as possible to belonging.30 
                                                            
30 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 288. 
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Following the definitions that have been proposed earlier, it may now be said that the social 
imaginary of this regulated social situation is limited in the following sense: it does not go 
beyond what is already being said and done in the situation, in so far as the only kind of subset 
that it admits into itself always relates back to what is already being said and done in the 
situation. And from the stability of the situation, it can be inferred that its regime of 
representation is effective in providing the inhabitants of the situation an experience of their 
world as orderly and intelligible. 
To close this section with an anticipation of what is to come: if there is a subset that is 
absent in the state of the situation regulated by a regime of representation, it would be a non-
constructible subset of S. No predicate or combination of predicates of the language of that 
situation circumscribes such a subset. If the state of the situation regulated by a regime of 
representation is the schema of social imaginary, then that subset may be ineffable or even 
vaguely menacing to the inhabitants of the situation, who can, in any case, neither describe 
nor know what it really is. Such a subset is said to be an ‘indiscernible’ part of the situation. 
This part can, under certain conditions, be termed ‘generic’, which also denotes the being of 
what will be called a ‘truth’. The second half of Being and Event is an attempt to demonstrate 
that the supplementation of the situation with this generic multiple is capable of inducing the 
situation’s transformation. But something beyond imagination can only appear as an 
unpredictable, aleatory occurrence from the perspective of the situation. 
 
1.2.3 The absence of the subject and the atemporality of situation 
Having outlined in the previous section how a social situation might be conceived 
under the schema of set-theoretical ontology, it is necessary to discuss one issue prior to 
proceeding to outline Badiou’s theory of change. The rather ambiguous status of the concept 
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of anonymous ‘operation’ of counting by which presentations and representations result has 
been noted by several commentators. Jean-Toussaint Desanti, in what is one of the earliest 
substantive reviews of Being and Event, quotes Badiou’s declaration that ‘[w]hat has to be 
declared is that the one, which is not, solely exists as operation. In other words: there is no 
one, only the count-as-one’. But proceeds to write: ‘It seems clear to me that the project of a 
pure ontology (an intrinsic theory of being as being) would stumble here with its very first 
step, were one to ask oneself this “preliminary” question: what is it to operate? Who operates 
here and in what realm?’31 Eduardo Acotto, similarly, asks: ‘Badiou defines [count-as-one] as 
an operation. But who is, concretely, the operator? This is one of the mysteries of the 
philosophy of Badiou, and of its exclusion of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms from 
ontological discourse.’32 The question of the ‘counter’ in the operation of count-as-one—to 
which ‘transcendental subjectivity’ cannot be an acceptable response for Badiou—challenge 
Badiou’s philosophy (apart from demanding a more robust account of the transition from 
inconsistency to consistency) to account for the genetic question of how particular situations 
come to be. A question—to a rephrase a point made by Paul Livingston in another context—
that is also relevant, especially for thinking social situations, is that of to what particular social 
situations that result from regimes of counting-as-one owe their ‘force’ in persisting as they 
are. Although Livingston raises this point apropos the concept of ‘transcendentals’ elaborated 
in Logics of Worlds (in which an ‘objective phenomenology’ that accounts for how things 
appear is developed), the point that he raises applies equally for Being and Event (if only 
because the concept of transcendentals is partly designed to alleviate some of the mysteries of 
                                                            
31 Jean-Toussaint Desanti, ‘Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology of Alain Badiou’, in Think Again: Alain 
Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, ed. by Peter Hallward (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 59–66 (p. 60). The 
translation of the passage from Being and Event quoted by Desanti has been modified in accordance with the 
English translation of Being and Event: Badiou, Being and Event, p. 24. 
32 Edoardo Acotto, ‘Alain Badiou et l’ontologie du monde perdu’, in Écrits autour de la pensée d’Alain Badiou, 
ed. by Bruno Besana and Oliver Feltham (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2007), pp. 83–100 (p. 117). Quoted in: 
Adrian Johnston, Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism: The Outcome of Contemporary French Philosophy 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2013), p. 117. 
39 
 
the anonymous operation of count-as-one). The points is this: irrespective both of what Badiou 
intends to achieve philosophically (such as avoiding recourse to subjective or linguistic 
idealism), it is ‘very difficult to avoid the natural assumption’, at least apropos social situations, 
that what is operative in the persistence of their presentational and representational regimes 
ultimately alludes to ‘structures of linguistic or conventional practice, established and held in 
place by the behavioural regularities of a specific cultural or language community’.33 It may 
be conceded both that for set-theoretical ontology to be a general ontology, its account of 
structuration cannot be inextricably tied to any particular ‘counter’, and that a general ontology 
founded on set-theoretical axioms is able to consistently deny any intrinsic definition of what 
a situation is, thus refrain from providing a general condition for what ‘counts’ as a situation 
and why. Yet, questions such as ‘who does the counting’, ‘what is an operation’, and—to cite 
Terry Eagleton—‘[w]hat is to count as a situation, and who decides’,34 seem to be pertinent 
when one begins to consider the specificity of particular situations or types of situations. 
Although the problematic distance between situations in general and social situations will be 
examined in more detail in the next chapter, it must already be noted that apropos social 
situations, Badiou himself appears to be willing to allow linguistic and conventional social 
practices to be implicated in their presentational and representational structures—this is 
attested by several of Badiou’s own examples, one of which will be quoted later in this chapter. 
If, however, it is the case that operations of counting, at least in social situations, could be 
understood in terms of linguistic or conventional practices, then the conspicuous absence in 
the account of social situations depicted in the previous section of any sort of ‘agent’ or some 
                                                            
33 Paul M. Livingston, The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences of Formalism (New 
York: Routledge, 2014), p. 245. 
34 Terry Eagleton, ‘Alain Badiou’, in Figures of Dissent: Critical Essays on Fish, Spivak, Žižek and Others 
(London: Verso, 2003), pp. 246–53 (p. 252). 
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form of subjectivity that such practices, in the end, may need to presuppose appears to be a 
serious omission. 
The depiction of social situations as asubjective can be contrasted with accounts 
offered by theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek. In the entirely asubjective action 
of structure postulated by the discourse of set-theoretical ontology and the depiction of social 
situations based on it, there seems to be little room for the thought, important in Laclau’s 
approach, that there is a distinction between identification and identity that corresponds to the 
distinction between the moment of the subject and that of subject-position, instituting an order 
and an instituted order, or between the political and the social. In the set-theoretical account 
of social situations, it seems that human inhabitants are passively captive to anonymous 
operations of counting, hence relegated to the status of structurally determined objects. For 
Laclau, however, a structure cannot fully constitute itself and its ‘elements’ as objects. It is 
precisely this failure of ‘structural objectivity’ that opens the ‘space of the subject’.35 It is 
because social agents construct and identify with certain subject-positions as an attempt to 
overcome the failure of structure that a social order is configured and reconfigured in some 
particular way—in this picture, subjectivity is implicated in how a social situation is structured 
and restructured. But neither such ‘creative’ acts of identification nor what compels such acts 
has a place in the set-theoretical account.  
However, there is a rationale that can be offered from the Badiouian perspective for 
the absence of consideration of human agency in normalized (that is, pre-evental) social 
situations. One of the key objectives of Being and Event can be said to be the conceptual 
determination of processes by which ‘situations necessarily transform themselves to 
accommodate the existence of something that had not been acknowledged until that point’.36 
                                                            
35 Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990), p. 67. 
36 Sam Gillespie, The Mathematics of Novelty: Badiou’s Minimalist Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2008), p. 
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There is, in Badiou’s system, a distinction between two types of change, namely, between a 
change that occurs as an immanent development of the situation, which is regulated by the 
state, and a change that begins from the interruption of that development. The former kind of 
change is one that Badiou associates with the constructivist orientation, which has been 
adapted as the defining character of normalized situation in the illustration in section 1.2.2. In 
the constructivist orientation, ‘[w]hat is called “change” in a situation is nothing more than the 
constructive deployment of its parts. […] A new nomination takes the role of a new multiple, 
but such novelty is relative, since the multiple validated in this manner is always constructible 
on the basis of those that have been recognized’.37 To borrow a line from a theorist who has 
made a claims similar to Badiou’s apropos classical structuralism (termed ‘logicism’ in his 
text), Cornelius Castoriadis, the ‘change’ that occurs in normalized situation is ‘no more than 
a spreading out’ of the situation, such that what counts as ‘the new is, in every instance, 
constructed through identitary operations by means of what was already there’.38 Within the 
normalized situation, identification harbours no transformative potential regardless of the 
‘agent’ behind it, in so far as it merely unfolds in accordance with the situation’s 
representational regime. Attempts to produce ‘new’ identities or subject-positions are 
applications of the discursive resources of the situation—its language—to produce ‘new’ 
constructible multiples, without such productions composing a process that necessarily brings 
something new into the situation, in as much as they are redeployments of what is already 
presented in the situation and to what already is being said and done. This renders 
identification per se irrelevant for the theorization of change as the emergence of new, 
unanticipated possibilities in a situation.  
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37 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 290. 
38 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. by Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, MA: The 
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The spatial metaphor of ‘spreading out’ in the line from Castoriadis is appropriate as 
the kind of change that a normalized social situation undergoes, as it is a situation that is not 
exposed to something other than what it already is or what is anticipatable from within it. 
Normalization is the spatialization of temporality, and a normalized situation is one of stasis 
in which the synchronic prevails over the diachronic. Terminologies introduced in Logics of 
Worlds may be adopted to distinguish two types of change that may occur. Regulated novelties 
can be said to ‘modify’ the situation. Modification is to be distinguished from change proper 
that effects a ‘transformation’ of the situation. Constructivist in their orientation, the regime 
of representation and its discursive apparatus cannot be the source of novelty. They modify 
but do not transform a situation. Whatever ‘new’ identity defined with the situation’s language, 
it will already have been represented. In a normalized social situation, ‘everyone is included 
in advance’, as Rancière had aptly said apropos the policed distribution of social roles.39 There 
is no subject prior to an event in Badiou’s system because the subject is ‘the real presence of 
change in a situation, or the actual existence of the new’.40 For Badiou, subjectivation, the 
process by which a subject emerges in the situation, is subsequent to the interruption of a 
normalized situation in an ‘event’.  
 
1.3 The conditions of real transformation 
1.3.1 Complicating the account of social situations 
The situation depicted in 1.2.2 has been proposed as a model of a normalized, ‘natural’ 
situation, wherein its regime of representation has established a close proximity between 
presentation and representation. A ‘historical’ situation is defined by the existence of at least 
one non-empty multiple of the situation that is presented but not represented. In Badiou’s 
                                                            
39 Rancière, Disagreement, p. 116. 
40 Ed Pluth, Badiou: A Philosophy of the New (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), p. 118. 
43 
 
typology, such a multiple is called a ‘singular’ multiple. A historical situation, then, is 
characterized by a failure of representation—this characterization will need to be qualified 
further, but is nonetheless apt, because a historical situation, in the first instance, is a situation 
in which there is a multiple that is presented but not represented. To begin with what Badiou 
provides as an ‘image’ of a singular multiple: 
Here is an image (which in truth is merely approximate): a family of people 
is a presented multiple of the social situation (in the sense that they live 
together in the same apartment, or go on holiday together, etc.), and it is also 
a represented multiple, a part, in the sense that each of its members is 
registered by the registry office, possesses French nationality, and so on. If, 
however, one of the members of the family, physically tied to it, is not 
registered and remains clandestine, and due to this fact never goes out alone, 
or only in disguise, and so on, it can be said that this family, despite being 
presented, is not represented. It is thus singular. In fact, one of the members 
of the presented multiple that this family is, remains, himself, un-presented 
within the situation.41 
According to this ‘image’, Indonesia would possess a singular multiple if one of its presented 
multiples had as its member an individual who is not an Indonesian citizen. If a group of 
workers in a port, for example, had, amongst its members, several undocumented individuals, 
that group would be a singular multiple in Indonesia. The group of workers itself is presented 
in (belongs to) the Indonesian situation, but the group is not included in the situation, because 
some of its members do not belong to the situation. A set α is included in—i.e. a subset of—
set β if and only if all of the elements of α are also elements of β. Strictly speaking, then, the 
group is not represented. However, as Badiou claims that this is ‘merely approximate’ without 
hinting what a complete picture might be, it would be appropriate to consider how the category 
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of singular multiple could be understood in line with the illustration of social situations being 
offered in section 1.2.2, in a manner that is slightly more than a mere approximation.  
Badiou claims that what distinguishes historical situations from natural situations 
(under which falls situations such as a piece of rock, the Pacific Ocean, and the planet Mars) 
is the ‘omnipresence of singularity’ in the former and the ‘omnipresence of normality’ in the 
latter.42 This statement can be understood in a way that adds a twist to the illustration of social 
situations. Suppose that there is a group of individuals who are baseball players in Indonesia. 
That there is an extension for the identity of a baseball player implies that there be a situation 
of baseball. When one considers the situation of baseball, it seems plausible to hold that an 
individual who is presented in the situation of baseball according to its presentational and 
representational regime is not presented in his ‘entirety’—or as Badiou puts it, the ‘concrete 
infinity’ that he is—but as a being capable of playing baseball, because for the situation of 
baseball, whatever other qualities that the individual might possess do not count as ‘proper’ or 
relevant properties for membership. If this is right, it can be said that in the Indonesian 
situation, the social identity ‘baseball player’ is a representation of individuals as they are 
presented in the baseball situation—it is a representation of individuals in their capacity to 
play baseball. Other capacities or qualities of individual baseball players, therefore, are not 
represented—not re-counted—in their identity as baseball players. Following this line of 
thought, in social situations, wherein multiples that are both presented and represented are 
social identities always defined via particular set of predicates (capacities, qualifications, and 
so on), it seems reasonable to say that there is a pervasiveness of what might be termed 
‘underrepresentation’ or ‘misrepresentation’.43 In social situations, there is always something 
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that escapes representation, such as to render every representation—therefore social identity—
of an individual an underrepresentation. In the last instance, what escapes representation is the 
void of all social situations, the generic humanity as proposed by Badiou or perhaps empty 
equality in the quasi-Rancièrian sense, neither of which are presentable, hence indiscernible 
and unrepresentable, for, they are the unpresented latent inconsistency of any social situation. 
Even if this twist to the illustration of social situations is added, however, it must be said that 
from the perspective of the situation and its inhabitants, there should be no such thing as 
underrepresentation, because representation is without failure as long as all multiples 
presented for it have been re-counted. The registry office in Badiou’s example does not 
know—it does not ‘register’, one could say—that the family is not represented but—applying 
the term introduced above—underrepresented, in so far as it does not know that one of its 
members is undocumented. Granted that the situation remains stable, from the interiority of 
that situation, the space of representation appears saturated and gapless for its inhabitants, who 
do not register the distance between the omnipresence of singularity the omnipresence of 
normality. The presentation in the situation of something that is not already represented, it 
may be surmised, is the first sign of malfunction in the mechanism that preserves the situation 
as it is. 
Once a singular multiple has been characterized as underrepresented, it is possible to 
define another type of multiple that alludes to a radical failure of representation. This multiple 
is the ‘evental site’. Although Badiou qualifies that ‘strictly speaking, a site is only “evental” 
insofar as it is retroactively qualified as such by the occurrence of an event’, this detail may 
be set aside for the present exposition44—it needs only to be noted that the existence of an 
evental site is merely a necessary condition for an event, and it is always possible that no event 
actually occurs. An evental site—or simply, a ‘site’—is a type of multiple that is a totally 
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singular multiple: none of its elements belong to the situation despite the multiple itself being 
presented. It should be said about the elements that belong to the site that they are 
unrepresentable in the situation. According to the situation’s regime of representation, there is 
no element to be represented (or discerned and classified) in the evental site: ‘Just “beneath” 
[the evental site]—if we consider the multiple from which it is composed—there is nothing, 
because none of its terms are themselves counted-as-one’.45 As a presented multiple that 
appears from the perspective of the situation as containing nothing that needs to be represented, 
an evental site is said to be ‘on the edge’ of the situation’s void. It might be said that an evental 
site is a kind of localization of the situation’s void. The void of an ontic situation is not an 
ontological void—as Adrian Johnston writes, ‘the void lurking within the evental site, 
haunting the re/presentational structures of the situation and its corresponding state, isn’t an 
absolute void à la the non-specific nothing or negativity of non-being per se’.46 Rather, each 
extraontological situation has its own ‘specific’ void. What is denoted by ‘void’ in 
extraontological situations is a ‘structural’ position, a position that is retroactively generated 
as that which is not counted-as-one and sustained as such, by the operation of count-as-one 
and the statist operation of representation that reduplicates that initial count. For an 
extraontological situation, if there is something that belongs to its evental site, it occupies 
‘level’ of the situation’s void—this is to say that whatever elements that belong to the evental 
site, from the perspective of that particular situation, count as nothing. Badiou claim that the 
sans-papiers compose an evental site for the French situation. It is not unreasonable to ask in 
what sense, in social situations, a concrete individual could count as ‘nothing’. This is a 
question that is easier to answer in ontological terms: no element of the evental site belongs to 
the situation, which is to say that the evental site shares nothing in common with the situation. 
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But a slightly more detail seems to be in need when discussing concrete social situations, if 
only for the fact that elements of the evental site called ‘sans-papiers’ are, like those who 
belong to the French situation, human individuals. The sense of ‘nothing’ might be understood 
by appropriating a point from Rancière: the regime of representation does not count the 
capacity for speech and thought as a proper property in the distribution of social roles.47 
Suppose that there is a group of people who compose a situation’s evental site. The sole 
‘property’—which, as will be seen, is not a property for the situation, hence the quotations—
these ‘inhabitants’ of the evental site possess, qua their being human, would be that of being 
capable of speech and thought. And this is a ‘property’ that every human individual in the 
social situation has in common (the same point can be made using ‘generic humanity’). But 
the inhabitants of the evental site are not counted-as-one for the situation whose regime of 
count-as-one, its membership criterion, is not ‘individuals with capacity for speech and 
thought’, but those that possess further qualifications for membership in the situation—
citizenship, the capacity to play football, and so on. The only ‘property’ the inhabitants of an 
evental site possesses is a non-property for the situation. Since the representational regime of 
the situation re-counts multiples that are already presented in the situation, the capacity for 
speech and thought cannot be the basis on which multiples are defined or constructed in the 
situation—in the construction of identities within the situation, that capacity is irrelevant. 
Given the references to aspects of Rancière’s thought through which several Badiouian 
concepts have been illustrated, it might appear that the Badiouian concept of evental site and 
what Rancière has called the ‘part of those without a part [la part des sans-part]’ are rather 
similar. Setting aside other details of Rancière’s thought, the distinction between those 
individuals composing an evental site and the part of those without a part may seem to be a 
terminological one: in Badiouian terms, the those composing an evental site do not yet 
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constitute a part—a subset—of the situation, provided that a part is taken to imply a 
relationship to the whole, which is established with reference to the state of the situation (via 
the language of the situation) that has been proposed as the ontological schema for the space 
of representation. This is because if whatever elements that compose an evental site, in as 
much as they do not count-as-one, is not underrepresented but radically unrepresentable, then 
there is no relation between the elements that belong to the evental site and the situation that 
would be discernible by the situation’s regime of representation. Although an evental site, as 
it itself belongs to the situation (hence is an element of the situation), must have some kind of 
presence in the situation, and recognizable to the inhabitants of the situation, it would be 
present only as a name that refers to no one in particular. ‘Commies’ in a right-wing autocracy 
or ‘Jew’ in an anti-Semitic society are not identities: they are merely placeholder names for 
those who are excluded from their respective situations. The seemingly minor point about the 
non-relationality between whatever elements that compose an evental site and the situation, 
however, accounts for the need, in the theoretical architecture of Being and Event, of the 
concept of event. In the statement that an evental site is the ‘point’ from which ‘[e]very radical 
transformational action originates’,48 this origination is a passage from unrepresentable to 
some possibility of representation that logically must precede the initiation of any process 
whose ultimate endpoint will be the representation of what would have remained radically 
unrepresentable had the situation and its regime of representation remained the same. If, for 
Rancière, ‘political subjectivation’ is this passage, Badiou seeks to conceptualize the passage 
differently, so as to leave subjectivation as a process that is subsequent to the passage. He does 
so through the formulation of an event as a moment of ‘direct’ presentation—a self-
presentation, as will be suggested—of what is nothing for the situation that is required because 
the passage between the unrepresentable to the representable cannot be induced by the 
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situation’s prevailing regimes of counting, in which case the passage would be an immanent 
development in the situation. If there is no natural passage between the former and the latter, 
an event is the short circuit at which this impossible passage occurs. 
 
1.3.2 Event and intervention 
Badiou has remarked that his ‘fundamental question is a very simple one: What exactly 
is something new? What is novelty? What is creation?’ The order in which he proceeded, he 
explains, is not from an abstract thought of being qua being, or of truths, but rather, from ‘a 
living experience of what is something absolutely new and a vivid experience of when 
something happens. […] And I first experienced this point in my life and only after had to 
create the concepts to justify and clarify this point’.49 In spite of all its intricacy, set-theoretical 
ontology by which the order of being—situations and states—is thought is something of a 
propaedeutic to addressing matters that are of genuine interest to Badiou. 
An event is that point from which the possibility of genuine change and novelty—that 
is, transformation, as opposed to modification—in a situation transpires. Badiou proclaims 
that an event is ‘that-which-is-not-being-qua-being’.50 That an ‘event’ is not part of the order 
of being, or of existence, in itself, is neither an unfamiliar nor a particularly mysterious 
proposition (Peter Hacker had remarked once that ‘the “being” of events is to take place, 
happen, occur—but not to “exist”51). Although the event itself is beyond ontology’s grasp, 
because an event must realize any consequences that it may have acquired the opportunity to 
realize in the order of being, the theorization of its consequences—around key concepts of 
‘truth’, ‘subject’, ‘fidelity’, and ‘forcing’—will need to find a way to be accommodated by the 
                                                            
49 Alain Badiou and Simon Critchley, ‘Ours Is Not a Terrible Situation’, Philosophy Today, 51.3 (2007), 357–65 
(pp. 361–62). 
50 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 184. 
51 P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Events and Objects in Space and Time’, Mind, 91.361 (1982), 1–19 (p. 3). 
50 
 
ontological discourse. It will nevertheless remain the case that whatever ontological categories 
that are employed in the theorization of post-evental processes of transformation can neither 
be intrinsically connected to the occurrence of an event, nor express everything of what a truth 
as an active process and the subject that is carried by it are, except the fact of their being 
special kinds of multiples.  
What is involved in an event can be summarized in three broad points. First, a process 
of change that brings something new into the situation begins from a point that escapes 
determinations of the state that pertains to the representation of what is already presented in 
accordance with the prevailing regime of count-as-one, which the state itself holds in place. 
In line with the interpretation offered so far, this is also to say that the new, in its emergence, 
cannot be a social identity that is, as it is defined via situation’s language, both presentable 
and representable under the prevailing presentational and representational regime. As a 
condition of possibility of an event, there needs to be a locale of radical unrepresentability 
within the situation, namely, an evental site. Second, that which is radically unrepresentable 
has a chance of gaining a presence in the situation, hence introduce the minimal condition of 
the possibility to disrupting the situation’s prevailing presentational and representational 
regimes, through a moment of ‘direct’ presentation: an event. The actual occurrence of an 
event, Badiou holds, is entirely a matter of unexplainable chance. Third, an event occasions 
those in the situation and affected by it to resolutely decide that it has occurred. In Being and 
Event, the decision in favour of an event is understood as an ‘intervention’ by which an event 
is recognized and a name is pinned onto it. For that which can only occur cannot exist, the 
‘being’ of an event is to vanish. What is left by an event, in so far as it has been recognized as 
having occurred, is merely a new signifier that is its name. It circulates in the situation as a 
name whose referent is unknown. A full exploration of the ‘grammar’ of event, be it the 
original formulation of Being and Event or the modified one of Logics of Worlds, shall not be 
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pursued in this thesis. The exposition below traces neither formulations that Badiou has 
offered exactly (specifically, it will simplify the account of intervention and the somewhat 
obscure idea of ‘evental recurrence’, which his tied to intervention, shall be left aside), but it 
should nonetheless be adequate for the purposes of this thesis.52 
The ‘matheme’ of the event, which expresses the purely formal aspect of an event as a 
multiple, is written as follows: ex = {x ∈ X, ex}. The matheme reads: an event ex of the site X 
is a multiple such that it is composed of, on the one hand, elements of the site, and on the other 
hand, itself. An event assumes the form of a multiple that is prohibited by ontology, namely, 
a set that has itself as an element. This formalization of an event is intended to capture, in 
addition to its exceptionality, its reflexive (that is, self-referential, self-predicating, or 
‘impredicative’) nature. Although all the elements of the site have to be counted-as-one if they 
are to be presented, in so far as the elements of the site are not presented for the situation, the 
counting-as-one of the elements of the site can only be achieved in the violation of the 
prevailing presentational and representational regime of the situation. An event presents the 
elements of its site—but if it does so by presenting these elements as one multiple, the event 
itself cannot be an element of the site. It must be said that an event, neither identical to its site 
nor an element of it, presents itself through the presentation of its site. As Badiou puts it: an 
event ‘“mobilizes” the elements of its site’—which are elements that the situation has hitherto 
not counted as one—and in addition, ‘adds its own presentation to the mix’.53 An event is self-
presenting and is not a subset of the situation, since it presents unpresented elements, namely, 
the elements of its site. Hence, an event is neither an internal development of the structure—
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the presentational count-as-one—nor a product of the statist regime of representation. 
However, despite this disjuncture between the situation and the event, in so far as the event 
occurs at a site that is a presented multiple of the situation, an event is not an intrusion of 
something external to a situation.  
In concrete social situations, the self-presenting (or reflexive) form of an event might 
be considered from two sides, from the ‘interiority’ of the evental site and from the perspective 
of the situation. To begin with an example Badiou offers: the event of the French Revolution, 
in so far as it is an event, ‘forms a one out of everything which makes up its site’, such as 
individuals, facts, deeds that one could list as having been present in France between 1789 and 
1794. However, merely listing all the facts cannot determine that they actually compose the 
event of the French Revolution, and runs the risk, Badiou claims, of ‘undoing’ the event ‘to 
the point of being no more than the forever infinite numbering of the gestures, things and 
words that co-existed with it’.54 Badiou explains that 
[t]he halting point [point d’arrêt] for this dissemination is the mode in which 
the Revolution is a central term of the Revolution itself; that is, the manner 
in which the conscience of the times—and the retroactive intervention of our 
own—filters the entire site through the one of its evental qualification. […] 
Of the French Revolution as event it must be said that it both presents the 
infinite multiple of the sequence of facts […], and, moreover, that it presents 
itself as an immanent résumé and one-mark of its own multiple. […] The 
event is thus clearly the multiple which both presents its entire site, and, by 
means of the pure signifier of itself immanent to its own multiple, manages 
to present the presentation itself, that is, the one of the infinite multiple that 
it is.55 
                                                            
54 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 180. 
55 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 180. 
53 
 
It seems that Badiou’s illustration allows an event to be understood in a way that resembles 
the Sartrean account of the emergence of group-in-fusion, or perhaps even the idea of class-
consciousness. In the case of French Revolution, the moment of the event’s self-presentation 
can be said to be the moment at which some part of the French population becomes ‘self-
aware’ of their participation in the Revolution. This seems consistent with the thought that an 
event presents itself through the ‘conscience of the times’. Perhaps a better example of self-
presentation is the publication of the following manifesto from the undocumented immigrant 
workers in France, the sans-papiers: 
We the Sans-Papiers of France, in signing this appeal, have decided to come 
out of the shadows. From now on, in spite of the dangers, it is not only our 
faces but also our names which will be known. We declare: Like all others 
without papers, we are people like everyone else. Most of us have been 
living among you for years […]. We demand papers so as that we are no 
longer suffer the humiliation of controls based on our skin, detentions, 
deportations, the break-up of our families, the constant fear.56 
Circulated few months after the highly publicized clash between the sans-papiers and the 
French police at the Church of Saint-Bernard, this manifesto is an exemplary case of self-
presentation. Those individuals who do not count-as-one in France and have been 
indiscernible (in the ‘shadows’) in the French situation and yet dispersed everywhere in it 
(‘living among you’) self-referentially designate themselves as ‘We the Sans-Papiers of 
France’, and enjoin the inhabitants of the French situation to count them, not as an indistinct 
name that names no one in particular, but as individuals (‘our names […] will be known’) that 
are ‘like everyone else’—capable of speech, thinking, political action. Because their self-
presentation is equivalent to the interruption of operations structuring the situation, the count-
as-one as well as that of representation whose remit is to prevent such an interruption, the 
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‘event’ of the sans-papiers is a presentation of something more than the empirical sum of 
individuals: the void of the situation.  
An event should be analysed from outside the interiority of its site and from the 
perspective of the situation. It must not be the case that an event be the sound of a tree falling 
in a forest that no one hears, because, strictly speaking, an event is only what it will have been 
after it unfolds its consequence in the situation. And the first consequence of an event, or rather, 
what constitutes an event as an event for the situation so that its consequences may unfold, is 
to recognize an event as having occurred in the situation. Badiou maintains that ‘if there exists 
an event, its belonging to the situation of its site is undecidable from the standpoint of the 
situation itself’.57 An evental site, as explained earlier, is a presented multiple and belongs to 
the situation. The situation may have a name for it—the ‘sans-papiers’ in France, for 
example—in so far as it is presented, despite the name being a name of the indiscernible, those 
that do not belong. It follows that even if an event presents the elements of its site, because 
whatever that belongs to the site is nothing for the situation in which the event occurs, the 
belonging of the event—as a multiple composed of the event itself and the elements of the 
site—to the situation cannot be established on the basis of its extension. This is to say that the 
belonging of an event cannot be decided from what would be from the perspective of the 
situation and its inhabitants on neutral or objective grounds: namely, knowledge, whose scope 
is conterminous with the situation’s regime of representation, which only represents what is 
presented in accordance with the initial regime of count-as-one. Even if the sans-papiers were 
to declare their presence in France, it could be deemed irrelevant and dismissed: they simply 
are not French. That they are ‘like everyone else’ does not establish their belonging, in as 
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much as the prevailing regime does not consider this as a sufficient qualification for 
membership in the situation. 
The two ways in which an event can be seen alludes to the two aspects of an event that 
makes the question of its belonging to the situation into a sort of a differend (although it might 
be observed that at a conceptual level, there is no genuine differend—in the Lyotardian 
sense—in Badiou’s system, since it stipulates that only from a decision in favour of an event 
does universality come to be).  On the one hand, an event is the presentation of what counts 
as nothing for the situation. On the other hand, an event is irreducible to what is counted as 
nothing in the situation, for it presents itself, in the momentary disruption of the situation’s 
regime of counting. Badiou maintains that an event ‘is never shared’—even though the truth 
whose production an event may initiate will be universal, ‘offered to all, or addressed to 
everyone’ 58 —because ‘its recognition as an event is simply at one with [a] political 
decision’. 59  Badiou calls ‘interpretive intervention’ the decision in favour of an event’s 
belonging to the situation.60 What an intervention recognizes is not the ‘meaning’ of an event 
in and of itself—there is, in fact, no such thing, for reasons that will be mentioned below. 
Rather, on the reading proposed here, what the decision on the belonging of an event to a 
situation ultimately affirms corresponds to the double aspects of the event itself, as the 
suspension of the situation’s regime of counting and as the presentation of elements that are 
indistinguishable from the situation’s void: firstly, that the regime that currently determines 
what count-as-one for the situation is not the only regime by which a situation can be made 
consistent, and secondly, through the invention of another way of discerning and classifying 
parts of the situation, that which had hitherto been considered as neither belonging to nor 
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included in the situation can be made to be included in the situation in as much they are 
presented. Neither propositions can be verified with existing knowledge, which makes 
intervention irreducibly a decision. Badiou writes that the ‘essence’ of intervention is that of 
attaching a signifier to the event as its name (recognizing an event and naming an event are 
inseparable—one can only name what one recognizes): 
The essence of the intervention consists—within the field opened up by 
interpretative hypothesis [that an event will have taken place in the situation], 
whose presented object is the site (a multiple on the edge of the void), and 
which concerns the ‘there is’ of an event—in naming this ‘there is’ and in 
unfolding the consequences of this nomination in the space of the situation 
to which the site belongs.61  
The meticulous workaround that is employed in Being and Event in order to avoid certain 
paradoxes involved in identifying an undecidability shall not be discussed here, but one point 
is worth mentioning. To ensure the status of intervention as a self-grounding, ‘illegitimate’, 
decision on the ‘there is’ of an event, Badiou stipulates that intervention has to ‘poeticize’: 
‘To name a supplement, a chance, an incalculable, one must draw from the void of sense, in 
default of established significations, to the peril of language’.62 The language of the situation 
is unable to name an event as an event—the conventional meanings of its predicative and its 
nominative resources will dissipate the singularity of an event. Thus, Badiou suggests that the 
interventional nomination of an event requires an invention of a new name, the creation of a 
new signifier, whose application would not be explainable or legitimated by the situation’s 
language. Why this must be the case can be understood from a practical standpoint. If there 
were rules for recognizing, for example, love, the passage from listing of facts—that is, the 
list of things that have happened between two persons—and the declaration of love would not 
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require a decision (as Sartre said: ‘One decides because one is ignorant; were one to know, the 
act of will would be redundant: the thing would be done automatically’63). Additionally, if the 
recognition of love appealed to existing knowledge about what ‘love’ means, then how one 
‘ought’ to behave as a lover would be a matter of knowing the rules—the ‘rituals’ of love—
as well. In this case, the ‘meaning’ of an event, in some sense, would be delivered over to 
knowledge before any of its consequences actually unfolded, and there would be no need ‘to 
invent a new way of being and acting in the situation’,64 which a response faithful to the 
exceptional singularity of an event would require. These considerations are reflected in 
Badiou’s account of the interventional nomination of an event. Peter Hallward writes that 
nomination consists in the  
creation of terms that, without referents in the situation as it stands, express 
elements that will have been presented in a new situation to come […]. The 
names “Proletariat, “Christian,” and “Revolutionary” are terms that incant 
their eventual referents, insofar as Proletariat is not the working class, 
Christian is not a particular kind of Jew or Roman, and Revolutionary is not 
merely an advocate for the Third Estate.65 
An event has been declared to have occurred and have been ‘inscribed by a singular naming’ 
that introduces to the situation ‘an additional signifier’.66 But ‘the consequences of an event 
[still] cannot be discerned as such’,67 for the event belongs to the situation only as a name that 
does not possess an extensional referent in the situation, thus as a signifier that is semantically 
empty. If the name of an event is to be more than an empty name, nomination must be followed 
by ‘subjectivation’. Subjectivation, which makes it possible for an event to be consequential 
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in the situation, is described as the emergence of ‘a special count, distinct from the count-as-
one which orders presentation, just as it is from the state’s reduplication’. 68  What 
subjectivation counts is the elements that are ‘connected’ to an event, whose name has been 
introduced to the situation by intervention. The operator of this count is called ‘fidelity’, which 
can be described, at this point of exposition, as a prolonged re-examination of the situation in 
the aftermath of an event, which investigates, from the perspective that has decided positively 
on the event’s belonging to the situation, what will have been presented in the situation as the 
consequence of the event having occurred. A truth comes to be through a fidelity to an event—
with its etymological connections to troth and the German treu, the English word ‘truth’ 
proves to be an apt translation. A declaration of love, as a singular instance, is nothing but 
what it will have been, and what it meant can only be known if the persons involved were to 
continue to draw out the implications of their declaration. Neither an event itself, which is but 
a momentary interruption that reveals the situation’s void, nor its name, which has been 
introduced to signify the interruption as having taken place, predetermines the consequences 
of an event—this is also to say that there is nothing in the event itself that guarantees that its 
consequences will have been a truth, and everything hereafter depends tracing ‘the effects on 
the situation of this bringing into play of an “additional-name [i.e. name of the event]”’ to 
‘weave a generic procedure’.69 The ‘entire effort’, Badiou maintains, consists ‘in following 
the event’s consequences, not in glorifying its occurrence’.70 
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1.4 Processes of post-evental transformation 
1.4.1 Faithful re-examination of the situation 
Sartre sought in the irreducibility of human freedom the possibility of the dissolution 
of seriality. The Critique falters, when, partly due to the ambiguous outcome of its notion of 
totalization of history, it makes it difficult to elaborate the specificity of a process that must 
be presupposed for the praxis of a fused-group to lead to a kind of transformation that is in 
some sense distinct from whatever transformations achieved in more banal types of praxes. 
The theoretical task Badiou undertakes to support his political vision is demonstrating how a 
process carried by an egalitarian maxim is a process that is conceptually distinguishable as a 
process of transformation rather than of modification. Given that the regulatory regime of 
representation has been disqualified as even a potential source of novelty in the situation, the 
potential for transformation must lie elsewhere. This is the point at which the dimension of 
something that exceeds the determinations of the representational regime that governs the 
situation enters the Badiouian discourse. This excessive dimension—what Badiou calls a 
‘truth’—is not something comes from outside the situation. Rather, it is ‘an indiscernible part 
of a situation’,71 a part of the situation that is ‘unnameable by the resources of the language of 
the situation alone’, a part that is ‘subtracted’ from the space of representation by having ‘not 
been already-counted’ by the regulatory regime that shapes it, ‘nor will be, if as long as it 
remains in the same state’.72  Earlier, it has been mentioned that a multiple can be qualified as 
‘generic’ if that multiple cannot be circumscribed by the language of the situation, thus absent 
in the situation’s state, the space of representation. In other words, a truth, in its being (as a 
multiple), is thinkable within the ontological discourse as a generic subset, which is 
indiscernible in as much as it is non-constructible, hence does not belong to the state of the 
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situation schematized as a power-set ℘(S) of the situation S. The generic subset, as it is non-
constructible, is an exception to all possible identities in the situation, for identities, as 
suggested previously, are to be thought as constructible multiples. Badiou speaks of the 
‘subtractive excess of the generic’73—excessive because it is absent from the horizon of 
possibilities the state of the situation delimits, and exceeds whatever that can be anticipated 
from within the situation. In a truth, existing classifications are annulled (as in Saint Paul’s 
proclamation: ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither 
male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.’ (Gal 3:28)). It must be emphasized that to 
say that a truth is an indiscernible part of the situation does imply that it pre-exists its 
production. Badiou maintains that ‘[e]very truth is post-eventful. In particular, there is no 
“structural” or objective truth’.74 Neither an event nor the void that it revealed thereby is itself 
a truth, though, as it will be seen, a truth will be constructed by re-examining the situation 
from the standpoint of its void. Though a truth, in its being, is thinkable as an indiscernible 
generic part, how a truth realizes itself, or what ‘will have been presented’ in the course of its 
active production in the situation depends the protracted labour of those who have decided 
positively on belonging to the situation of an event and have begun to draw outs its 
implications. ‘Truth’, Badiou writes, ‘is a process, and not an illumination’.75 
Badiou theorizes the process of producing a truth in a situation in terms operations of 
fidelity and forcing. Fidelity concerns the construction of the generic multiple, which Badiou 
understands to be the being of a truth in whose production the subject that has affirmed an 
event engages. Forcing—to which Badiou refers as the ‘law of the subject’—provides the 
formal scheme of the process by which a truth is incrementally introduced to a situation. The 
operations of fidelity and forcing are analytically separable but united in concrete practice, for 
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they denote aspects of the singular process of the production of something new in a situation. 
This process can be termed a ‘truth procedure [procédure de vérité]’, a ‘truth process 
[processus de vérité]’, or a ‘generic procedure’. A ‘truth’ is the result of this process. 
Badiou defines fidelity as a set of procedures that ‘discern, in a situation, multiples 
whose existence depends upon the introduction into circulation (under the supernumerary 
name conferred by an intervention) of an evental multiple’.76 What fidelity attempts to discern 
from the situation is the possible referents that a name of the event (‘Proletariat’, ‘Christian’, 
‘Revolutionary’, and so on) may come to have in the future, which is tantamount to 
investigating the consequences of an event. In practice, fidelity requires ‘the subject to invent 
a new way of being and acting in the situation’,77 a way of being and acting that is sustained 
by a ‘belief’ or ‘confidence’ that fidelity to an event will not have been in vain, or that ‘there 
is something lying beneath, or something at work in the situation, something that remains to 
be discovered through a constructive practice. In short, there is unknown consistency, there is 
a way of doing things […] that works, but that remains foreign to our imagination’.78 Fidelity 
thus attempts to examine the consistency of a situation in relation to those elements that could 
not have been discerned or counted-as-one as belonging to the situation under the 
presentational and representational regime prior to an event. Although the way in which 
fidelity is concretely practiced is a matter of creative invention following a particular event 
from whose recognition it emerges, the general account of fidelity can be offered. Each step 
of a fidelity procedure is termed—Badiou adopts a Maoist vocabulary here—an ‘enquiry’. An 
enquiry determines whether there is a ‘positive connection’ or ‘negative connection’ between 
the event and an element that it ‘encounters’—meaning that an enquiry is driven by chance 
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and cannot anticipate its result—in the situation (Hallward explains that ‘negative connection 
means that the element investigated remains indifferent to the event, unaffected by or hostile 
to its consequences’, where as a positive connection ‘might amount to a conversion, a 
commitment, a renewal, a successful experiment’79).80 Fidelity, like the operations of the state 
(language and knowledge), consists of discernment and classification: each enquiry is an 
encounter with some element of the situation, which is analogous to discernment; and each 
element encountered is classified according to its relation to the event, dividing the situation 
into elements that are affected by an event, hence positively connected, and the elements that 
are not, which are negatively connected to the event.  
The path from an event to the emergence of a fidelity procedure in a more concrete 
setting shall be illustrated with reference to Rancière’s fascinating rendition of the heterodox 
pedagogical practice of Joseph Jacotot. In 1815, Jacotot was faced with the predicament of 
having to teach Flemish students who did not speak French, without himself possessing any 
knowledge of Flemish: ‘There was thus no language in which he could teach them what they 
sought from him. Yet he wanted to respond to their wishes. To do so, the minimal link of 
a thing in common had to be established between himself and them.’ 81  Having to find a 
common ground, Jacotot hands his students a bilingual copy of Telemachus, and assigns the 
students to write a paper on the text in French—a task the students were able to accomplish. 
This unexpected success might be construed as an event in the situation of education, in so far 
as the individual students, beyond their particular differences, reveal that which had been 
foreclosed by the ‘stultifying’ presupposition of dominant pedagogical practices that students 
are of lesser intelligence than the teacher: that ‘all people are virtually capable of 
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understanding what others had done and understood’.82 It may be noted that these ‘students’—
taken collectively—is not a representation and not an identity. It is a multiple whose 
presentation could not have been anticipated within the educational situation, for is not 
constructible according to the regime of representation that governs the educational situation, 
and therefore is absent in the space of representation. Making a decision on the belonging of 
the event to the educational situation (hence deciding that what had occurred in the classroom 
is not an anomaly or some effect unrelated to education: mere coincidence, cheating, and so 
on), Jacotot becomes a faithful subject attempting to draw the consequences of this event. To 
be faithful to this event, Jacotot comes to conclude, the educational situation has to be 
approached with a presupposition that radically differs from the one that on which dominant 
pedagogical practices is based: the egalitarian supposition of the equality of intelligence. The 
assignment that students produced for him was now to be seen as the medium through which 
this egalitarian presupposition was ‘verified’ in one instance. For Jacotot, this meant that 
equality of intelligence could be verified elsewhere. There is the emergence of a fidelity as a 
process that delineates what could come to be in the situation of education through a series of 
enquiries whereby the egalitarian maxim is put into practice—in so doing, Jacotot examines 
the situation of education ‘from the bias of its void’.83 Whatever work that follows from an 
event must begin from a local point in the situation, ‘the environs’ of the evental site84—in the 
case of Jacotot, a Belgian classroom perhaps. But what had emerged in due course was 
something like a ‘community of equals’, those who are, collectively, the subject faithful to 
what might be called the ‘Jacotot-event’, that continued to investigate the possibilities of the 
egalitarian maxim—it is as if the evental site expands from a classroom into other corners of 
the educational situation. Each instance wherein equality of intelligence is verified with 
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someone would indicate that he or she is positively connected to the event, and fidelity is the 
continual enquiry into the multiples of the situation that can be connected to the Jacotot-event. 
Rancière maintains that there is no objective evidence based on which equality of intelligence 
could be asserted as a ‘fact’. Though Badiou concurs that equality is never the goal to be 
obtained but something that is declared (or axiomatically presupposed, as Rancière would put 
it), if Rancièrian and Badiouan thought part ways regarding the consequences of the 
declaration (or presupposition) of equality, it is because the latter nevertheless seeks to 
theorize the lasting transformative effects of the egalitarian declaration in the situation. 
Though the void as such may never become a presentation in the situation, a truth—of which 
the subject is a part—can be built or woven from the void as something that comes to be in 
the situation to generate lasting transformative effects of a vanished event. 
 
1.4.2 Truth and the conceptual determination of a process of change 
It is time to examine the contribution that Badiou’s theory of post-evental change 
makes with respect to conceptually securing what has been termed in the introduction to this 
thesis the ‘vertical’ axis of socially transformative process by establishing the distance 
between a situation and a situation that will have been transformed. The most important task 
here is to connect fidelity and truth. It is in this connection that fidelity—which could appear 
as practical voluntarism—becomes a conceptual determination of a process whose 
continuation is a condition for a situation to definitely transform.  
A fidelity procedure, Zachary Fraser writes, is ‘a truth procedure if the projected 
infinite subset of the situation consisting of all the elements positively connected to the event 
will have been generic’.85 The generic subset, which Badiou designates with the symbol ‘♀’, 
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is the being of a truth.86 To dwell on the story of Jacotot a little longer. Each instance of 
applying the maxim of equality of intelligence would have yielded a result. Suppose that there 
is a set of results that verify the equality of intelligence: it has been verified with a twelve-year 
old kid, a worker, and so on. Equality of intelligence is not how individuals are identified—
discerned and classified—in the pre-evental educational situation, wherein individuals are 
identified in terms of certain properties and qualifications (being ignorant and being 
knowledgeable) that support a hierarchical relationship between the knowing master and the 
ignorant pupil, which fidelity to the Jacotot-event defies. Because the practice of fidelity to 
the Jactot-event is strange or alien to the educational situation, the results collected through 
fidelity to the Jacotot-event would appear to be irrelevant or transgressive from the perspective 
of the educational situation as it currently stands. But to establish, conceptually, that a fidelity 
is a truth procedure, it is not enough to just rely on the fact that it is transgressive. As stated 
earlier, each step of a fidelity procedure, enquiry, involves discernment and classification. For 
this reason, fidelity ‘resembles’ the production knowledge.87 And because discernment and 
classification are the paradigmatic operations of the state, fidelity ‘can appear […] like a 
counter-state, or a sub-state.’88 But this resemblance is the beginning of a problem. The danger 
is that the operation of fidelity may not only resemble operations of the state, but render it 
conceptually identical to the state or regime of representation, even if it might still be 
suggested that fidelity is a ‘counter-state’ based on a different mode of discernment. However, 
if fidelity were to be just another state, it would result in the conceptual equivocation of truth 
and knowledge, which implies, in Badiou’s architecture, the equivocation between the new 
and the old. The fulfilment of the following requirement is critical for the separation of the 
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operation of fidelity and the operations of the state, in establishing the irreducibility of truth 
to knowledge, and specifying a distinctive process by which something new is necessarily 
introduced to the situation: the set of elements that are positively connected to an event must 
not be discernible and representable under the prevailing regime of representation; it must 
avoid circumscription by the situation’s language and its predicative resources. 
For a fidelity to be a truth procedure, the multiple that it constructs must be 
extensionally non-identical to any multiple that could be circumscribed by the situation’s 
language, with its resources of discernment and classification, which is to say that the multiple 
it produces must be a part of the situation that is indiscernible, and indeed, generic. The method 
of constructing a generic multiple is a variant of Cantor’s technique of diagonalization. From 
each property discerned in the situation, one element of that property is added to the generic 
multiple. Once an element from all discernible properties—a process that would continue ad 
infinitum since the situation itself and the predicates that are inscribed in the situation’s 
language are infinite in number—are collected in this way, the generic multiple would contain 
‘a little bit of everything’, and no discernible property would discern generic multiple itself. 
For instance, if the set takes as its elements twelve-year old kids and those who are not a 
twelve-year old kid, elderly women and those who are not elderly women, and repeats this 
procedure for every classification, the set will not coincide with any possible classification. 
The subset of the situation generated in this way is, as Badiou puts it, an ‘anonymous 
representative’ of the situation. As for the being of this generic multiple, one of the crucial 
passages of Being and Event should be quoted in length: 
What could this ‘one’ be which—subtracted from language and constituted 
from the point of the evental ultra-one—is indiscernible? Since this part has 
no particular expressible property, its entire being resides in this: it is a part, 
which is to say it is composed of multiples effectively presented in the 
situation, an indiscernible inclusion—and such, in short, is a truth—has no 
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other ‘property’ than that of referring to belonging. This part is anonymously 
that which has no other mark apart from arising from presentation, apart 
from being composed of terms which have nothing in common that could be 
remarked, save belonging to this situation; which, strictly speaking, is its 
being, qua being. But as for this ‘property’—being; quite simply—it is clear 
that it is shared by all the terms of the situation, and that it is coexistent with 
every part which groups together terms. Consequently, the indiscernible part, 
by definition, solely possesses the ‘properties’ of any part whatsoever. It is 
rightfully declared generic, because, if one wishes to qualify it, all one can 
say is that its elements are.89  
The infinitude of this subset that must not be circumscribed by any regime of representation 
is securable by its intrinsic openness to every term of the situation—so must a fidelity also be 
if it is to ‘fill’ the set such that it remains generic. A truth cannot be except as a certain 
‘indifference to differences’, as something that could be ‘offered to all, or addressed to 
everyone’.90 And it is because the being of a truth is generic that a truth is said to be universal 
and egalitarian, and the process of its production is a ‘process of universality’.91 However, 
because each step of fidelity, each enquiry (such as the verification of equality of intelligence 
in one instance), is finite, a truth, as such, will forever remain incomplete. It follows that 
although the determination of a truth in the ontological discourse as generic multiple resolves 
the theoretical problem of conceptually distinguishing truth from knowledge and operations 
of fidelity from statist operations, because fidelity will never have actually completed a generic 
multiple at any given moment in its course, the distinction between these couples cannot be 
established beyond that conceptual distinction—in principle, it is possible to circumscribe 
whichever set a fidelity procedure has constructed at any point in its actual temporal unfolding 
with a long, complex predicate. This implies—as Zachary Fraser had put it—that the 
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‘truthfulness of a procedure does not disclose itself in extensionally determinate evidence’, 
and that it is impossible ‘to decide, based on empirical evidence, whether any procedure is or 
is not generic’.92 The confirmation of truthfulness of a procedure would be possible only from 
a position from which a situation could be assessed sub specie aeternitatis, from the 
unreachable point when a truth has reached completion—this is a position that neither the 
inhabitants of the situation nor the faithful subject occupies. As a result, Fraser writes that the 
truthfulness of a procedure 
can be testified to only in the interiority of the sequence, with respect to its 
projected intension. […] Any declaration concerning the existence of a truth 
must […] always remain hypothetical and anticipatory, without the hope of 
sufficient evidence ever arriving. For as long as a procedure is conceived as 
a stepwise concatenation of discrete elements of a situation, it is clear that 
never will this procedure achieve historical completion.93  
It will remain unknown to the subject as well as any inhabitant of the situation whether a 
fidelity has so far composed or will have composed a truth. Thus, if the category of truth 
remains relevant for the theorization of change, its relevance lies not so much in its capacity 
to ‘inform’ practice by providing those faithful to an event some epistemic confirmation that 
they are ‘in the right’. Badiou writes that there is ‘no question of confirming or applying’ truths 
because they are ‘reality itself’. A truth is ‘something that exists in its active process’—such 
as in the ‘production of political novelties, political sequences, political revolutions, and so 
forth’.94 The significance of the concept of truth in thinking change is that it is the concept by 
which processes of modification and processes of real transformation can be distinguished. 
The ontological discourse can only hope to articulate the de jure conditions necessary to think 
the transformation of the situation as the supplementation of a truth whose being is an 
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indiscernible generic subset of the situation. In Being and Event, the demonstration that a 
transformation of the situation via a truth is thinkable is achieved through an expropriation of 
a mathematical technique called ‘forcing [forçage]’, recast as the ‘fundamental law of the 
subject’, or the ‘law of the future anterior’. The reasons for such designations shall come to 
light in the exposition of the notion, which begins by reflecting on the being of a truth as a 
completed generic subset. 
Considered in its hypothetical completion, a truth, in its ontological being, is identical 
to that which has been said to be the space of representation prior to the intervention of a 
regime of representation or ‘law’, namely, the unrestricted power-set whose cardinality is 
immeasurable. But if a truth is a representation, of which situation (or presentation) it is a 
representation, it can only be said that it is a representation of a situation that is to come. A 
question arises at this point: it is not immediately obvious what a truth should actually ‘contain’ 
as a representation of a situation that is to come, and indeed, how a situation that is 
supplemented or extended by a truth would differ from the situation prior to its 
supplementation. Although it is established that the generic subset, in its infinite totality, 
cannot be circumscribed by the predicates of the language of the situation, in so far as it is a 
multiple that is not empty, parts of it must, hypothetically, be nameable and predicable in some 
language, which may be other than that of the current language of the situation. It can also be 
supposed, if a transformed situation came to be, that its parts will have been made to belong 
to that situation. It should, therefore, be asked which predicates would be semantically fulfilled 
by virtue of having presented multiples as their extension after the supplementation of the 
initial situation by a truth. In his reading, Paul Livingston hints that a truth, an unrestricted 
power-set liberated from the constructivist restriction of the language of the situation, would 
be something like an ‘infinite reservoir of sense’, that is, ‘the whole totality of the possible 
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extension of any predicates (ranging over the members of the initial set) at all’.95 If what is 
meant by the language of the situation, at least in social situations, is the regulatory regime for 
the construction of multiples qua social identities within a situation, it may be possible to offer 
a somewhat different description of what is included in the generic subset as its parts, one that 
diverges from Badiou’s, but nonetheless is consistent with the reading that has been offered 
so far. It shall be said that the generic subset of a given situation is the possible extension of 
all social identities that could not have been constructed in the situation under its prevailing 
representational regime. On this interpretation, the eventual outcome of supplementing a 
situation with a truth will be a situation in which multiples that hitherto could not have been 
constructed can be constructed. Social identities, by definition, are representations, hence 
discernible or nameable parts of a situation. But under the interpretation proposed here, 
genuinely new identities can only be conceived as transpiring from a break from the prevailing 
regime of representation, a break that is pursued through the fidelity that discerns and groups 
together elements of the situation in previously unimaginable ways, without reference to the 
regime of representation that currently governs it. In the next section, it will be seen how 
‘forcing’ a truth introduces multiples that could not have bene constructed in the initial 
situation, such that they will have a chance to be representations when the situation and its 
corresponding state are transformed. 
 
1.4.3 The subject and the inscription of change 
‘Just as it cannot support the concept of truth (for the lack of the event)’, ontology, 
Badiou claims, cannot ‘formalize the concept of the subject. What it can do, however, is help 
think the type of being to which the fundamental law of the subject corresponds, which is to 
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say forcing’.96 This claim is tied to the fact that what Badiou seeks to offer in Being and Event 
is a de jure determination of a process of transformation. If human animals support a truth 
procedure as a material practice, ontology can think what these human animals must be and 
the effects that their activity has on the situation, on the order of being, in as much as they 
support a truth procedure. Forcing is set-theoretical ontology’s account of what might be 
described as the ‘inscription’ of a truth in a situation, S, such that what will have come to be 
is S(♀), that is, a situation extended (or supplemented) by a truth. Or to put it differently: the 
transformation of a situation into a new situation for which parts of the generic subset are 
representation of multiples that will be presentable and representable in that new situation.  
It is instructive to begin with the kind of concrete effect to which the idea of forcing 
alludes. Badiou describes one of the prominent observable effects of a truth as that of 
transforming ‘the codes of communication and […] the regime of opinions’ such that ‘they 
become other’. This means that ‘formerly obvious judgements are no longer defensible, that 
others become necessary’.97  A journalist reporting in 1865 on the exhibition of Manet’s 
Olympia writes that many viewers regarded the painting as an elaborate joke, the meaning of 
which they would understand if they looked closely enough. Others maintained that Olympia 
is a serious work of art. The journalist is led to conclude: ‘Very probably everyone is right to 
some extent, and such diverse opinions are authorized by the incredible irregularities of 
Monsieur Manet’s work. He has shown mere sketches. […] And what is his aim? His canvases 
are too unfinished for us possibly to tell.’98 The reactions to Olympia—of whether it is art or 
a joke, which are two incommensurable genres—has an undecidable status in the artistic 
situation. But if the bewildered reaction of Manet’s contemporaries comes across as rather 
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amusing today, it is because Olympia inspired a generation of artists and a body of artworks 
and came to occupy an indelible place in the history of art. In other words, the status of the 
appearance of Olympia as an artistic event was secured retroactively after its consequences 
had unfolded through the artistic practice of the subject—associated with figures such as 
Cézanne, Monet, and Renoir, and also the works of art they produced—that, in Badiouian 
terms, ‘forced’, in the situation of art, the veracity of the statement ‘impressionism is art’, thus 
inscribing in the situation’s knowledge a new piece of knowledge. Anton Webern remarks in 
his lectures on the innovation of atonalism that ‘in [Schoenberg’s] musical material new laws 
have come into force that have made is impossible to describe a piece as in one key or another. 
[…] Things have asserted themselves that made this “key” simply impossible’.99 In this case, 
it can be said that the atonal compositions force the veracity of the statement ‘music does not 
have to be written in one key or another’.  
Stated simply, forcing proceeds by selecting and adding a set of non-constructible 
multiples to the situation. The end result of the extension of the situation with non-
constructible multiples will be the expansion of the space of representation beyond the 
restrictions of the prevailing regime of representation. As a consequence of this expansion, 
previously indiscernible and non-constructible multiples will come to be discernible and 
constructible. As Brian Anthony Smith explains, the extension of the situation 
based on the newly chosen and affirmed addition to the situation does not 
occur all at once, nor is it ever fully completed. Mathematically it does 
happen all at once, based simply on it being possible, but within Badiou’s 
philosophy the procedure of extending a situation occurs slowly. The subject 
is both what produces this slow extension, and the extension itself; the 
subject is a finite portion of a truth procedure.100 
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For the subject placed in a concrete situation, the result of enquiries—that is, the faithful work 
of approaching the situation according to the event—provide some information based on 
which ‘hypotheses’ about the composition of the generic subset if it were to be complete could 
be formulated. If equality of intelligence has been verified with a child in one case of enquiry, 
then it can be hypothesized that the generic set will contain children; conversely, statement 
that it does not contain children is negated, since at least one child belongs. With these 
hypotheses, the subject composes a ‘fiction’ or ‘partial descriptions’ of a situation-to-come, 
wherein a truth will have supplemented the initial situation.101 The hypothetical statements 
that compose what Badiou calls a ‘subject-language’ employs names and predicates to define 
multiples that, in S, are not semantically fulfilled, but would be fulfilled in the situation-to-
come, in virtue of having their referents in the generic subset. From the ‘interiority’ of the 
faithful procedure, it 
sounds like this: ‘If I suppose that the indiscernible truth contains or presents 
such or such a term submitted to the enquiry by chance, then such a 
statement in the subject-language will have had such a meaning and will (or 
won’t) have been veridical.’ I say ‘will have been’ because the veracity in 
question is relative to that other situation, the situation to-come in which a 
truth of the first situation (an indiscernible part) will have been presented.102 
If, in the course of enquiry, it turns out that certain multiples are positively connected to the 
event, then it is legitimate to hypothesize that certain names and predicates are likely to have 
a referent in the generic subset. The content of the ‘fiction’ that the subject composes concerns 
that ‘configuration or partial property’ of the generic subset.103 As it retains the form of the 
predicative language of set theory as much as the language of the situation, subject-language 
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is not categorically distinct from language of the situation, except that the predicates 
composing the former would be without extension if the situation remains the same. As it had 
been proposed that what is contained in the generic subset are identities that are non-
constructible according to the representational regime of the situation as it stands, it can be 
said that in making hypothesis about the situation-to-come, the subject is defining certain 
identities that are extensionally ‘empty’, but only so that it ‘will have been filled if the truth 
comes to be as a new situation’.104 A situation is supplemented by a truth, by definition, if the 
extensional fulfilment of statements of subject-language is accomplished by the actual 
presentation in the situation of a part of the generic subset.  
The account of forcing leads to the definition of what ‘subject’ is, in its being (a 
multiple), in the Badiouian account of social transformation. Suppose that, in a situation, there 
is really a truth that is coming to be in a situation through the work of a faithful subject. One 
cannot call any multiple that is actually presented a ‘truth’, since a truth is by definition 
uncompleteable and never presented as such in its generic being, always retaining, in the 
situation for which it is its truth, the status of something that ‘will have been presented’. It is 
in fact none other than ‘subject’ that is Badiou’s term for the actually produced part of a truth, 
the part of it that has attained the chance to transform the situation. ‘Grasped in its being’, 
Badiou writes, ‘the subject is solely the finitude of the generic procedure, the local effects of 
an evental fidelity’—what the subject ‘“produces” is the truth itself’.105 To return for the last 
time to the story of Joseph Jacotot, the following can be said: the collective of ignorant masters 
emerging from the fidelity to an egalitarian maxim in the educational situation is the subject 
of the truth that transpires from the Jacotot-event. To the extent that the collective is the result 
of a truth procedure at a given moment somewhere in the situation, the subject is the ‘local 
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status of a procedure’. And in so far as what it is—a ‘community of equals’, as Rancière might 
put it—could neither have been anticipated nor constructed by the previous representational 
regimes or the language of the situation, it is ‘a configuration in excess of the situation’.106 
The following passage in Badiou’s exposition of his account of forcing and subject-language 
is relevant: 
A subject uses names to make hypotheses about the truth. But, given that it 
is itself a finite configuration of the generic procedure from which a truth 
results, one can also maintain that a subject uses names in order to make 
hypotheses about itself […]. Here, language (la langue) is the fixed order 
within which a finitude, subject to the condition of the infinity that it is 
realizing, practices the supposition of reference to-come. Language is the 
very being of truth via the combination of current finite enquiries and the 
future anterior of a generic infinity.107 
Metaphorically, the subject faithful to the event of Jacotot expands his classroom—the site of 
the event—to all corners of the educational situation. But this expansion is tantamount to the 
expansion of the subject itself: the more the subject re-examines the situation from the 
presupposition of equality of intelligence, the more it will have come to know about itself, in 
the most general sense that its very presence as a growing collective in the situation attests to 
what human animals, over and above their particularistic differences, are capable of when 
carried by an egalitarian maxim. If the situation and the state of that situation that governs the 
presentational and representational regime of the situation—and the suggestion that the state 
is the schema of social imaginary should be reiterated—were to finally accommodate the 
subject as belonging by the transformation of its structure, namely, its regime of count-as-one, 
a number of previously non-constructible, unrepresentable, multiples will have turned into 
constructible, hence representable, multiples, and previously unverifiable statements will have 
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become verifiable via knowledge. The trajectory that begins from an event to a transformed 
situation may be described as that of normalization of a truth. A truth is in the beginning a 
pure representation, an ‘anonymous excrescence’. It will ‘end up being normalized’ when the 
faithful subject ‘forces the situation to accommodate it’, such that a truth, partly realized in 
the situation as the subject, will ‘finally be recognized’ as a term that belongs to the 
situation.108 However, although a truth is thinkable in its hypothetical completion as a generic 
subset, and parts of it will come to be in the situation through the presentation of new multiples 
and their subsequent representation, in principle, a truth is infinite and its transformative 
potential is inexhaustible. Normalization of a truth would only be complete if a truth procedure 
itself came to an end.   
Berating Sartre’s denigration of ordinary reality as a situation in which nothing of 
significance occurs, Raymond Aron had argued that the primary purpose such ‘monstrous 
transfiguration of our everyday world’ serves is to depict the ‘banality of hell or hell of banality’ 
that stands in contrast with the ‘moment of perfection’, that is, to highlight the exceptionality 
of the ‘apocalyptic’ dissolution of seriality into a group-in-fusion.109 It would be easy to accuse 
Badiou of having replicated the Sartrean dichotomy that Aron had found implausible in 
sharply distinguishing the post-evental subject of truth from the human animal inhabiting a 
normalized, pre-evental situation. Such an accusation may not be without a dose of truth, but 
it should nonetheless be noted that Badiou’s point is not that the human animal is something 
that needs to be superseded by some ‘authentic’ subject. Badiou is not an aesthete and is 
thoroughly materialist on this point. As hinted in Ethics, Badiou holds that the animal 
capacities, interests, and desire for self-preservation must be mobilized in the pursuit of 
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truths.110 The thesis that is affirmed by the impossibility of a truth to be completed is none 
other than that once subjected to an event of a truth, what human animals are capable of 
bringing into being exceeds what they have hitherto brought into being. This is not surprising: 
one must concede that such things as generic humanity or equality of intelligence can never 
be made into a ‘state of affairs’. But that such things will always be the void of social situations 
is also what enables truth procedures that realize their effects to continue, in principle, without 
end. There is an optimism largely absent in Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason in Badiou’s 
conceptualization of a truth procedure: there is nothing intrinsic to it that suggests that the 
practico-inert is its inevitable destination. Thus, having departed from the derogatory 
designation of ‘human animal’ that had been accorded to the inhabitants of the pre-evental 
situation, Badiou at last arrives at a kind of defence of the human—not as animals, but as 
beings capable of supporting truths. ‘Truths—but of what?’ Badiou responds: ‘the truth of the 
fact that over and above their vital interests, human animals are capable of bringing into being 
justice, equality, and universality’.111  But if the production of truths—as the creation of 
equality and universality—is tantamount to social change, then one might ask how far the 
transformative effects of a truth can extend and whether the concept of truth procedure 
developed under set-theoretical ontology is able to support the thought of an extensive, far-
reaching, social change. These are the matters the next chapter hopes to investigate.
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Chapter 2. Ambiguities in the theory of evental change 
 
2.1 Two lines of criticism 
This chapter will investigate the ambiguities in the account of social change developed 
in the previous chapter on the basis of Being and Event. The central ambiguity arises because 
there are matters left untouched by set-theoretical ontology, which become relevant when the 
categories such as void, event, and truth are deployed in analyses of specific and concrete 
situations. That is, the issues that are raised in this chapter pertain to the problematic distance 
between set-theoretical ontology and social ontology, which persists because set-theoretical 
ontology—a perfectly general discourse of being, inasmuch as it is nothing in particular—
does not elaborate how a concrete situation come to be in its particularity, nor provide an 
account of how situations sustain themselves and interact with each other. One of the outcomes 
of this distance that is of particular interest for thinking social change is the ambiguity of the 
extent of transformative effects of truths, which, it will be suggested, may be limited in a way 
that renders the conceivability of far-reaching social change difficult. Before proceeding, two 
lines of criticism that have frequently been advanced against Badiou’s theorization of event 
(and fidelity) shall be discussed. The investigation in this chapter adopts the basic intuition of 
one of the lines. 
The Badiouian text frequently cites the Paris Commune and the October Revolution as 
political events. Although the relationship between philosophy and ‘real’ politics—which 
Badiou considers as one of the ‘conditions’ of philosophical thought, meaning that philosophy 
‘comes second’ and cannot, by itself, determine or dictate specific political action or 
imperatives—is more complex than that of philosophy passing judgments on historical 
sequences, simply accepting abovementioned historical events as exemplifying the Badiouian 
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concept of event is prone to covering over whatever theoretical ambiguities there may be 
present in the Badiouian theory of change with blinding spectacles in which any account of 
radical social change is likely to recognize itself. That events may be more common than 
Badiou recognizes is the point of departure for what might be called a ‘deflationary’ line of 
criticism. The observation from Peter Dews in his review of Being and Event succinctly 
expresses the general point of the deflationary line. Dews draws from the later Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on mental processes to illustrate the possibility that events may be mundane and trivial. 
One of the two instances of a mundane ‘event’ that Dews devises is that of expecting 
someone’s arrival: 
[T]here is no determinate set of thoughts and activities that can be said to be 
necessary and sufficient conditions of such expectation (and furthermore, 
activities which, in one context, are correctly taken as indicating expectation, 
may no longer have this meaning when transposed into a different 
context).  It seems, then, that we could say, applying Badiou's terminology, 
that the ‘event’ of expecting someone's arrival consists of the ‘evental site’ 
(an indeterminate range of thought and activity)—plus the event itself (ex = 
{x ∈ X, ex}).1  
The other theorist whose work will feature in this thesis and whose criticism of Badiou shall 
be examined in the next chapter, Ernesto Laclau, has questioned the exceptionality of events. 
Even while acknowledging that Badiou’s ontology is ‘complex’ and ‘in many ways 
fascinating’, Laclau alludes, like Dews, to Wittgenstein, but this time to the latter’s reflections 
on rule-following, to suggest that ‘it is wrong to think that we have purely situational periods 
interrupted by purely evental interventions’, proposing instead that ‘the contamination 
between the evental and the situational is the very fabric of social life’.2 Dews, similarly, is 
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led to wonder whether, given the way they are defined, events may be ‘far more pervasive 
than Badiou allows: indeed, that they are the very texture of the socio-historical world, of the 
domain which Hegel—for example—terms “Geist”’.3  
There is another line of thought that can be brought to a similar deflationary conclusion. 
For Donald Davidson, the problem with theoreticians who emphasize incommensurable 
‘conceptual schemes’ and ‘paradigms’ was that they tend to prioritize ‘issues of semantics—
the fact that various languages differ in their range of lexical or descriptive resources—over 
issues concerning the elements of logical structure that all languages must have in common in 
order to qualify as such’.4 And although the issue of ‘language as such’—langage, as distinct 
from langue, to put it succinctly—is not a significant factor in the present examination of 
Badiou’s system, in restricting the sense of ‘language’ to that of ‘language of situation’, the 
theoretical approach of Being and Event may have made itself vulnerable to another 
deflationary conclusion that events may not be exceptional. Again, it is a work in which 
Wittgenstein features heavily that provides the cue. In The Politics of Logic, Paul Livingston 
notes that restricting membership to the state of the situation to only constructible subsets of 
the situation, for Badiou, is supposed to ‘capture a restriction of discernibility to the 
predicative powers of the specific, existing “language of the situation” which cannot describe 
or even reference anything beyond this situation’. However, Livingston contends: 
whereas the sets of the constructible universe are limited to predicative 
definitions and predicatively definable terms (and it is in precisely this sense 
that they are supposed to ‘restrict existence’ by means of language), there is 
no reason to suppose that the representative powers of any actual, historical 
language are in fact limited in this way. In fact, every actual language is, 
very plausibly, strongly and essentially impredicative. This impredicativity 
is marked not only in the capacity all such languages have to ‘totalize’, to 
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talk of the ‘all’ and the ‘universe’, but also in their inherent capacity for self-
reference […].5  
Badiou distinguishes ‘subject-language’ and ‘language of the situation’, but this is irrelevant 
given that what is being asserted is the essential impredicativity of language as such. For there 
is no reason to suppose that subject-language would be categorically different from the 
language of the situation—subject-language is a predicative language just as much as the 
language of the situation, except that its referents are in a situation-to-come that will have been 
extended by a generic subset indiscernible given the situation’s regime of representation. 
However, if it is the case that the nominative and descriptive resources of language as such—
the one available to human beings, but not to the inhabitants of the set-theoretical universe—
exceed those of the predicative languages that Badiou employs in Being and Event, then the 
self-referential, reflexive form captured by the matheme of an event would neither be 
exceptional in human linguistic acts nor would could such acts in any plausible sense be 
deemed illegitimate or prohibited simply due to their form. 
Another common line of criticism advanced against Badiou’s theorization of events 
and truths might called the ‘practico-ethical’ line of criticism. This line of criticism is typified 
by arguments of the following sort: Badiou relies on an ethics wherein the ‘good’ is conceived 
as ‘nothing more than the subject’s consistent fidelity to the event’, thereby opening itself to 
an absolutism that is blind to consequences, as well as the voluntarism, no less reckless, of an 
existentialist ethics that exalts the ‘authenticity’ of commitment in the face of the unknown.6 
Even though the occasions for an interventional decision, namely, the event itself, cannot be 
induced at will, given the indeterminacy of the ‘meaning’ of an event, which depends almost 
entirely on an consequences of the event that only begin to surface after an essentially 
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ungrounded decision on its eventuality, the apparent ‘heteronomy’ of an event that calls the 
subject to resolutely decide, is, in the end, no more than a façade behind which lurks a deeply 
‘subjective’ determination of what fidelity to that event demands in terms of practical 
engagement in the situation. The following passage from the overview of Being and Event by 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle is the customary endpoint of the practico-ethical line of criticism: 
Since the event is, where I am situated, essentially unintelligible, how can I 
recognize an event, if not by an illumination, on the road to Damascus? 
Answering that an inquest is required for such recognition will not do: for 
the inquest will be held in the only terms I know, those of the encyclopaedia 
[i.e. knowledge] of the situation. This does not mean that Badiou’s system 
renders political action impossible; it does mean that it makes rational 
politics impossible. I sympathize with most of Badiou’s political choices 
[…]; but I can find hardly anything within his system to protect me from 
Heidegger’s mistake, when he took the National Socialist “revolution” for 
an event, and thought that a new process of truth had started. The risk is that 
the eventuality of the event will eventually be left to individual decision.7 
Yet, however plausible the assessments made from the practico-ethical line of criticism may 
be with respect to some of Badiou’s claims in Ethics, or elements of decisionism and 
voluntarism in Badiou’s thought, there is a danger in commencing a critique of Badiou’s 
theorization of change from the practico-ethical line as characterized above. For, it is not 
obvious whether the indeterminacies of a truth procedure (as a subjective practice), such as 
the inability to ground the principles guiding its construction in anything other than itself and 
the difficulty of predicting and evaluating its consequences constitute a real problem. As the 
opacity and indeterminacy of practice appear to be least objectionable in creative artistic 
practices, art shall serve to illustrate the point. Badiou’s own interventions in the domain of 
art need not be elaborated here, as the Kantian story exhibits enough similarities with the 
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general contours of Badiou’s account of truth procedure to serve as a reference. For Kant, a 
work of artistic genius is a work for which no set of rules for its creation can be articulated, 
not even by its creator, who, Kant claims, ‘does not himself know how the ideas for it come 
to him, and also does not have it in his power to think up such things […] and to communicate 
to others precepts that would put them in a position to produce similar products’.8 It is through 
the production of a succession of artworks that ‘imitate’ or succeed the exemplar that the work 
of genius is that it is retrospectively recognized by others that the initial work was a creation 
of an ‘original sense’, and not—to allude to one type of responses provoked by Manet’s 
Olympia—an original non-sense. Similar characteristics are found in a truth procedure. 
Spurred by an unexplainable aleatory occurrence, the faithful subject seeks out to investigate 
the situation to establish that, as Oliver Feltham had put it, that ‘there is unknown consistency, 
there is a way of doing things […] that works, but that remains foreign to our imagination’.9 
What that occurrence, an event, will have meant depends on the active fidelity of a subject, 
the trajectory of which the event itself does not determine. If the constitutive opacity and 
incommunicability of a creative artistic procedure are not problematic as such, then neither 
should they be problematic, as such, in any other procedure that operates under the same logic. 
Problematizing those characteristics of the subjective practice of a truth procedure, then, 
requires at least one additional premise. Two premises that, when either one is granted, would 
problematize the aforementioned indeterminacies of a truth procedure are readily conceivable: 
(1) practices that cannot express their precepts with lucidity or seek discursive justification are 
inherently problematic; (2) as a truth procedure could potentially lead to consequences of great 
magnitude (including disastrous ones), the demand to justify the practices involved in its actual 
construction would be reasonable. To a critic whose practico-ethical concerns pertaining to 
                                                            
8 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), §46.  
9 Feltham, p. 108. 
   84 
 
event and fidelity presuppose the first premise, it must be asked in return how he conceives 
essentially creative practices such as that of artistic production, which, very plausibly, is a 
testament to an aspect of the socio-historical world whose expulsion is likely to leave human 
experience impoverished: that something that cannot be communicated can nonetheless be 
shown. On the other hand, a critic whose objection presupposes the second premise would not 
have taken enough critical distance from Badiou’s theorization of events and truths. For unless 
it is possible to preclude the possibility that events could be utterly mundane, as suggested by 
those advancing the deflationary line of criticism, a critic who has chosen to articulate his 
criticism primarily in terms of practico-ethical concerns, including those related to 
catastrophic consequences of fidelity or the subjective determination of principles and the 
condition of their application, would have conceded too much. Few would seriously entertain 
scenarios of catastrophes brought forth by expecting someone’s arrival (as in Dews’s example), 
nor would judge the various activities and thoughts involved in awaiting someone to be causes 
for serious concern. In so far as they are raised with seriousness, then, ethical concerns 
concerning Badiou’s theorization of events and their consequences cannot but tacitly grant 
that the events and truths about which they are so concerned are exceptional, consequential, 
or subversive in some indefinite sense, despite the contention of the deflationary critics that 
one of the ambiguities of Being and Event is whether it succeeds in establishing that events 
are as exceptional as they are advertised to be and, by extension, that post-evental truth 
procedures are in reality processes of effecting changes substantial and subversive enough to 
even merit a reflection on their consequences, let alone catastrophic consequences. Since the 
present thesis is concerned with the implications for social change that could be drawn from 
set-theoretical ontology, it is the deflationary criticism, which suggests that there are not so 
many implications to be drawn, that should be of primary concern. 
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2.2 The void-ness, evental-ness, and the situatedness of truths  
One reader of Badiou contends that ‘there is no a priori reason to privilege universality 
over any other value as the necessary substance of event’. 10  Within the architecture of 
Badiou’s theory of change, however, there is a reason why a truth procedure initiated by an 
event that reveals the void of the situation is conceived as the production of a generic, 
egalitarian universality. In a truth, particular differences—subject-positions or social 
identities—that are constructible in accordance with the situation’s representational regime 
are annulled. In its ‘indifference to differences’, the generic, egalitarian universality of a truth 
violates the regime that tames the situation by partitioning it into manageable and discernible 
parts, and makes the production of a truth the production of multiples indiscernible from the 
perspective of the situation that will have transformative effects by forcing the situation to 
accommodate them, such that they will be presentations for the situation, multiples that belong 
to it. The reason for the ‘privilege’ of universality is that the ‘process of universality’—which 
Badiou says is ‘one and the same’ with a truth procedure11—is the process that can be 
conceptually determined, at least within Badiou’s theoretical framework, as a process that 
transforms the situation.  
If what has been said concerning the ‘privilege’ accorded to universality is right, the 
following would be a plausible hypothesis: if the universality of a truth could somehow be 
questioned, what would emerge as a question is whether the conceptualization of post-evental 
process of change as a truth procedure is able to support the thought of social change as the 
introduction of something radically new. It should be made clear that it would be unfair to 
protest that set-theoretical ontology does not immediately yield a satisfying theory of social 
situations (as a specific class of situations) and social change, for it is simply not its objective 
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to yield one. Badiou himself has been careful to point out that it is not the remit of a 
philosopher to position himself as a guide to those actively engaged in politics. Ontology is 
but one situation for Badiou, and he is content to accept that each concrete situation will have 
complexities that the language of set-theoretical ontology cannot express—‘ontology is not 
Hegel’s absolute knowledge’, Badiou says.12 Yet, it would be not unfair to attempt to trace 
just how much implications for a process of social change could be drawn from the framework 
Being and Event has developed, and consider, if it is the case that ontology does not capture 
everything of concrete situations, what of the latter eludes the former’s grasp. In the course of 
engaging with the question of extent of the transformative potential of a truth procedure, this 
chapter will attempt to show that the generic universality of a truth risks turning into a 
particularity, thereby placing in doubt the potential for a truth to effect extensive social change. 
To return to the deflationary line of criticism: a challenge against the exceptionality of 
events through the kind of deflationary criticism mentioned previously, which turns to the 
form of the evental multiple, is likely to invite a swift rejoinder. Such a challenge may be 
accused of neglecting a qualification that is central to Badiou’s concept of event and the 
theorization of post-evental transformation: that an event be the revelation of a situation’s void, 
of the latent inconsistency a situation has to unpresent in order for it to constitute itself as a 
consistent multiplicity, and whose occurrence it is the remit of its state to foreclose. ‘[W]hat 
the State strives to foreclose through its power of counting is the void of the situation, while 
the event always reveals it’13—it would not be an exaggeration to say that the significance of 
the event for thinking social change is almost entirely expressed in this statement (and it is 
certainly difficult to see how the aspect of an event as the bringing forth of the void of a 
situation would be captured by Dews’s example of expecting someone’s arrival). Moreover, 
                                                            
12 Badiou, ‘Ontology and Politics: An Interview with Alain Badiou’, p. 174. 
13 Badiou, Metapolitics, p. 119. 
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the pervasiveness of events—or more accurately, the many instances of the form of an event—
may not be so devastating for theorizing social transformation within Badiouian framework, 
if it is conceded that an event is only what it will have been once its consequences have 
unfolded. Todd May explains that Rosa Parks’ refusal to give up her seat was an event even 
though there ‘were others before her who also refused. What makes her refusal an event is the 
fidelity to her act by other committed activists. And it is only in retrospect that we realize that 
hers was an event while the previous refusals were not’.14 An event can only be consequential 
if and only if there is a subject that has decided that there is something to be pursued 
subsequent to that event. But subjectivation—and the concomitant initiation of a fidelity 
procedure—may not be necessitated by an event. With this additional specification, it can be 
asserted that although instantiations of events that has the form captured by the matheme of 
the event may pervade the socio-historical world, only very few of these instances qualify as 
events proper, in so far as events that reveal the void of situations are rare and even those rare 
instances may not have been followed by a subjectivation on which their consequentiality in 
the situation entirely depends. And yet, it is uncertain that even these additional qualifications 
are sufficient to secure the exceptionality of events and the potential for social transformation 
originating from them, as rest of this chapter will attempt to show.  
Badiou writes that ‘[e]very structured presentation [thus, every situation] unpresents 
“its” void’.15 It is also claimed that ‘what allows a genuine event to be at the origin of a truth 
[…] is precisely the fact that it relates to the particularity of a situation only from the bias of 
its void’.16 The ‘its’ in these statements serves as a reminder of the fact, that in extraontological 
situations, the void is not the ontological void, the negativity of non-being as such, but is the 
                                                            
14  Todd May, review of Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Re-thinking Emancipation, by Nick Hewlett, 2008 
<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/badiou-balibar-ranci-232-re-re-thinking-emancipation/> [accessed 16 December 
2017]. 
15 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 55. 
16 Badiou, Ethics, p. 73. 
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nothing that is particular to a situation. It is also the case that the concept of a totally singular 
multiple, the evental site that borders the situation’s void, ‘is neither intrinsic nor absolute’17—
the determination of a multiple as a site depends on the particular structure of the situation in 
which it is positioned as a site. Badiou accepts that ‘[a] multiple could easily be singular in 
one situation (its elements are not presented therein, although it is) yet normal in another 
situation (its elements happen to be presented in this new situation)’.18 He could not have 
stated the contrary, since if the unpresentable were to remain unpresentable in every possible 
situation, change qua the production of novelty, thus of new presentations and representations, 
would not be possible. But it is not the case that the situation in which an evental site would 
be normal could come about solely through an event and a truth procedure, as Badiou goes on 
to say that ‘[o]ne of the profound characteristics of singularities is that they can always be 
normalized: as is shown, moreover, by socio-political History: any evental site, can in the end, 
undergo a state normalization’.19 In any case, the point that is confirmed by these remarks is 
that the ‘very same multiples that are evental qua abnormally singular/void in one situation or 
world easily could be non-evental in another setting’, that the elements that are not 
presentable—count for nothing—in one situation might, in a different situation, ‘very well 
possess the non-void status of being integrated into the networks of a state-regulated situation 
or world through re/presentation’. 20  Because the void, in non-ontological situations, is a 
structural position retroactively delineated by the operation of count-as-one that is specific to 
a situation, what is unpresented, in non-ontological situations, is determined in relation to the 
situation for which it is its void. Thus, as Adrian Johnston explains, the ‘event-ness of the site 
and/or event is a relative property’, and the void, too, is ‘a real whose realness is indexed with 
                                                            
17 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 176. 
18 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 176. 
19 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 176. 
20 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, pp. 27–29. 
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respect to a given particular reality’21—it is because a situation unpresents the void that is 
particular to it that an event that reveals it can be described as the return of the repressed. It 
can be said that the situatedness of an evental site and particularity of the void that circulates 
within it indexes events and truths to particular historical circumstances, rather than turning 
them into irruptions from a point that is radically external to the situation. 
To draw implications for an account of social change of the indexing of the void to a 
situation, one might begin by considering the void that is the void any social situation, and 
provides the support for the generic egalitarian universality of a truth, namely, ‘generic 
humanity’, which Hallward had defined as the ‘pure be-ing human considered without 
reference to any criterion of hierarchy, privilege, competence, or difference’.22  It is undeniable 
that in any social situation, generic humanity will be its void, since the situation’s statist regime 
stratifies the situation into parts, which, for a social situation, has been suggested to be social 
identities. It seems that in so far as it is possible to speak of different situations, such as 
educational situation, the situation of Indonesia, or the situation of the factory, and so on, it 
has to be admitted that there is a plurality—an infinite plurality, as one could legitimately posit 
according to set-theoretical ontology—of social situations. Granted that there is a plurality of 
situations that qualify as social, the following proposition deserves a consideration: given that, 
ontologically, the fundamental individuating feature that differentiates situations are their 
differing regimes of count-as-one, and given that the void of a concrete situation is the void 
particular to a situation, in the singular, it may be the case that different events need not be 
revelations of the one and the same void, and, by extension, different fidelity procedures in 
different social situations, in so far as they are different, need not be relating to their respective 
                                                            
21 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 29. 
22 Hallward, p. 117. 
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social situation from the bias of the void construed solely and invariantly as generic humanity 
in order to qualify as truth procedures.  
For Badiou, ‘there is a multiplicity of singular events in singular situations which also 
enable a multiplicity of truths unfolded by “faithful” subjects’—this, Frank Ruda suggests, is 
one of the features by which Badiou’s theorization of event and change can be distinguished 
from that offered by a thinker like Giorgio Agamben, for whom ‘there are multiplicity of 
singular event as ruptures of the given which always expose one and the same truth (of 
being)’.23 It is a strength (in that it better captures the sense of interventions in specific 
situations) of the Badiouian approach that it locates the origin of a process of transformation 
immanently within a particular situation as the revelation of a specific void and allows that 
fidelity to different events requires the invention of different ways of being and acting. The 
situatedness of events and truths implied by the fact that evental-ness and void-ness are relative 
properties, however, introduces an ambiguity concerning the extent of support that the 
ontological discourse may offer for thinking far-reaching social change. In investigating this 
ambiguity, it is instructive to begin with a caricature, which is based on a historical incident 
in the situation of Italian football.  
In the early twentieth century, Italian football clubs allowed only Italian and English 
players to join. Footballers not of those two nationalities, if they were to sign with a club, 
would have had to conceal their nationality—these footballers would have been unrepresented 
in the situation of Italian football. On 9 March 1908, several members of the Milan Football 
and Cricket Club dissent to the club’s exclusionary policy and break away to found a new 
football club under a declaration that one could plausibly argue is egalitarian and universal for 
this situation, the situation of Italian football: ‘Si chiamerà Internazionale, perchè noi siamo 
                                                            
23 Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (London: Continuum, 2011), 
p. 208. 
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fratelli del mondo’—or: ‘it [the new club] will be called Internazionale, because we are 
brothers of the world’. The construction of a generic multiple to extend the situation of Italian 
football in fidelity to this declaration would not be required to approach the situation from the 
standpoint of generic humanity, the void of every social situation as such, but from the capacity 
to play football, in so far as it is voided of markers of nationality and ethnicity that had 
previously served to restrict the multiples—footballers, that is—that could be presented and 
represented in the situation. Such would be enough for a fidelity procedure to qualify as a truth 
procedure in this situation, and the being of the truth—the truth of the fact that beyond ethnic 
and national differences, football is an activity that offers itself to everyone—it incrementally 
produces to be a generic multiple, assembled by a mode of discernment that considers elements 
in as much as they are in the situation, without reference to qualifications that the situation’s 
representational regime imposes to restrict membership. 
What surfaces is the possibility that the situatedness of events and truths may work to 
restrict their socially transformative potential. Toula Nicolacopoulos and George 
Vassilacopoulos note one consequence that seems to be implied by the thought of the non-
ontological void as the retroactive determination of the constitution of a particular situation, 
namely, that an event is the irruption of void that disturbs the determinants of the situation, 
but conversely, the situation conditions the possibilities that are opened thereby. The authors 
note that ‘the principle or law of the situation ultimately determines the site’. And ‘[b]ecause 
of this historical restriction and the situatedness of the political event in an evental site, the 
event […] can only challenge what is determinate in the situation such as the state, the 
authoritarian party, the legal institution and so on’.24  The real issue, however, is not the 
‘conditioning’ of an event’s consequences—the truth of that event—by the configuration of 
                                                            
24 Toula Nicolacopoulos and George Vassilacopoulos, ‘Philosophy and Revolution: Badiou’s Infidelity to the 
Event’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2.1–2 (2006), 210–25 (p. 222). 
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the situation (‘what is determinate in the situation’, as above authors write) in which it had 
occurred. No less problematic would be if it were said that the consequences of an event had 
nothing to do with the configuration of the situation in which it had been recognized as having 
occurred. Rather, the situatedness of events and truths poses an ambiguity concerning 
universality and their potential to transform a social order, due to one of the implications of 
set-theoretical ontology’s disdain for Ockham’s razor, and due to the fact that ontology itself, 
being indifferent to whether any particular concrete situation exists, abstains from responding 
to the question—raised by Terry Eagleton—of ‘[w]hat is to count as a situation, and who 
decides’,25 or, to put it differently, where a situation begins and ends: namely, that there are 
other situations. 
The subtraction from predication by which the genericity of a truth is defined is not an 
absolute subtraction, but subtraction with respect to the regimes of counting specific to a 
situation and its representational regime, its state. If indiscernibility or genericity of a multiple 
in an extraontological situation is a relative property, it must be said the elements belonging 
to a generic multiple possess a further qualification in addition to the property of belonging to 
that situation pure and simple—which, in the preceding example, would be that of having the 
capacity to play football. The being of a truth, Badiou asserts, ‘is anonymously that which has 
no other mark apart from arising from presentation, apart from being composed of terms which 
have nothing in common that could be remarked, save belonging to this situation’.26 The 
emphasis on ‘this’ is crucial: in the formulation Badiou has offered, it is precisely the 
qualification ‘this situation’ that is the marker of deixis, that which makes a truth the truth of 
a particular situation. What this implies is that in so far as the generic subset is generic by its 
non-relation to the determinations of the representational regime that prevails in a particular 
                                                            
25 Eagleton, p. 252. 
26 Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 338–39. 
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situation, a mark of particularity is retained in the being of a truth, a particularity that is none 
other than its being generic by its subtraction from the statist determinations, classifications 
and predications, that stratify a particular situation. Even if it were asserted as a matter of 
principle that a political event invokes generic humanity, or that political truth procedure 
proceeds to investigate the implications of some maxim of a radically egalitarian universalism, 
it seems difficult to deny, in so far as a truth procedure is always the process of production of 
a truth in a particular situation, that the generic multiple that a truth is in its being will be 
marked in this way. But granted that a potentially infinite number of social situations can be 
thought (such as the situation of football, the situation of education, the situation of a racially 
segregated society, and so on), there is no a priori limitation on postulating the proliferation, 
also infinite, of indiscernible multiplicities and evental sites. What emerges consequently is a 
matter of concern for the political implications of Being and Event. Badiou maintains that ‘the 
place of truth should remain empty and precisely because of this feature it is equally valid “for 
all”’, and that a truth that originates from an event is universally addressed because it ‘neither 
excludes nor constrains anyone’. 27  Yet, the extension of ‘for all’ and ‘anyone’ in such 
statements is limited to those that belong or will come to have belong to some particular 
situation, and it appears that the transformative effects of each of the multiple truth procedures 
are confined, in the end, to the particular situation within which they unfold. But if this is right, 
the meaning of the universality that these procedures, as truth procedures, are meant to produce 
is ambiguous. One could imagine that a truth procedure would, in its course, come to render 
representable, by transforming a situation’s regime of count-as-one, those that previously were 
not even properly counted-as-one within a situation. However, the group newly made 
representable as a result of that truth procedure is nevertheless particular, since it would be 
merely one group among the multiplicity of groups that populate other social situations, with 
                                                            
27 Badiou, Ethics, p. 73. 
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the chance that some groups may as well form evental sites in their respective situations due 
to the regimes of representation specific to those situations.  
There is neither anything inherently objectionable in the thought that the 
transformative potentials of truths are restricted to situations that might appear, at first sight, 
to be of little significance when seen from above its narrow locale, nor is it inconsistent with 
the Badiouian account of change to suppose that the extent of a truth’s transformative potential 
remains unknown and can be pursued indefinitely. Nonetheless, the fact that the handful of 
events Badiou cites as revolutionary are widely recognized as such in science, art, and politics 
is enough to elicit a question of whether the conceptualization of a truth procedure should 
incorporate a distinction between the transformation of what might be regarded as relatively 
‘local’ situations (such as the situation of the Milanese football scene) and the transformation 
of relatively ‘global’ situations (for instance, the state of Italy), or instead reject a distinction 
of such kind, thereby indexing any one process of transformation to a particular situation, 
without consideration of whether the situation is relatively ‘global’ or ‘local’. Regardless of 
whether such a distinction is ultimately desirable, it is, in any case, unclear how this distinction 
could be conceived with the resources of set-theoretical ontology.28 It might be suggested that 
the concept of transcendentals introduced in Logics of Worlds that is designed to account for 
the ‘sense of “more” or “less”’ in identities of objects and differences between them—hence 
for relationality, in a way far more nuanced than the binary logic of belonging and not 
belonging in Being and Event—is able to provide the basis on which such a distinction could 
                                                            
28 The reason for this can be stated roughly as follows. Within a situation, the predicates of its language (including 
relational predicates, which are simply higher-order predicates), quantify over that situation. This means that a 
statement such as ‘something that happens in this situation matters for social change more than something that 
happens in this other situation because the former situation is relatively global with respect to the latter situation’, 
for example, would be, in principle, verifiable if both situations featured in the statement are represented 
multiples of another situation. But since that another situation is itself a particular situation, there is no point 
from which the referents of ‘global’ or ‘local’ could be fixed from the interiority of any situation. The 
determination has to be made from a perspective outside any situation—and it is unclear both what that 
perspective would be and by what authority anyone can claim to possess that perspective. 
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be made. But as the concept of transcendentals pertains to appearance but not to being for 
Badiou, if that concept, hence the thought of relationality, is needed to think social situations 
and social change in their specificity, it would remain the case that general ontology alone is 
not enough to think social situations and social change. Furthermore, as noted in section 1.2.3 
of the first chapter, it is doubtful whether the concept of transcendentals could respond to the 
question of what accounts for the force that sustains particular presentational and 
representational structures. Finally, as will be seen in section 2.3.1, there is an ambiguity with 
respect to the extent of a truth’s transformative effect that is intrinsic to the account of forcing, 
which must still refer to the being of a truth. As examinations the follow will further suggest, 
the ambiguity of the transformative effects of a truth attests to the distance between general 
ontology and specifically social ontology, a distance that exists due to the indifference of the 
former to questions such as where a particular concrete situation begins and ends, how certain 
concrete situations come to be, and to what they owe their force of inertia. 
 
2.3 The specificity of social situations and the extent of transformative effects 
2.3.1 Forcing a truth beyond a situation 
As the ambiguity raised in the previous section concerning the universality and 
transformative potential of a truth was premised on there being a plurality of situations in a 
social order, one possibility that should be considered is whether a truth procedure may 
dissolve the boundaries of the situation from which it had originally initiated such that it could 
extend beyond its situatedness in a situation and generate transformative effects across 
situations, in the plural. If this were possible, it would be a step toward securing a stronger 
sense of the universality of a truth, in so far as it could offer itself to more than those of one 
situation. Oliver Feltham comes close to proposing something like this. 
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Feltham writes that ‘[f]orcing […] consists in amassing those multiples that are 
connected to the event’.29 He suggests that ‘forcing can be understood as the slow expansion 
of the evental site; it extends and exacerbates the original point of opacity at which the event 
occurred’, such that, in the course of ‘its continual assertion that this opaque enlarged multiple 
belongs to the situation’, it ‘breaks with the established distribution of the situation’s parts’. 
Enquiries, meanwhile, ‘create new parts or neighbourhoods with yet unknown boundaries’, 
which can ‘[affect] not only the original boundaries of the evental site and the established 
partition of the situation, but finally the very boundaries of the situation itself’.30 It might 
appear that Feltham has reversed the role of fidelity (or enquiry) and forcing, but that is not 
the case, as his premise is that there is no separation between the being of a subject as a 
multiples and forcing. The point that is of interest here is the possibility that is raised by 
Feltham, namely, that the consequences of an event may somehow spill over into other 
situations and transform the boundaries between situations. While acknowledging that Badiou 
does not draw this extreme conclusion, Feltham proposes that the ‘activity of generic truth 
procedures within domains of art, politics, science, and love [i.e. four domains in which truths 
are produced according to Badiou] could lead, through infinite expansion of evental sites, to 
either the complete indetermination of those domains or their renaming’.31 There is no reason 
to contest the first part of Feltham’s suggestion, namely, that forcing is an expansion of the 
evental site. With reference to Joseph Jacotot, it can be said that the continual application of 
his heterodox pedagogical method gives rise to a ‘community’ of ignorant masters as the 
subject of the Jacotot-event. This is tantamount to an expansion of the evental site itself, since 
the subject is a multiple that is non-constructible, hence unrepresentable under the statist 
regime of the educational situation. The question is how strongly the account of truth 
                                                            
29 Feltham, p. 122. 
30 Feltham, p. 122. 
31 Feltham, p. 122. 
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procedure implemented in Being and Event is able to support the second part of Feltham’s 
proposal, namely, that the boundaries between situations could become indeterminate. One 
immediate difficulty with conceiving the possibility that Feltham describes can be imagined. 
A truth procedure a process immanent to a situation, and subject-language cannot refer to 
situations that are external to the initial situation, since, as Burhanuddin Baki explains, forcing 
‘is always locally implemented with reference to the elements that range over the situation 
S’. 32  The being of a truth is a generic subset of the situation, which is to say that the 
‘ingredients’ needed for its production is dispersed in the initial situation, as unrepresentable 
or indiscernible elements. Thus, in so far as the sets that play a role in a truth procedure are 
the initial situation, its state, and the generic subset that is constructed from the initial situation 
through enquiries, it must be concluded that ‘forcing procedure never goes outside the 
domestic immanence of S itself or the various states connected to S’.33 Statements that are 
forced in situation S anticipate their semantic fulfilment, that is, the coming-to-be of the 
extensional equivalents (referents) of the names and predicates used in the statements—these 
extensional equivalents, however, do not arrive from outside S itself, for a truth is built from 
the void of a situation. This means, conversely, that whatever truth procedures that may be 
taking place in other situations do not affect S. In what way the boundary between S and that 
other situation may become indeterminate, such that transformative effects in one situation 
affects or ‘spills over’ into the other, is unclear.  
Although a truth does not generate effects outside the situation for which it is a truth, 
there is something that could happen in social situations. A truth (or a part of it: the subject), 
once forced and accommodated as belonging and as included by the situation, will have 
transformed the situation’s regime of count-as-one, which can be seen as the situation’s 
                                                            
32 Baki, p. 208. 
33 Baki, p. 208. 
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membership criteria (or its structure, based on the reading of the first chapter). This implies 
the possibility whereby the boundary between what had been two or more separate situations 
becomes indeterminate. However, given the theorization of the being of a truth as a multiple 
built from a specific void, the indetermination of the boundaries between situations cannot 
continue indefinitely, unless all situations either had one and the same void or could come to 
have one and the same void. But both options contravene the premise that the void of a 
situation is a void particular to it and situations are infinitely numerous. Thus, the extent to 
which a truth transforms the boundaries between situations will at some point be limited—so 
will be its addressee, hence its universality. Given that there is an infinite plurality of situations, 
no real solution to the ambiguity of the universality of a truth—and the extent of its 
transformative effects—that can be posed by referring to the existence of other situations 
follows from this possibility. It must be stressed that it is not being argued here that the 
consequences of a truth is in any sense ‘finite’. The observations so far only suggest that 
developing the thought of the radicalization of a truth’s transformative effects to the extent 
that is suggested by Feltham may require additional conceptual resources that are not to be 
immediately found in set-theoretical ontology. 
 
2.3.2 The issue of multiple truth procedures and the impact of any particular event 
It has been suggested that the extent to which truth procedures could create 
transformative effects beyond the singular situation within which it is a truth is ambiguous. 
Feltham, who proposes, as seen previously, the possibility whereby a truth procedure acts to 
transform the boundaries of situations, has posed the question directly to Badiou, asking 
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whether truth procedure is able to ‘traverse more than one situation’.34 Badiou responds as 
follows: 
Two generic procedures are never actually in the same situation of reference 
because they are truths of their situations. But a concrete situation is not 
exactly the ontological scheme of the situation. A concrete situation is an 
interplay of different situations in the ontological sense of the term. 
Ontology is not by itself the thinking of a concrete situation. Ontology is a 
situation, the ontological situation which is the situation of thinking, and 
finally, the mathematical situation. We can think a part of the concrete 
situation from the ontological schema. We can say, there is a multiplicity, it 
is infinite and so on. But there is a concrete analysis which is not ontological 
at all.35 
Badiou, again, insists that ontology is but one situation, which is distinct from concrete 
situations. Yet, if the disjuncture between the situation of ontology and concrete, 
extraontological situations is such that in the latter, one finds an ‘interplay’ of a plurality of 
situations, the issue of the situatedness of truths returns: if a concrete situation is ‘an interplay 
of different situations in the ontological sense of the term’, it is not clear what meaning words 
such as ‘generic’ and ‘universality’ conceived by the ontological discourse would have in the 
discussion of concrete situations, in which a plurality of other situations—‘in the ontological 
sense of the term’—co-exist. It is dubious whether the interplay between different situations 
in the concrete situations is something that a formal specification of a process of change could 
be simply set aside as irrelevant. There is at least one way in which two or more situations are 
implicated in a process of change is already presupposed in the theorization of change. If such 
things as evental-ness and void-ness are relative properties, it follows that for any evental site 
and void, there is a situation in which they would not be evental or void. It appears to be the 
                                                            
34 Badiou, ‘Ontology and Politics: An Interview with Alain Badiou’, p. 174. 
35 Badiou, ‘Ontology and Politics: An Interview with Alain Badiou’, pp. 174–75. 
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case, then, that in any given event and truth procedure at least two situations are in some way 
implicated: the situation in which a particular multiple is an evental site and a situation in 
which that multiple is not evental. This is not an ‘empirical’ observation of concrete situations, 
but it is implied by the theorization of a truth procedure in a situation as built from its void, 
whose void-ness is a relative property. It seems reasonable, therefore, to demand the ‘interplay’ 
between situations that is implicated in any concrete process of change be reflected in the 
theorization of situations and their transformation.  
A way in which the interplay between situations could be especially relevant for 
thinking social change might be conceived in terms of the formation of an evental site with a 
specific composition in a situation. Even if an event itself is a purely haphazard occurrence, it 
might be argued, the impossibility of ‘inducing’ an event as such need not preclude a 
theorization of how evental sites, as necessary but insufficient conditions of events, form—
and dissipate, as Badiou has allowed this as a possibility—in social situations. Indeed, 
Johnston observes that ‘[o]ddly enough, despite his sweeping ban on positing conditions or 
pre-cursors for events, Badiou himself occasionally appears to defy this same ban’.36 Citing 
Badiou’s remark in his Handbook of Inaesthetics, in which it is stated that ‘every event admits 
of a figural preparation’,37 and an interview, wherein in he remarks that ‘we are in a period of 
the constitution of a possible evental site’ as ‘zones of precariousness, of partial movements 
which one can interpret as announcing that something will happen’,38 Johnston finds it 
reasonable to propose […] that although an event apparently explodes onto 
a situational scene in an ex nihilo fashion, there are certain (perhaps hidden 
and invisible) primers or triggers […] clandestinely participating in setting 
of this explosion—furthermore, that such figures, as primers or triggers 
                                                            
36 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 20. 
37 Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, trans. by Alberto Toscano (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2004), p. 120. 
38 Badiou makes this remark in an interview published in Cahiers du cinema Quoted from: Johnston, Badiou, 
Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 20. 
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prefiguring events, perhaps can be discerned, thus allowing for a foreseeing 
of potential event-level happenings. Such propositions indeed must be put 
forward if Badiou is to adhere to his own requirement that change accounted 
for as an immanently emergent transformation arising from within the 
worldly situation itself.39  
How the constitution of an evental site might occur in social situations is hinted by Feltham’s 
discussion of what makes the sans-papiers the evental site of the French situation. For a 
‘materialist ontology’, Feltham claims, what is ‘in’ an evental site of a situation must ‘come 
from somewhere’,40 and suggests that an ‘evental site […] consists of an encounter between 
heterogeneous situations’. It is through an encounter between situations (Mali, Senegal, France) 
that heterogeneous elements come to enter one situation (France) to form its evental site (the 
sans-papiers), whose indiscernibility in the situation is to be accounted by the heterogeneity 
of its composition that makes it unrecognizable as a part of the (French) situation. An evental 
site, Feltham concludes, ‘can thus be defined as a non-recognized intersection between 
situations; a disqualified mix which appears, at the level of the state, as a pure disjunction’.41 
This is a thought that is not only reasonable but one that also sheds some light on Badiou’s 
somewhat vague remark on the ‘figural preparation’ of events cited by Johnston. The 
constitution of an evental site through the encounter or intersection between heterogeneous 
situations is one way to speak of the ‘interplay’ between situations. Such interplay in and 
between situations by which an evental site is constituted in a situation presumably implies 
some kind of pre-evental dynamics in those situations. But it is not entirely clear how such 
dynamics—pre-evental kinesis, so to speak—is to be reflected in the account of social 
situations, when set-theoretical ontology relegates individuals to the status of objects fully 
determined by anonymous operations of count-as-one and assigns stasis as one of the 
                                                            
39 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, pp. 20–21. 
40 Feltham, p. 122. 
41 Feltham, p. 122. 
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characteristics of pre-evental situations. Without elaborating an account of how different 
situations and their respective states interact, it seems that if there is an evental site with a 
certain material composition in a situation, what can be said is that it is already there in the 
situation, with the process in which they have come to be falling beneath theorization. 
It remains the case that Badiou insists on the irreducible plurality of truths, truth 
procedures, and subjects: ‘there are only multiple procedures of truth, multiple creative 
sequences’,42  he writes, and there no ‘single Subject, but as many subjects as there are 
truths’.43  But if truth procedures and subjects exist in the plural, the possibility of their 
incompatibility needs to be considered. Yet, there is little else in Badiou’s system that 
precludes interferences and conflicts between pluralities of truth procedures a priori other than 
the fact that their effects are, under the strictly formal definition of fidelity and forcing, 
restricted to the particular situations in which they unfold, situations that remain separate and 
whatever ‘interplay’ that may occur between them ontological discourse does not reflect. 
Whilst ‘any one individual belongs to a vast number of situations, and subjective participation 
in any one procedure need not block other sorts of commitment’, Hallward observes that ‘to 
any one truth, there seems to correspond only one subject’ and that there is ‘no obvious way 
that a situation might tolerate more than one subject’.44 The question, then, is whether the non-
conflicting plurality of truth procedures that is apparently implied by set-theoretical 
ontology—and apparently endorsed by Badiou’s remark quoted earlier, that there is not a 
plurality of truth procedures in one and the same situation because each truth is a truth of a 
particular situation—could be maintained consistently, in the case that a concrete situation is 
an interplay of a plurality of situations.  
                                                            
42 Alain Badiou, The Century, trans. by Alberto Toscano (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007), p. 109. 
43 Badiou, Ethics, p. 28. 
44 Hallward, p. 289. 
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One of the commentators to have remarked on the tension that arises at this point is 
John Milbank, who has advanced a reading of Badiou that he admits is ‘perverse’ but insists 
is ‘accurate’ nevertheless.45 At one point in his reading, Milbank writes that ‘if for Badiou the 
many different truth-processes are compatible with one another, then it does not seem 
satisfactory to say, as he does, that the public measure of their legitimacy is merely the non-
interference of one process with another’. It is not satisfactory, he claims, because it implies 
that Badiou’s theory of evental change thereby lapses into a ‘liberalism’, in the sense that a 
‘clearly demarcated distribution of boundaries of discourse […] prevail over the 
unpredictability of a newly emerging Event’.46 Rephrased in accordance with what has been 
previously suggested in this chapter: what will have been achieved is different groups, in 
different situations, that co-exist as differences in a ‘larger’ social situation. Milbank shares 
with Feltham the intuition that the transformative potential of an event ‘must surely include 
the capacity to revise any such boundaries’ between different situations or discourses. Milbank 
suggests that if the thesis that a plurality of truths do not conflict and that truths effect radical 
transformation were to be maintained simultaneously, what needs to be considered is the 
possibility of a ‘“meta-truth-process” arising from an event that is “the universal of all 
universals”’ 47 —what is insinuated is that a ‘meta-truth-process’ could account for the 
compatibility of plurality of truths and their cumulative contribution to extensive social change 
(such that they ‘add up to a revolution’, to use Gramsci’s expression).  
It might be pointed out that the kind of thought toward which Milbank’s suggestion 
leads has no chance of being accommodated by Badiou’s system, as set-theoretical ontology 
leaves no room for such things as the ‘universal of all universals’ (or by the same token, the 
                                                            
45 John Milbank, ‘The Return of Mediation’, in Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of 
Christian Theology, by Slavoj Žižek, Creston Davis, and John Milbank (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2010), pp. 
211–38 (p. 238). 
46 Milbank, p. 215. 
47 Milbank, p. 215. 
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‘truth of all truths’), in so far as they presuppose a multiple of all multiple whose existence the 
laws of being written in the language of axiomatic set theory has prohibited. And yet, Badiou’s 
own philosophical—that is, metaontological—premises do not allow for a convenient 
dismissal of Milbank’s proposal of a ‘meta-truth’ that evidently has a theological undertone. 
On the one hand, the non-conflicting plurality of truths is depoliticizing, as producing simply 
another particularity is indistinguishable from the effect of stabilization achieved by the 
situation’s regime of representation. On the other hand, if the concept of the event is in essence 
a defence of the possibility of something that transgresses the laws of being, then it may be 
asked what in Badiou’s system rules out the possibility that God, whose existence is prohibited 
by ontology, may come into being as an event. 
Only a step away is Milbank’s position from the thought that different subjects, though 
they may be plural, realize a truth that is, at bottom, one. And if one were to attempt to think 
the being of this univocal truth, it can only be assumed that it would be an ‘absolute’ genericity: 
it is a truth that is subtracted from the representational regime of any and all situation. But this 
is tantamount to the denial of a truth’s situatedness, for the being of this ‘meta-truth’ would 
not be generic with respect to any particular situation. This truth would thus be ahistorical and 
beyond expression in the discourse of set-theoretical ontology, for genericity, as conceived by 
set-theoretical ontology, is definable only in relation to a particular situation and state, even 
though the relation between a truth and a state is that of non-reference, non-relation, or 
exceptionality of the former with respect to the latter. Whatever attempt to preserve the 
universality of a truth against its ‘particularization’ by being marked by the particularity of 
situation of which it is a truth, then, cannot resort to a complete denial of the situatedness of a 
truth procedure and the specific void from which it is built, for this would be tantamount to 
the expulsion of processes of change from any concrete historical context, thereby rendering 
it equivalent to an intervention of divine transcendence. What follows, if the arguments so far 
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are right, is that the theorization of truth procedure in Being and Event is doubly bound. If the 
situation in which a truth unfolds as a process were to be specified, then whatever truths 
produced therein risks slipping into a particularity, since the situation would be one of an 
infinite plurality of situations, seriously restricting its transformative potential as a result. But, 
conversely, if the situation were not specified, a truth procedure risks disconnection from the 
historical circumstances in which it unfolds.  
Ambiguities concerning the situatedness of events and truths, and the tension between 
the need to specify a situation and the problematic implications of doing so, lead Badiou to 
resort to tenuous equivocations when he attempts to describe the specificity of a political event 
that one must presume occurs in extraontological, social situations. One instance of a 
problematic equivocation is found in the concluding essay of Metapolitics, titled ‘Politics as 
Truth Procedure’. In this text, the ontological thesis of the immeasurable excess of inclusion 
over belonging—that the state of the situation exceeds the situation (as the cardinality of the 
power-set is greater than that of the base set)—is transposed onto the realm of politics through 
the equation of the state of a situation with the political state (the two shall be distinguished 
hereafter by capitalizing the latter, which is a convention often adopted by Badiou). For 
example, Badiou writes that ‘[t]here are always more parts than elements; i.e. the 
representative multiplicity is always of a higher power than the presentative multiplicity. This 
question is really that of power. The power of the State is always superior to that of the 
situation’.48 He then proceeds to suggest that ‘[e]mpirically, whenever there is a genuinely 
political event, the State reveals itself. It reveals its excess of power, its repressive dimension’, 
which has to ‘remain measureless, errant, unassignable’ for the ‘normal functioning of the 
State’.49 If what Badiou is suggesting is that a genuine political event induces the normally 
                                                            
48 Badiou, Metapolitics, pp. 144–45. 
49 Badiou, Metapolitics, p. 145. 
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hidden repressive police apparatus of the State to appear on the scene, there is little that is 
controversial in the suggestion. That true radical politics provokes the State is not in itself a 
particularly contentious view. Moreover, granted that the intervention of the repressive 
apparatus may be an indicator of the impotency of the State, in as much as it evinces the failure 
of the State in maintaining order, it may even be said that the State’s violent reaction to an 
event is plausibly one of the first signs that announces the possibility of change in the situation. 
But it is difficult not to concur with Paul Livingston when he objects that the particular way 
in which the point is expressed by Badiou conflates the quantitative excess of the state of the 
situation (that its cardinality exceeds that of the situation of which it is the state) and the 
qualitative excess of the State’s repressive power.50 Whereas Livingston concludes that there 
is a metaphorical leap that cannot be justified by set-theoretical ontology in Badiou’s 
description of the political event in an ontic setting, some readers have nonetheless associated 
the State with one type of multiple defined in Being and Event, namely, ‘excrescent’ multiples, 
which are multiples that belong to the state of the situation but not to the situation itself, hence 
‘exist’ as something like an external appendage to the situation.51 Excrescent multiples are a 
direct expression of the excess of inclusion (representation) over belonging (presentation)—
they conform to the premise on which the repressive power of the State is based, namely, that 
‘the representative multiplicity is always of a higher power than the presentative multiplicity’. 
There is a way of reading this statement as a critique of representative politics: even in its most 
democratic form, the State represents individuals only through the means of groupings or 
classifications (such as electoral constituencies). The ‘excess’ or ‘excrescence’ of the State, in 
this case, refers to the fact that a State is fundamentally at a distance from the individual 
                                                            
50 Livingston, p. 272. 
51 See, for example: Nina Power and Alberto Toscano, ‘Politics’, in Alain Badiou: Key Concepts, ed. by A. J. 
Bartlett and Justin Clemens (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 94–104 (p. 95). 
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members of those groups that it claims to represent—this is a point that Livingston is willing 
to grant.52 
Yet, it is unclear whether the association of excrescent multiples with the empirical 
State actually succeeds in fully dispelling the suspicion that there is a hypostatization of an 
ontological category. This is because given the way in which the being of a truth has been 
defined, a truth is also excrescent in exactly the same sense: it is included in the situation in 
so far as it is a subset but does not belong the situation in so far as it is an infinite generic 
subset. Thought in its generic being, a truth, Badiou writes, is a ‘pure indistinct excess over 
presented multiples’, indeed, an ‘anonymous excrescence’.53 Excrescence, then, is the type of 
multiple that by which the being of both a truth and a State is thought in the discourse of set-
theoretical ontology. In fact, it is none other than the immeasurable excess of representation 
over presentation on which the thought essential to the theory of post-evental transformation, 
namely, that a truth, in its being, is generic, infinite, and irreducibly separated from knowledge, 
is grounded. The equation of excrescence with the State, therefore, is not implied by the 
ontological discourse itself. Nor can the ‘repressive dimension’ of the State be attributed to 
the excess of representation over presentation, in so far as a truth is essentially liberating and 
transformative (rather than repressive and inertial). If the ‘State’ stands for the mechanism that 
maintains a social situation as it is, the equivocation that has been witnessed here between 
quantitative and qualitative excess of ‘power’, it would not be unreasonable to suggest, may 
be a symptom of the lack of a clear place in the Badiouian framework—to return to a point 
noted previously in the first chapter (section 1.2.3)—for the qualitative force that must be 
posited in order to account for the inertia and persistence of a social situation.  
                                                            
52 See: Livingston, p. 47. 
53 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 342. 
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Since the equation of state of the situation and State is tenuous, one might ask whether 
it could simply be disregarded in a Badiouian account of social change. Yet, it appears that the 
equivocation does perform a role in the account. The mere existence of the repressive 
apparatus of the State does not entail its intervention. If so, the fact that the State has intervened 
in response to a certain event must be seen as showing something about the event and the 
situation for which it is an event. The claim of this chapter was that the fact that there is an 
infinite plurality of situations in a society may render events and truth procedures rather 
common—and possibly mundane—in so far as they are limited to particular situations. The 
provocation of the State can be said to fulfil the following revelatory function in the Badiouian 
account of social change: the intervention of the State’s repressive apparatus, its resistance to 
an event, confirms retroactively that the void that the event has revealed is in fact something 
that is disruptive, something that matters to the State, so much so that it is forced to intervene. 
It confirms, in other words, the non-mundanity of the event in a particular social situation—
its status as a ‘genuinely political event’—that is not determinable in terms of set-theoretical 
ontology alone.  
 
2.4 Toward the determination of society as a situation 
In the proposition that ‘[a] truth concerns everyone inasmuch as it is a multiplicity that 
no particular predicate can circumscribe’, the extension of ‘everyone’ has two possible 
interpretations. Either a truth concerns only those in the particular situation in which it is 
produced, or it also concerns, or at least can come to concern, those who are beyond—or are 
not inhabitants of—the situation for which it is its truth. If the argument advanced in this 
chapter that any specific void and the event that reveals it are indexed to a particular situation 
and that this situatedness limits the extent of the socially transformative potential of a truth is 
right, then only the former interpretation is defensible within the bounds the theoretical 
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framework developed in Being and Event. What is thereby placed under doubt is whether the 
account of truth procedure is adequate to support the thought of an extensive transformation 
of society, if society is conceived ‘concretely’ as the ‘interplay’ of social situations in the 
plural. It can be conceded that it is not the task of general ontology to provide an account of 
extensive social change. But if such an account is to be developed, it does not seem satisfactory 
to simply concede the incommensurability of concrete situations and the ontological situation. 
The ambiguities raised in this chapter may be alleviated if either of the following could be 
incorporated into the social situations and transformative processes: (1) an account of how a 
political process takes place across different situations and in relation to a plurality social 
identities therein; (2) a specification of situations that, in some sense, ‘matter’ more than other 
situations for social change. With neither conceptually determinable with the resources of 
Being and Event, the elaborate formal theorization of what it means to transform a situation 
that it succeeds in providing is not yet a theorization of far-reaching, extensive social 
transformation, in as much as the social could be construed as being composed of a potentially 
infinite number of situations that are formed, related, and sustained in ways that are not clearly 
specifiable within the framework of Badiou’s general ontology. If Being and Event secures 
the ‘vertical’ axis through the conceptual determination of novelty and process of change, it 
does not elaborate with the same acuity the concrete, historical conditions in which processes 
of change take effect—something of the ‘horizontal’ axis thus remains undertheorized. This 
undertheorization attests to the lack of theoretical resources in Being and Event to address the 
specificity of social situations. The next chapter thus turns to the works of Laclau, which 





Chapter 3. Hegemony and the search for fullness 
  
3.1 Introduction to the theory of hegemony  
Hegemony theory proposes that processes of totalization of diverse particular identities 
are involved in both the constitution of a social order and a project toward its transformation. 
This totalization occurs through a ‘hegemonic’ operation by which a particularity—a group, a 
social identity, a demand or a political struggle, and so on—comes to assume the function of 
universal representation, which, for Laclau, always alludes to an as yet unachieved self-
identity of society. As long as the self-identity of society—its ‘fullness’—is unachieved, and 
it is never finally achieved according to Laclau, it becomes the objective to be attained. The 
‘absent fullness’ of society is what generates political desire, and sustains any attempt to 
establish or transform a social order. Given such an emphasis on totalization, it might be hoped 
that the process of social change that is thinkable under hegemony theory would provide an 
alternative account that avoids some of the ambiguities in the theorization of social change 
drawn from Being and Event that have been found in the previous chapter, such as the 
situatedness of a truth procedure in a situation and the difficulty of conceiving the interaction 
between different situations and subjects. 
There is no shortage of ambition in Laclau’s work. Its final objective is nothing short 
of a theoretical system that reflects the ‘basic homology at all levels of analysis of human 
reality’ attested by linguistics, psychoanalysis, rhetoric, and politics.1 On what this homology 
Laclau finds is, the following is perhaps the most succinct approximation: there is no social 
reality beyond processes of signification or meaning, social activities are signifying (or 
‘discursive’ or ‘articulatory’) processes, all social objects are produced through such processes 
                                                            
1 David Howarth, ‘An Interview with Ernesto Laclau’, in Ernesto Laclau: Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique, 
ed. by David Howarth (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 257–71 (p. 261). 
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(hence they are discursive objects), and the contingency of their identity and the possibility of 
their transformation is revealed in the breakdown of the process of signification. What Laclau 
proposes is an ontology for which the constitution of objectivity is—instead of the anonymous 
count-as-one—the outcome of signifying acts. If the anonymity of the count-as-one ensures 
the generality of Badiou’s ontology, then perhaps Laclau’s premise concerning the 
constitution of objectivity renders the ontology that underpins his theory of hegemony a 
‘regional’ ontology. But if his is indeed a regional ontology, it is unquestionably one that 
elucidates the processes by which specifically social situations are constructed, maintained, 
and transformed. 
Although the core of Laclau’s thought remains constant in his works, presenting 
hegemony theory as a single chain of reasoning is not an easy task, for Laclau’s formulation 
of his theory shifts as the domain of his theorization shifts and new concepts appear and 
disappear in his works as the purpose and object of his analyses change. Some of his key 
concepts—such as dislocation, antagonism, subject, and empty signifier—have undergone 
significant reformulations over time. Rather than retracing the developments of Laclau’s 
thought, this chapter will aim to reinterpret hegemony theory as to present it in a way that 
would maintain a sense of continuity with the interpretation of set-theoretical ontology offered 
in the first chapter. The result is an unconventional reading—whatever dangers such a reading 
entails shall simply be embraced. 
In the two subsections of 3.2, the idea that the structure of social order is a systematic 
totality shall be elaborated. After considering of the purported differences between Badiou and 
Laclau and the some of the questions that Badiou’s approach has elicited in section 3.3.1, this 
chapter will turn to Laclau’s critique of Badiou, in which prominent theoretical differences 
between them concerning the structure of social order and the possibility of social change are 
shown. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 are devoted to Laclau’s account of subject and ‘fullness’, 
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which orients the political process of instituting an order in the place of disorder induced by 
the breakdown of a prevailing order. In the next chapter, a further examination of the account 
of social change proposed by hegemony theory will be carried out by contrasting it against 
positions advanced by other theorists and his critics, finally to reach a verdict on whether 
hegemony theory provides a satisfactory account of social change, one that will be issued, in 
part, from a Badiouian perspective. 
 
3.2 The logic of hegemony and the actualization of alternative possibilities 
3.2.1 Totality and hegemonic formations 
Laclau accepts as a basic ontological principle the thesis that ‘“relations” and 
“objectivity” are synonymous’.2  A social order, as well as all the elements that are embraced 
within it, are constituted through the various relations that hold between them. Although 
Laclau adopts insights of structural linguistics rather than axiomatic set-theory as the basis of 
his ‘discursive’ social ontology, the initial steps that Laclau takes toward the conceptualization 
of social order are not without parallel in the Badiouian approach. In the Badiouian account 
of a normalized situation, the state of a situation, under the limitation of the constructivist 
regime of representation, ‘tames’ the immeasurable excess of representation to preserve the 
situation as it is. A comparable thesis is asserted by Laclau: a stable social order is the outcome 
of an attempt by certain social forces to ‘domesticate’ the non-totalizable ‘infinitude of the 
social’ and ‘embrace it within the finitude of an order’.3 The particular social force that has 
succeeded in instituting a stable order is said to be ‘hegemonic’. It can said to have ‘[acted] 
over the ‘social’”, by fixing the relationship between social elements—signifiers, words and 
                                                            
2 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 256. 
3 Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, p. 91. 
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deeds, subject-positions—into a stable configuration, 4  which shall hereafter be called a 
‘hegemonic formation’. When positional differences thereby instituted maintain their 
regularity, the order is said to be ‘sedimented’. On several occasions, Laclau has employed 
the vocabulary of ‘countable’ and ‘uncountable’ to describe a sedimented social order, writing, 
for instance, that ‘sedimentation refers to the institutionalized forms of the social (broadly 
speaking, to what Rancière calls “police”) and are the point at which the “countable” and the 
“uncountable” exclude each other’.5 It might be said that elements integrated into a hegemonic 
formation are ‘counted’ as differential positions that belong to it, whereas the ‘uncounted’ 
elements are those that do not belong. But setting this terminology aside for now, it is to 
Laclau’s own theorization of the constitution of social orders the exposition shall turn. 
To conceive a differential system, Laclau argues, is to conceive the limits of that 
system, the boundary between what is inside and what is outside the system. Limits, Laclau 
claims, ‘only exist insofar as a systematic ensemble of differences can be cut out as totality 
with regard to something beyond them, and it is only through this cutting out that the totality 
constitutes itself as formation’.6 One way to conceive this limit that ‘cuts out’ a totality would 
be to imagine it to be a fence between the inside and the outside. But in this case, there are 
still only differences: the inside, the outside, and the fence itself. Under the conception of a 
limit as another difference, the determination of the ‘beyond’ that is needed to cut out a totality 
would be deferred, in which case it is impossible to determine the beginning and the end of a 
social order. A limit that is the ground of a system of differences—a systematizing limit—
cannot be just one more element or one more difference. Laclau proposes that the limit be seen 
as ‘exclusionary’. The beyond is to be conceived not as another difference vis-à-vis the inside, 
                                                            
4 Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, pp. 90–91. 
5 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Reply’, Cultural Studies, 26.2–3 (2012), 391–415 (p. 412). 
6 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
2nd edn (London: Verso, 2001), p. 143. 
114 
 
but as ‘something that the totality expels from itself’ in order to constitute itself, such that 
whatever lies beyond the limit is not ‘simply one more, but an excluded one’.7 From the 
thought that a totality is constituted by an exclusionary limit, Laclau infers a subversive 
dialectic between ‘equivalential’ and ‘differential’ relations within that totality: 
A first effect of the exclusionary limit is that it introduces an essential 
ambivalence within the system of differences constituted by those limits. On 
the one hand, each element of the system has an identity only so far as it is 
different from the others: difference=identity. On the other hand, however, 
all these differences are equivalent to each other inasmuch as all of them 
belong to this side of the frontier of exclusion. But in that case, the identity 
of each element is constitutively split.8 
Equivalence, which is the subversion of difference, is as much a condition of possibility of a 
system of differences as difference. Totality is the locus of tension between relations of 
equivalence and difference. This tension is one that cannot be eliminated, since equivalence 
and difference are necessary but contradictory conditions of the constitution of a systematic 
totality. Laclau occasionally remarks that there is ‘no square circle that can provide the basis 
for the logical articulation of these two poles’.9 For Laclau, what is is not the one, but it is not 
multiplicity either—if the paradox of self-belonging leads axiomatic set-theory to declare that 
there is no set of all sets, Laclau draws from the tension between the two poles constitutive of 
systematic totality the conclusion that totality ‘exists’ as a ‘failed unicity’.10  
                                                            
7 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 70. 
8 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), p. 38. 
9 Brian Price and Meghan Sutherland, ‘Not a Ground but a Horizon: An Interview with Ernesto Laclau’, World 
Picture, 2 (2008) <http://www.worldpicturejournal.com/WP_2/Laclau.html> [accessed 18 September 2017]. 
10 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Glimpsing the Future’, in Laclau: A Critical Reader, ed. by Simon Critchley and Oliver 
Marchart (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 279–328 (p. 325). 
Following Livingston, it might be said that axiomatic set-theory opts for consistency and incompleteness, 
whereas Laclau’s discursive ontology opts for inconsistency and completeness. See: Livingston, chap. 9. 
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‘The social only exists as the vain attempt to instate that impossible object: society. 
Utopia is the essence of any communication and social practice’11—this statement, with which 
Laclau concludes a programmatic essay published alongside Hegemony and Socialist Struggle, 
prefigures the direction of Laclau’s argument from this point onward. No object corresponds 
to the concept of totality as a ‘sutured and self-defined’ entity,12 and it is impossible for a 
social order to constitute itself as such. However, that a totality is never finally constituted—
that it has a boundary that will remain essentially porous and renegotiable, and that, for this 
reason, the relationship between the elements, hence their identities, cannot be fixed once and 
for all—does not eliminate the need to constitute it, as there would be no social order and no 
social identities without it. Laclau is keen to repeat that totality persists as a ‘horizon and not 
a ground’, suggesting that social activities are attempts—the success of which will always be 
precarious and temporary—to constitute this impossible object. 13  For it is ultimately 
unachievable, totality is always an attempt at totalization. The dichotomy between pre-evental 
stasis of the situation and post-evental kinesis that is found in the Badiouian approach becomes 
difficult to uphold, since complete stasis could be ascribed to the elements of a totality if it 
were the case that the totality itself existed in a state of equilibrium. Despite blurring the 
dichotomy, however, hegemony theory proposes that relative stasis can be, and must be, 
achieved for there to be an order rather than chaos. 
Processes by which any discursive—that is, social—object is produced are termed 
‘articulation’. Social activity, in so far as it establishes, modifies, and reinforces relations 
between elements, are articulatory processes. Any social order or hegemonic formation is a 
‘structured totality resulting from […] articulatory practices’. 14  But an additional step is 
                                                            
11 Ernesto Laclau, ‘The Impossibility of Society’, The Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 7 (1983), 
21–24 (p. 24). 
12 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 111. 
13 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 71. 
14 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 105. 
116 
 
needed to constitute a totality, namely, the instance of totalization. One could say that a 
‘“concrete individual” can have a number of different subject-positions’—one and the same 
individual may belong to a plurality of such articulated totalities that allow that individual to 
‘be positioned as, “black”, “working class”, “Christian” and a “woman”’ and so on’.15 Because 
all such subject-positions with which an individual could identify that, in some sense, must 
‘cohere’ to form a social order as a relatively stable self-identical configuration are initially 
particularistic elements within various articulated totalities, an account of how all of these 
differences, the plurality of elements and a variety of formations in which they are constituted 
as objects come to be differences within a broader systematic totality is required. Hegemony 
theory postulates that there is an instance at which a certain element totalizes to produce a 
whole. This instance is that of hegemony itself, at which ‘a certain identity is picked up from 
the whole field of differences, and made to embody this totalizing function’,16 or, alternatively 
phrased, when a certain particularity—which may be anything: words, a political project, 
subject-positions, or ‘ways of life’—‘without ceasing to be particular’, come to acquire a 
significance beyond its own particularity as the representative of the totality as a whole.17 In 
this instance of hegemony, some particular element in the system further splits ‘between the 
particularity which it still is’ and a more universal dimension of which it ‘becomes the 
bearer’.18 Through this splitting—‘the moment of excess’ at which the particular overflows its 
own particularity19—the particular element ‘becomes something of the order of an empty 
                                                            
15 Howarth and Stavrakakis, p. 13. 
16 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 81. 
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signifier’.20 A slightly altered version of a diagram that Laclau has employed on several 
occasions serves to illustrate the idea of empty signifier21: 
 
The constitutive split in each element, S, is marked with the symbol θ. The ‘=’ linking the 
plurality of S’s indicate their equivalential relation, that they compose a ‘chain of equivalence’ 
in virtue of being elements of the same systematic totality. One of the elements, S1, appears 
twice, indicating its split between its particularity and its being an empty signifier. The results 
of Laclau’s reflections on systematic totality as something with a beyond returns to limit the 
universality that can be achieved, such that the only achievable universality becomes a 
partial—or hegemonic—universality. An empty signifier itself has to be defined in relation to 
something else. But since an empty signifier has to be a ‘signifier of the pure cancellation of 
all difference’ in as much as it is not just another difference, and in as much as it represents 
the totality as a whole,22 it must be defined not against an element within the system but against 
what the totality excludes. The exclusionary limit is marked in the diagram above by the 
horizontal bar between S1 and A. The latter is the signifier that represents whatever that is 
beyond the limit and serves as the negative reference of S1. An empty signifier represents 
‘something equally present’ in the elements of a totality23—but that which is equally present 
                                                          
20 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 71. 
21 The original diagram can be found in: Ernesto Laclau, ‘Constructing Universality’, in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, by Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto Laclau, and Judith Butler (London: 
Verso, 2000), pp. 281–307 (p. 303). 
22 Laclau, Emancipation(s), pp. 38–39. 
23 Laclau, Emancipation(s), p. 42. 
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is not a positive feature, but the relation of exclusion that all of them share with respect to the 
outside, by which their belonging together on one side of the exclusionary limit is attested. A 
particularity that functions as an empty signifier is also called ‘hegemonic identity’ or 
‘hegemonic particularity’ in the Laclauian text, in which it is maintained, pace Claude Lefort, 
that ‘emptiness is a type of identity, not a structural location’.24 This is meant to suggest a 
reciprocity between the totalizing function of the empty signifier and that which it totalizes: a 
particularity functions as an empty signifier in so far as a wide range of social agents, in their 
condition as subjects whose identities are constituted through acts of identification, identify 
with it. What motivates identification, what conditions identification, and the ‘content’ of 
identification, are matters to be explored later in this chapter and in the next chapter.  
 
3.2.2 The glimpses of change 
Following the elaboration of the constitution of systematic totality, it can be said that 
the construction or articulation of subject-positions within a systematic totality, as much as it 
is the introduction of another difference, is also an expansion of the equivalential relation or 
the chain of equivalence that holds between differential elements in as much as they belong to 
one side of an exclusionary limit. Difference (that particular positions are articulated into the 
formation) and equivalence (that these positions belong to one side of the exclusionary limit) 
are two relations that are always simultaneously operative in any process of hegemonic 
articulation. This is why equivalence, in and of itself, implies neither a normatively substantive 
idea of equality nor an emancipatory dimension. Rather, what will need to maintained instead 
is that the emergence of a socially transformative process involves the construction of an 
equivalential chain between elements that, in some sense, breaks from the internal 
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determinations of the previous formation. As this chapter hopes to present hegemony theory 
whilst maintaining a sense of continuity with the interpretation of set-theoretical ontology 
offered in preceding chapters, it is instructive to turn to the following passage from Roland 
Végső—in which both Laclauian and Badiouian vocabularies are employed—to give a 
redescription of hegemonic identity and anticipate how that break will be conceived: 
we could say that whatever is excluded from a particular hegemonic 
articulation appears from the perspective of this articulation as a singular 
term. In case some of these elements successfully enter the chain of 
equivalences composing this hegemonic articulation, they will become 
normal terms. They are both presented and represented in the sense that their 
identity is always split between their particularity and the hegemonic 
universality that counts them as one.25 
An element that has been successfully articulated into a hegemonic formation belongs to it as 
a differential element and is represented by the hegemonic identity that, in its function of 
universal representation, counts as one all elements that belong to the formation, in as much 
as they belong. Geoff Boucher is right when he writes that universality, for Laclau, ‘cannot 
exist before—or independently of—a chain of equivalences, formed through discursive 
articulations, that links particular identities’.26 It does not seem plausible, however, to maintain 
that the universal dimension of a hegemonic formation is a ‘mere generalization’ of plurality 
of particular elements, or that any element could be integrated into an equivalential chain.  
Laclau had written that in a sedimented order, the ‘“countable” and the “uncountable” exclude 
each other’, suggesting thereby that in so far as a hegemonic formation is stable, there are 
some elements that cannot be articulated as another difference within it. Thus, it would not be 
implausible to suggest that in a sedimented social order, in as much as it remains such, the 
introduction of another difference will be constrained in some way. To conceive of this 
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constraint, the interpretation may turn to a notion that has featured in some of Laclau’s writings: 
social imaginary. As Laclau defines it, a social imaginary is a ‘surface of inscription of subject 
positions’ or a ‘space of representation’ that operates as a kind of framework according to 
which subjects constitute their identities. 27  ‘[S]ocial imaginaries organized around some 
empty signifiers represent’, Laclau writes, ‘the limit of socially attainable universalization. 
There is no universality […] except through an equivalence between particularities, and such 
equivalences are always contingent and context-dependent’.28 From the objective presence of 
a stable order, it is inferred that a hegemonic identity, in so far as it continues to stabilize a 
formation, is comparable to what has been defined in the first chapter as the regime of 
representation that governs what can be represented in a situation: it establishes the extent of 
what would be an immanent development of the structure. The introduction of further 
differences that expands the equivalential relation, but as a relation that is constitutive of one 
particular formation, will be constructed within the limit of what can be represented as 
elements that belong to the formation, whose universal dimension some particularity 
functioning as an empty signifier or a hegemonic identity represents. It remains to be 
investigated how hegemony theory accounts for the emergence, persistence, and displacement 
of a particular regime of representation, such that it will have accounted for not only the 
structure and development of a stable order but the possibility of a different social order in 
which the relationship between the countable and uncountable is renegotiated, such that 
previously unrepresentable positions will have become representable.  
The necessity of a constitutive outside implies that there are always elements that are 
excluded from a particular hegemonic formation, elements that are not counted. The ‘ideal of 
                                                            
27 Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, p. 64. 
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a radical inclusivity’ is impossible, since every social order, always configured by hegemonic 
processes, presupposes exclusion. This is not a reason for despair, for a world in which 
everything is already included is a saturated world without room for future inclusion. Judith 
Butler captures Laclau’s position when she writes that it is the ‘very impossibility [of radical 
inclusivity that] nevertheless governs the political field as an idealization of the future that 
motivates the expansion, linking, and perpetual production of political subject-positions and 
signifiers’.29 The possibility of change, then, comes from the outside that exists due to the 
impossibility of any order to extend its inclusivity to embrace all positions. Thus, Butler 
explains that, for Laclau, politics will be transformative to the extent that 
the constitutive exclusions that stabilize the discursive domain […]—those 
positions that have been excluded from representability […]—are 
established in relation to the existing polity as what calls to be included 
within its terms, i.e., a set of future possibilities for inclusion, […] as part of 
the not-yet-assimilable horizon of community.30 
Unassimilated positions can emerge as possibilities whose actualization would initially disrupt 
a formation, and then possibly lead toward its transformation if it were to be assimilated. It 
might be asked how someone whose identity is constituted by and located within a particular 
hegemonic formation could begin to identify with a position external to that formation. There 
are two possible responses. First, the articulation of elements as fixed ‘moments’ of a totality 
is never accomplished entirely and finally. This is due to the influence of other discourses, or 
the ‘structural pressure’ of other systematic totalities and their articulatory processes—
exposure to alterity is what prevents the absolute totalization of the social space by one 
discourse. Even if it is the hegemonic, most dominant, discourse that has acted over the social, 
it is but a partial totality in the non-totalizable ‘infinitude of the social’. It is thereby implied 
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that there will be a ‘surplus’ of elements that allows for the articulation of other social objects 
(identities, projects, or discourses), and that the stability of all discursively articulated objects 
is inescapably open to the possibility of disturbance by what is other to them. This line of 
response has invited some criticism. Hegemony theory, especially the version presented in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, has been criticized for an ‘excessive voluntarism’ by critics 
who saw Laclau as ‘stipulating that on the basis of the availability of a particular discourse, 
effectively anything was possible’.31 It will be seen in the next chapter that for Laclau, there 
is no instance at which everything becomes possible and that the availability of a discourse 
does not entail its acceptance. The second response—developed in the years following the 
publication of Hegemony—is that there are crises, or ‘events’ that ‘dislocate’ established 
discourses or social formation. Laclau cites the German economic crisis of the 1920s and its 
devastating effects on the middle classes, at which ‘[a]ll routine expectations and practices—
even the sense of self-identity—had been entirely shattered’, leading to a ‘generalized 
dislocation of traditional patterns of life’.32 In either case, it is there is a ‘failure’ of the 
structure to determine the identity of social agents. In hegemony theory, such lack of identity 
is ultimately the ‘experience of antagonism’, or, the experience of the ‘limit of the social’. 
What is theorized under the concept of ‘antagonism’ is the interruption of immanent 
development of the structure. 
Torben Bech Dyrberg describes antagonism as revealing the ‘split between the actual 
and the potential in which the latter is sought hegemonized by the former as an actuality that 
is prevented from being what it is’.33 Laclau claims that it is ‘because a peasant cannot be a 
peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his land’.34 These 
                                                            
31 Oliver Harrison, Revolutionary Subjectivity in Post-Marxist Thought: Laclau, Negri, Badiou (Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate, 2014), p. 50. 
32 Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, p. 65. 
33 Torben Bech Dyrberg, ‘The Political and Politics in Discourse Analysis’, in Laclau: A Critical Reader, ed. by 
Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 241–55 (p. 247). 
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formulations of antagonism suggest, firstly, that in antagonism, there are identities social 
agents aspire to attain but whose attainment is denied under the prevailing hegemonic 
formation. Thus, where antagonism exists, what is shown is the internal limit of a social order 
as it is presently configured. The abovementioned formulations of antagonism suggest, 
secondly, that in as much as what gives rise to antagonism is not a pure externality with respect 
to the social order but arises from the relations that constitute the social order, antagonism is 
an instance at which the non-self-identity of that order is shown. Antagonism exists between 
hegemonic processes by which identities are constituted when one is experienced by another 
as the subversive presence of an ‘other’ that prevents its identity from becoming a ‘full’ self-
identity. When an object is prevented from self-identity, this object is said to be dislocated. 
‘Actualizing the potential’ that is thwarted by an antagonistic other, Dyrberg explains, ‘is an 
act in the sense that it cannot be read off from structure, which is why the decision is an 
irreducible moment in the process of rendering the potential actual’.35 It is at the point at which 
a gap exists between the actual and potential that the distinction between subject-position and 
subject is introduced. In the event of dislocation, Laclau, playing on an existentialist trope, 
asserts that one is ‘condemned to be free’. But this freedom, he asserts, emerges not because 
one has no structural or objective identity, but because he has a ‘failed structural identity’. One 
is ‘simply thrown up in [one’s] condition as a subject’ because he has ‘not achieved 
constitution as an object’.36 It is this feature of subjectivity—that the subject is born from the 
failure of structure and identity—that is disclosed in the dislocating experience of antagonism 
or the limit of the social, ‘when it is no longer clear how the subject is to “go on”, that is, when 
it is undecided as to how it is to follow the rules, for instance, or engage in its routinized 
practices’.37  Dislocation is an identity crisis for social agents because the formation that 
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constituted the subject-positions with which they had identified no longer accommodates them. 
The contingency of one’s identity, which implies its non-identity with a subject-position, is 
shown in this instance. The link between the subject and identification becomes that of 
possibility than of necessity, that of real alternative than that of immanent development—thus, 
dislocation can also be said to be the interruption of the structure’s capacity to determine its 
outcome. The Laclauian subject, condemned to be free because it has not achieved self-identity, 
is confronted by an ‘undecidability’, which Laclau defines as the ‘distance’ between ‘the 
plurality of arrangements that are possible out of [a given structural point] and the actual 
arrangement that has finally prevailed’.38 The ‘moment of the subject’, Laclau writes, is the 
‘distance between the undecidability of the structure and the decision’.39 The decision of the 
subject is an act of identification. The subject asserts a new identity, which, if it succeeds, 
amounts to the neutralization of dislocation, thus the restoration of order as a relatively self-
enclosed totality. The decision is directed toward the actualization of one possibility over 
others, and in so far as it is, it implies the repression of alternatives that had been available. In 
this respect, ‘[t]he constitution of a social identity’, as much as it is an exercise of freedom, is 
also ‘an act of power’. But if this is the case, it must also be that ‘identity as such is power’,40 
for the stability of a restored identity implies the continual repression of certain possibilities 
from actualizing in the order reconstituted through the act, the order in which dislocation has 
been resolved and the moment of the subject has passed.  
Dislocation, at which the immanent development of a systematic totality is interrupted, 
and identification, which results in its reconfiguration into a transformed totality, compose a 
process that has been described figuratively as a ‘“loosening” and “tightening” of the 
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structure’. 41  If sedimentation moves toward an order in which ‘the “countable” and the 
“uncountable” exclude each other’, dislocation renders the boundary between the countable 
and the uncountable indeterminate—it is the moment of ‘reactivation’ at which contingency 
of an order is revealed and alternatives become available. There is a somewhat unintuitive 
implication of the preceding description. If dislocation—the ‘loosening’—is the source of 
freedom, possibility, and of the subject, then the subsequent ‘tightening’ achieved by the 
subject’s act results in its eclipse of the subject, the loss of freedom, and the closing down of 
possibilities. This outcome—in which an unexpected similarity with the Sartrean idea of the 
becoming-inert of human praxis is observed—is one that Laclau is prepared to accept, as he 
does not hesitate to conclude that ‘social action tends towards the constitution of that 
impossible object [i.e. society as a closed, self-identical totality], and thus towards the 
elimination of the conditions of liberty itself’.42 The Laclauian subject is a ‘vanishing operator’ 
whose effects on the structure is indicated by its disappearance and the institution of a new 
order and subject-positions, which are, as ‘objective’ social identities, ‘the crystallization of 
an act of the subject’.43 Not only does this characterization of the subject differ in tone from 
Badiou’s description of the subject of a truth as ‘Immortal’, 44  it also is indicative of a 
substantive difference between the role that Laclau attributes to a political process toward 
extensive social transformation and the role that Badiou accords to politics as a truth procedure.  
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3.3 The political vision of hegemony theory 
3.3.1 Subtractive politics or strategic rearrangement of discourses 
A process toward social change ‘involves the articulation of different identities and 
subjectivities into a common project’,45 where the structure of this ‘project’ itself is conceived 
as a systematic totality, or more accurately, attempts at totalization. As the equivalential 
articulation of different identities marks the emergence of a new hegemonic universality, it 
would appear that Laclau is, broadly, in agreement with the assertion, from Badiou, that the 
‘difficulty lies on the side of the Same’ that transcends differences, that the task of a theory of 
social change is thinking the universality that ‘must come to be’.46 When the extent to which 
this concern for universality in political process is shared is examined, what emerges is the 
sense in which the understanding that a political process unfolds in a situation that is populated 
by different groups—thus, an aspect of what has been termed, in the introduction, as the 
‘horizontal’ axis—becomes a more prominent concern in hegemony theory. One very brief 
sentence that is found in an essay by Alberto Toscano shall serve as a starting point for 
comparing and contrasting Badiouian and Laclauian approaches.  
Toscano writes that ‘despite the deceptive resonance’, the production of a universal 
and egalitarian truth is not to be confused with the hegemonic construction of an equivalential 
chain. The latter, he claims, involves ‘strategic rearrangement and occupation of discourse 
(what Badiou would call “the language of the situation”)’, whereas the production of a truth 
‘requires instead an organised subtraction or separation from its manner of structuring and 
stratifying our experience of the world’.47 Within the bounds of parentheses, the concept of 
discourse is equated with the Badiouian category of the language of the situation. The equation 
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appears even at first sight to be spurious, as there is no reason to believe that whatever 
‘language’ that is presupposed by the concept of discourse could be identified with the wholly 
predicative language that the language of the situation is. But even if this matter were set aside, 
it is unclear to what extent the succinct distinction between ‘rearrangement and occupation of 
discourse’ supposedly characteristic of hegemonic processes are constituted and ‘subtraction 
or separation’ that characterizes a truth procedure is capable of establishing a difference 
between the two.  
The faithful subject of a truth ‘emptily names the universe yet-to-come’ by devising a 
subject-language that employs names and predicates that will be semantically fulfilled in a 
situation extended by a truth.48 Because the subject, due to its situatedness in a particular 
situation, ‘cannot make a language out of anything except combinations of the supernumerary 
name of the event and the language of the situation’,49 subject-language anticipates the truth 
that ‘will have been presented’ by ‘shifting’ established meanings, to name empty places that 
will have been filled in a situation extended by the accommodation of previously indiscernible 
multiples. ‘Language’, Badiou goes as far to assert, ‘is the very being of truth via the 
combination of current finite inquiries and the future anterior of a generic infinity’.50 When a 
truth procedure is characterized in these terms, it seems difficult to deny that the production 
of a truth in a situation does involve what can only be presumed is a discursive procedure that 
rearranges the language of the situation. If so, ‘rearrangement and occupation of discourse’ 
cannot be an entirely erroneous way to describe at least one aspect of the Badiouian post-
evental process. Another distinction between Laclauian and Badiouian theorizations of 
political process insinuated by Toscano’s brief remark is that the rearrangement of discourses 
is ‘strategic’ in hegemony theory, in contrast to the politics of truth, which operates in the 
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mode of ‘subtraction’. What needs to be seen is what ‘strategy’ means, and whether the 
‘subtractive’ should be maintained as categorically incompatible with the ‘strategic’. 
As Oliver Marchart writes, ‘the only possible reference [of equality] is the non-
reference to the state of the situation, to the principle of classification and order’. 51 
Universality and equality—and a truth for Badiou is nothing if not universal and egalitarian—
cannot have a positive, particularistic determination, and their production takes place as the 
undoing of identitarian differences that are established by the situation’s prevailing 
representational regime in order to regulate presentable and representable realities. Thus, 
although ‘every truths erupts as singular’ (as their evental nature is such that they cannot be 
subsumed under existing order of representation and knowledge), they are ‘immediately 
universalizable. Universalizable singularity necessarily breaks with identitarian singularity’.52 
Badiou places this idea in a historical context in Saint Paul, wherein Paul’s attempt to establish 
the universality of Christianity is presented not as a matter of religious faith as a paradigm of 
political action.  
‘That every truth procedure collapses differences, infinitely deploying a purely generic 
multiplicity’, Badiou writes, ‘does not permit us to lose sight of the fact that, in the situation 
(call it: the world), there are differences’.53 In order ‘for people to become gripped by truth’ 
such that they transcend their differences to participate in its universality, ‘it is imperative that 
universality not present itself under the aspect of a particularity’.54 Badiou cites the following 
passage from Corinthians: 
For though I am free from all men, I have made myself a slave to all, that I 
might win the more. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win the Jews; 
to those under the law, I became as one under the law—though not being 
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myself under the law—that I might win those under the law. To those outside 
the law I became as one outside the law—not being without law toward God 
but under the law of Christ—that I might win those outside the law. To the 
weak I became weak, that I might win the weak. I have become all things to 
all men.55 
If the idea of ‘becoming all things to all men’, which seems to involve, in practice, presenting 
oneself differently when interacting with different groups, does not already bear some 
resemblance to a ‘strategic occupation’ of different discourses, one might, with Audrone 
Žukauskaitė, note that it may very well be the case that ‘not every identitarian or minority 
group prefers to be subjected to the universal truth’. 56  Badiou describes a truth as a 
‘subsumption of the Other by the Same’. But that a truth is addressed and offered to all is one 
thing; for the addressee to receive the offer is another. It would not be unreasonable to seek an 
explanation for the factors that may have led to successes, difficulties, or even failures, of 
certain attempts to ‘win over’ different groups—which, in Being and Event, had been theorized 
as the ‘enquiry’ of the faithful subject—in the process of establishing the universality of a 
truth. Perhaps it should be accepted that conversion, in the end, is a matter of ‘grace’, thus, as 
unexplainable as an event (which Badiou does occasionally say is ‘grace’, something that 
‘presents itself as pure givenness’57), but also—as Kant might say—as unexplainable as 
freedom. And yet, the moment one attempts to offer some explanation for successes and 
failures of the activity of ‘winning over’, one will have moved toward an explanatory account 
of the efficacy of a process in producing actual transformative effects. But to have such an 
account is no different from the possession of the prerequisite for developing any kind of 
strategy, in so far as strategic actions are fundamentally goal-oriented actions that are 
performed because there are reasons to believe that their accomplishment would be a step 
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toward the intended goal, actions that are also open to course-correction depending on 
circumstances. 58  It is not being denied that the process of social transformation that is 
conceived within the framework of Being and Event must operate in the mode of subtraction 
in as much as it is a truth procedure—that a truth must transcend differences in order to 
introduce novelty into the situation is a fundamental thesis of Badiou’s de jure account of 
change. Nevertheless, whether forcing a choice between the ‘strategic’ pursuit of practical 
efficacy and the practice of disciplined ‘subtraction’ that a truth procedure is characterized to 
be is conducive to thinking social change is rather dubious.  
In the next section, the sole essay in which Laclau discusses Badiou’s work at length 
will be discussed at length.59 Laclau’s criticism of Badiou reveal the differences between their 
conceptualization of particularity and universality, and the centrality of the question of 
universalization for Laclau. The discussion also will point to the role that hegemony theory 
assigns to a process of extensive social change, which Laclau believes is absent in Badiou’s 
theorization. In sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, Laclau’s account of the emergence of a universal 
dimension through a ‘radical investment’ in a political project will be outlined.  
 
3.3.2 The disruption of social order and its reconstitution  
What Laclau finds unconvincing about Badiou’s account of fidelity is that the ‘winning 
over’ is regarded as a ‘total conversion’ in which ‘there is either a ‘“connection” or 
“disconnection”’ with an event, without the possibility of any ‘middle’.60 What Laclau means 
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by this ‘middle’, one can only presume that it will broadly correspond to what he theorizes as 
a ‘floating’ signifier. Such an element, which neither entirely belongs nor is entirely excluded 
from a given totality—hence an element classifiable neither as entirely connected nor entirely 
disconnected to an event—cannot be thought under Badiou’s approach as long as the 
categorical and absolutely dichotomous distinction between the generic multiple that a truth 
is and the constructible multiples authorized by the situation’s state is maintained. Although 
Laclau’s demand for such a middle is a sign of his poststructuralist leanings that tend to exalt 
contamination and porous boundaries over purification and dichotomization, his point, in the 
end, is that Badiou’s theorization of post-evental process of change leaves untreated the issue 
of what is it about a particular truth procedure that wins certain individuals and groups over, 
and what motivates inhabitants of a situation to participate in the universality of a truth. Thus, 
one line of criticism that Laclau advances against Badiou in his essay turns to the issue of how 
universality emerges from particularities—or, to put it differently, how there can be a 
universalization of something particular. Laclau’s criticism on this matter is followed by 
another one, which seeks to introduce another role that a process of extensive social change 
will need to fulfil.  
In Badiou’s account, an event reveals the void of the situation, which is an exception 
to any particularistic determination and possibly begets the subject of a truth that approaches 
the situation from the bias of its void. Laclau glosses this as follows: ‘as far as human situations 
are concerned, the subjects of a truth that affirms the event address universality pure and 
simple. This means, indistinct humanity—in the sense that Marx for instance asserted that the 
proletariat has only his chains’.61 Badiou’s effort to secure the generic universality of a truth 
with the category of the void faces an ‘insurmountable’ difficulty that results, Laclau argues, 
from the fact that the ‘category of the void—of the empty set—is only empty when it operates 
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within mathematics’. When transposed to social analysis, the void is not without a particular 
differential content. Instead, it is ‘filled with certain contents—thinking, 
freedom/consciousness, “only chains” etc.—which are far from being empty’. 62  This is 
Laclau’s iteration of the point that has been confirmed, that the void-ness of the void in 
extraontological situations is a relative property. The challenge that is posed by Laclau’s 
reading is the following: in the case that the point that the void is not empty were conceded, 
then to insist that a truth produced by faithfully drawing out the implications of an event is a 
universality in as much as this process approaches the situation from the bias of its void would 
be tantamount to bypassing the difficult issue of the universalization of a particular project 
toward social change. Laclau maintains that if the issue of universalization is to be given 
proper theoretical treatment, it must be accepted as a starting point that no group, however 
excluded, enjoys a special relation to universality by virtue of their excluded position. As for 
the sans-papiers, one of the recurrent figures of the edge-of-the-void multiple—an evental 
site—in Badiou’s political interventions, Laclau quickly points out that the ‘demands of the 
sans-papiers are clearly, in the first instance, particular and not universal demands’. 63 
Ascribing a special significance to excluded groups and their demands with reference to their 
status of being void elements of a situation, for Laclau, would rely on an ‘illegitimate’ and 
‘hopelessly metaphorical exercise’ by which ‘emptiness’ of the void, strictly thinkable within 
the ontological discourse only, is equated with universality.64 
In Laclau’s eyes, then, the Badiouian proposition that a truth is ‘immediately 
universalizable’ in virtue of its property of being generic is one that makes sense solely within 
the intrinsic rationality of the ontological discourse. The Badiouian approach does not 
elaborate an account of universalization needed to think politics in the ontic realm. This is a 
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decisive omission for Laclau, as he holds—and on this point he is concurring with Badiou—
that it is the universality of a political process that ensures that it be capable of social change. 
As he believes that any proposal for an alternative arrangement that could emerge following 
an event—an event of dislocation, possibly manifest as an unfulfilled demand—is initially a 
particularity, hegemony theory posits no single event of dislocation as the origin of extensive 
social change. Nor is it the case for Laclau that an instance of dislocation, although it is 
conceptually a disruption of a social order, can be seen as necessarily posing, in a concrete 
context, a serious challenge against established order. For, in practice, it is possible for a 
dislocation to be ‘differentially absorbed’ by the institutionalized social order, such that the 
disruptive effect of dislocation will not reverberate beyond the narrow confines of one of its 
‘local’ sectors—a demand for clean water, for example, even if the government agency 
responsible for supplying water is unable to fulfil it, may be fulfilled by a non-governmental 
organization. The demand absorbable in this way receives no opportunity to be anything other 
than a particular demand—such as a demand for clean water. Thus, when Laclau writes that a 
social change begins from a ‘breakdown of something in the social order’,65 the breakdown 
denotes not a single event of dislocation but a proliferation of dislocations, which may appear 
as an emergence of a plurality of unfulfilled demands across different sectors of society, that 
the prevailing order has failed to absorb. A process of extensive social change emerges through 
the widening of an antagonistic relation through the equivalential articulation of a plurality of 
unfulfilled demands, so that it becomes not one between, for example, a peasant and a 
landowner, but between, for example, the ‘people’ and an ‘un-responsive power’. Laclau 
contends against Badiou that the universal dimension of a political cause emerges, not from 
an ‘immediately universalizable’ truth, but only when ‘people excluded from many other sites 
within a situation (who are unnameable within the latter) perceive their common nature as 
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excluded and live their struggles—in their particularity—as part of a larger emancipatory 
struggle’.66 
The thought that an extensive social change presupposes the proliferation of dislocated 
points leads to one of the features that sets politics of hegemony apart from approaches in 
emancipatory political thought that regard politics as primarily a form of resistance. Although 
Laclau emphasizes the need for the construction of a common front of excluded groups—a 
collective subject—against an institutionalized order, this is but one aspect of a socially 
transformative political process that also involves a second movement: the reconstitution of 
the order itself. A very brief digression shall be made to note the potential practical implication 
of this aspect that Laclau builds into his vision of politics as hegemony. The implication can 
be hinted with reference to one of Žižek’s comments made against the kind of political practice 
advocated by Badiou and Simon Critchley. In practice, Badiou recommends abstention from 
most, if not all, ‘conventional’ political processes, such as electoral politics. If the modus 
operandi of whatever that counts as ‘true’ politics for these theorists is to work at a ‘distance’ 
from state—the empirical State, in this context—and ‘bombarding [the State] with prescriptive 
proclamations and demands’, Žižek wonders whether the kind of political practice they 
advocate ‘rely on the fact that someone else will assume the task of running the state machinery, 
enabling us to engage in taking critical distance towards it’. 67  One could argue that the 
practical implications of the introduction of the second movement is that politics, including 
emancipatory politics, does not preclude as a matter of principle an involvement in the State 
and the chance that it may need to appropriate the State apparatus.  
The line of thought that underpins Laclau’s introduction of the second movement, 
however, is not based on the above practical considerations. Conceiving politics as involving 
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solely a ‘subtraction or separation’ from the statist regime that ‘structures and stratifies’ a 
social order presupposes the consistency of that regime, or at least restricts the extent to which 
it could be deprived of its power to structure and stratify. And this is the point where another 
one of Žižek’s assessments of Badiou seems to be relevant. ‘Badiou goes wrong’, Žižek claims, 
‘when he insists on a strict frontier between the Political and the Social (the domain of State, 
of history)—he concedes too much: namely, that society exists’. What should be endorsed 
instead, Žižek continues, is ‘the thesis, articulated by Laclau and Mouffe, that “society doesn’t 
exist”’.68 What would be entailed by the endorsement of the thesis—one that Žižek continues 
to support even after the acrimonious denouement of his intellectual partnership with Laclau—
is the abandonment of the assumption of stability of the statist regime of representation, which 
Laclau argues, is a ‘simplifying assumption’ for which there is ‘neither logical nor historical’ 
justification to accept. It is an assumption that is carried onto Badiou’s political reflections 
from set-theoretical ontology, but one that precludes the possibility of what Gramsci had called 
an ‘organic crisis’. If a situation is such that the possibility of its far-reaching transformation 
has been opened, this opening logically presupposes that whatever mechanism that sustains 
the situations as it is—the situation’s regulatory regime of representation—has failed to 
perform its role. In the context of engaging with Badiou’s work, Laclau describes an organic 
crisis as a historical circumstance in which that which has become ‘uncountable in the situation 
is the principle of countability as such’.69 Rephrased in Laclau’s own theoretical vocabulary, 
it would be the widespread proliferation of dislocations. Since a dislocation is an identity crisis, 
organic crisis is the ‘generalized crisis of social identities’—the example of the German 
economic crisis has been mentioned earlier.70 Laclau contends that under such a condition, the 
determination of the evental site as a delimited point of unrepresentability within a situation 
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that is required for Badiou’s conception of event would be undermined. For ‘what confronts 
us, in that case [i.e. of organic crisis, when the ‘principle of countability as such’ has ceased 
to be operative], are not particular sites defining (delimiting) what is unrepresentable within a 
general field of representation, but rather the fact that the very logic of representation has lost 
its structural abilities’.71 Whilst it can be contested that Laclau’s adoption of the terms of set-
theoretical ontology in his critique does not accurately reflect their meaning in the Badiouian 
text, Laclau may well retort that if this idea of organic crisis—whose nature his expropriation 
of set-theoretical terms has the virtue of intuitively conveying—cannot be expressed in terms 
of set-theoretical ontology, then it is an evidence of its shortcoming in theorizing a certain 
dimension of social reality, and by extension, social change.  
If the emergence of a socially transformative political process is contemporaneous with 
a widespread structural failure (as in an organic crisis), then a political process that begins 
from an event—whose unpredictability in the situation asserted by Badiou is fully endorsed 
by Laclau—has from ‘its very inception’ two roles. The two roles are elaborated by Laclau 
through a distinction between ‘situation’ and ‘situationness’, with the ‘former being the 
actually ontic existing order and the second the ontological principle of ordering as such’.72 
Here, ‘ordering’ denotes systematicity, the condition of any hegemonic formation, thus, of 
social order, whereas ‘order’ denotes its specificity. If attaining the former requires that 
something be excluded as per Laclau’s reflections on the grounds of a systematic totality, then 
the latter is defined by what it includes and excludes. In the case that what is pervasively 
disrupted is the situationness of the situation, Laclau proposes that a political project—that is, 
a rival or counter-hegemonic project—cannot solely consist of a fidelity to an event qua ‘an 
exception vis-à-vis a highly structured situation’ that ‘[subverts] the existing state of the 
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situation’, but will need to also consist, ‘in one of its basic dimensions, in reconstructing the 
situation’ and ‘[restructuring] a new state around a new core’.73 What such reconstructions 
must involve is readily inferable: the reconstruction of a social order, or the construction of a 
new hegemonic identity, such that a different regime of representation will have emerged. 
 
3.3.3 The source of political desire 
What needs to be examined is how Laclau understands the transition from a 
multiplicity of dislocated subjects (or partial identities) to a collective one, such that they 
comes to ‘live’ a common struggle and work toward the neutralization of dislocations, which 
is tantamount to the constitution of a new order in which it had been absent. The examination 
of this aspect of Laclau’s thought requires turning to his attempt to complement the formal 
dimension of systematicity and dislocation with an account of the affective ‘force’ with which 
a particular hegemonic formation and projects toward extensive social change grip subjects.74 
In elaborating this affective dimension, Laclau relies on a somewhat idiosyncratic 
interpretations of objet petit a and sublimation (that he claims is based on the interpretation of 
the Lacanian text offered by Joan Copjec), declaring that the ‘logic of objet petit a and the 
hegemonic logic are not just similar: they are simply identical’.75 Laclau has not been wholly 
transparent in stating the extent to which he is willing to integrate aspects of Lacanian theory 
into his own, and warns against assuming that his theoretical categories correspond to 
seemingly analogous categories in Lacanian theory (for instance, it is simply not the case that 
what Laclau calls ‘discourse’ corresponds to what Lacan calls ‘symbolic’—that a mechanical 
translation would be unwarranted is already evidenced by the fact that the Lacanian 
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‘distinction between the symbolic and imaginary is not present in [Laclau’s] theoretical 
approach’76). But even if Laclau is ‘neither Derridean nor Lacanian, but mostly Laclauian’, as 
one commentator observes, the conspicuous absence of any reference to the Lacanian notion 
of fantasy in Laclau’s text is somewhat perplexing, especially since one of the most oft-cited 
definitions of objet petit a—whose ‘logic’ Laclau claims is identical to that of hegemony—is 
that it is the object of fantasy, and as such, requires the notion of the imaginary.77 Nevertheless, 
the account of political desire that Laclau develops implies a necessary dimension of 
ideological distortion that accounts for the ‘cohesive power’ that sustains a hegemonic 
formation, and in that distortion, one aspect of fantasy seems to be involved. 
In Badiou’s account of post-evental transformation, a truth is that which the activity of 
a subject incrementally produces—or realizes, as the subject itself—in the situation. Thought 
in its ontological being as a multiple, a truth is an excrescence, pure representation of what 
would remain unpresented and unpresentable if the situation and its state were to remain the 
same. The faithful subject of a truth is oriented by the hypothesis, or ‘fiction’, of a completed 
truth articulated with subject-language whose referent, as Žižek has aptly described, is ‘“empty’ 
precisely in so far as it refers to the fullness yet to come’.78 The function of fullness, or 
specifically, the fullness of society, in the Laclauian theoretical architecture is an analogue to 
that of truth in the Badiouian framework, to the extent that it is that toward whose attainment 
a process of social change which, under the present interpretation, should be seen as composed 
by acts of identification taken by a plurality of those who have been thrown up in their 
condition as subjects, is oriented. Like a truth that is incompleteable, fullness is constitutively 
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unreachable, for it denotes for Laclau an ‘entirely reconciled society’79: a totality without an 
outside (an impossible, ‘mythical totality’), the incorporation or transcendence of all 
particularities, hence undifferentiated and unexposed to temporality and change, whilst 
hegemony is premised on the thought that every institution of an order is based on a 
constitutive exclusion whereby it is exposed to the subversive presence of the other it has 
excluded. There is no such thing as an actually achieved fullness of society. A systematic 
totality that embraces every difference is an impossible object, and there is no social order that 
could extinguish once and for all the possibility of dislocation and their subsequent 
equivalential articulation into a hegemonic project toward an alternative order. Despite this, it 
is the claim of hegemony theory that it is the desire for fullness that mobilizes a plurality of 
subjects, setting in motion the process toward the institution of a different social order.  
The Laclauian subject is a subject in so far as it has a failed identity, which evinces the 
fact that the structure cannot constitute itself as a closed totality in which identities will be 
entirely determined by the structure. This construal is the basis on which an affinity between 
hegemony theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis can be asserted, and allows for the 
appropriation by the former the idea of the desire for self-completion—a ‘full’ identity—to 
recast it as the essence of political desire. In terms closer to Lacanian theory: to have social 
existence—to have an identity—is to be symbolically represented. However, despite the 
reservoir of signifiers available for symbolic representation, there is something ‘radically 
unassimilable to the signifier’, namely, the ‘subject’s singular existence’, its unique being.80 
The resemblance that the Lacanian description bears to Hegel’s analysis of sense-certainty in 
Phenomenology of Spirit is worth noting: the resources of symbolic representation are general 
terms, which are constitutively inadequate for representing a singularity. Something of the 
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subject’s singular being will fall beneath symbolization, and any signifier—socio-symbolic 
identity—by which the subject represents itself is experienced as inadequate. This inadequacy 
of the signifier sets in motion the subject’s desperate, but in the end, futile, search for a signifier 
that fully expresses its being, hence for the reconciliation of its singular being and socio-
symbolic identity, that is, for a state of harmony, and it is this state of harmony that Laclau’s 
term ‘fullness’—an entirely reconciled society—denotes at a larger scale. Notwithstanding the 
shifts observable in the Lacanian text on this matter in different phases of Lacan’s thought, 
this state of harmony that the subject seeks can be said to be full jouissance—what the subject 
experiences as lacking in its socio-symbolic existence ‘the lack of a pre-symbolic, real 
enjoyment’.81 When transposed onto Laclau’s system, the reference to a state of harmony that 
is pre-symbolic, hence pre-social, should not carry the implication of a linear evolutionary 
conception of the emergence of the subject of lack (this would be akin to a narrative of a theft 
perpetrated by the process of socialization on a child basking in its union with the mother). 
The conception of politics as oriented toward the recovering of an original loss would endow 
the lost object with a transhistorical determination, paving way to the equation of the recovery 
of the lost object with the end of history—the transhistorical concept of labour that underpins 
certain branches of Marxist thought can effortlessly be re-described in terms of an originary 
loss. Rather than conceiving fullness as something that pre-exists its loss, it must be 
conceived—to adopt a Lacanian expression—as the ‘lack of lack’. Fullness is a ‘retrospective 
illusion’,82 and it is always experienced as absent because it is the effect of ‘the potential yet-
to-be-realized that is prompted by the blockage of this potential’,83 namely, the limit of society 
experienced in the dislocation of identities. Accordingly, that which the subject of lack 
perceives as something that must be attained is the general description of the role of fullness 
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in Laclau’s theorization of social change, but what must be restored, redeemed, liberated, 
attained, or realized is not determinable prior to the particular social order that has been 
articulated under a concrete historical circumstance and the unfulfilled demands that might 
have arisen within it. This way, Laclau is able to reject the discourse of the end of history but 
simultaneously maintain that ‘[e]mancipation is not […] an act of creation but instead of 
liberation of something which precedes the liberating act’.84 
Drawing from Freud, Lacan introduces the term ‘the Thing’ in the seventh seminar to 
designate the object of primordial jouissance that the subject experiences as lost. Desire is the 
search for this lost object, but, as one of Lacan’s memorable expressions goes, ‘“that’s not it”’ 
is the very cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from jouissance expected’.85 
No actually obtainable thing delivers full jouissance. The rationale behind Laclau’s 
declaration that the ‘logic of objet petit a’ is identical to the ‘logic of hegemony’ surfaces at 
this point. As Alenka Zupančič explains, ‘the objet petit a designates nothing but the absence, 
the lack of the object, the void around which desire turns. […] [T]he moment the subject 
attains the object she demands, objet petit a appears as a marker of that which the subject “has 
not got”, or does not have—and this itself constitutes the “echte” object of desire’.86 This 
should be connected to Laclau’s claim that ‘[a]lthough the fullness and universality of society 
is unachievable, its need does not disappear: it will always show itself through the presence of 
its absence’. 87  Fullness as such cannot show itself—it is an impossible object, has no 
consistency of its own, and is strictly unknowable and indescribable. Thus, it has to show itself 
as ‘incarnated’ or ‘embodied’ in some particular object, the only kind of objects that exist. 
What Laclau understands by the ‘logic of objet petit a’ is the possibility for a partial object to 
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be constituted as an object of desire by incarnating an impossible fullness, the Thing, to which 
no partial object is actually commensurate; and hegemony presupposes that a particularity, 
without ceasing to be particular, can come to represent the dimension of universality that 
exceeds its particularity. As these two ‘logics’, Laclau claims, are identical, it is to be 
concluded that an ‘empty signifier can only function as an objet petit a’.88 This means that a 
political project or a cause, if it is to acquire a universal dimension as a hegemonic identity 
and thus the power to act on the social, must present itself—which is always something 
particular—as the promise of fullness, as the negative reverse of a dislocated social order. 
During the German economic crisis mentioned as an example of organic crisis, Laclau claims 
that National Socialism emerged as a ‘real hegemonic alternative’ by ‘[addressing] the 
problems experienced by the middle class as a whole and [offering] a principle for their 
interpretation’.89 The same can be said of the Long March, which, Laclau claims, ‘succeeded 
because it was not only the destruction of an old order but also the reconstruction of the nation 
around a new core’.90  
 
3.3.4 The moment of radical investment and the necessity of ideological distortion 
The account of political desire as the search for absent fullness outlined so far is 
vulnerable to an objection, one to which hegemony theory itself had been vulnerable ever since 
Laclau’s declaration—made long before his dallies with Lacanian theory—that attempts to 
realize a reconciled society are ultimately in vain. If subjects that desire full identity identify 
with a particular political project because the latter offers a promise of fullness, then this is a 
desire that inevitably will fail to be satisfied, for a particular project cannot institute anything 
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other than a finite and limited social order. An objection of the following sort seems 
unavoidable: Laclau has turned every actual political project and hegemonic formation into 
surrogate for that which is ontologically impossible—utopia, the ‘real thing’—and has 
explained the inevitability of political disappointment, and the lure of resignation and cynicism. 
It might be noted first that hegemony cannot simply preclude the possibility of such outcomes, 
if only because they are real political experiences that hegemony theory would be obliged to 
take into account if it is to be a descriptive theory of ‘how politics actually works’. Moreover, 
given Laclau’s reliance on Lacanian theory to formulate his account of political desire, it may 
be no less of a problem if full satisfaction were achievable. The negative undertones of 
‘impossible satisfaction’ should not mislead, as it is meant to indicate the following point, 
articulated by Adrian Johnston: 
One of the reasons why people don’t remain passively riveted to an 
indefinitely enduring configuration of collective life is that a certain libidinal 
‘restlessness’ (perhaps capable of being described, in Lacanian parlance, as 
an insatiable thirst for a socio-politically defined ‘surplus jouissance’) 
always promises to agitate at least some people into striving toward the 
achievement of various alterations of their present circumstances’.91  
Acts of identification are repeated because complete satisfaction is impossible. Since they are 
the condition of possibility of social change, if ‘total and complete satisfaction (qua full, 
absolute jouissance) were indeed capable of being achieved’—in which case both the need 
and motivation for further acts would be eliminated—there ‘really would be an “end of history” 
in a vulgar Hegelian sense’.92 However, even if it were granted that full satisfaction remains 
unachievable, Laclau would still need to respond to the objection that the awareness by social 
agents that the object being desired is a surrogate for something that cannot in principle be 
                                                            
91 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, pp. 100–101. 
92 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, pp. 100–101. 
144 
 
attained, and in this respect is merely the ‘second best’, is likely to thwart a sustained 
attachment to a political cause. Psychoanalysis proposes that desire is metonymy—but 
whether political desire, especially with respect to projects toward profound social 
transformation, should be theorized in exactly the same manner by which desire is conceived 
under psychoanalysis is not obvious. For it appears that political subjects have the option—
unlike the neurotic subjects of psychoanalysis—of withdrawing from the search for fullness 
through protracted, and oftentimes arduous, processes of extensive social transformation.93 
Laclau’s attempt to circumvent this difficulty relies on a theory of what he calls ‘radical 
investment’ (or, alternatively, ‘ethical investment’) that proposes an account of the operation 
by which the attachment to a particular project or hegemonic formation occurs. The theory of 
radical investment presupposes that an identification with a particular object can be a moment 
of transubstantiation whereby a partial object—an object incommensurate to the Thing—
becomes, not a part of a whole that is in principle unobtainable, but instead, a part that is the 
whole. In this account, Laclau appeals to the distinction between desire, which is unsatisfiable 
because its objects are surrogates for an impossible Thing, and drive, which does bring about 
satisfaction. As Copjec explains, drive is ‘no longer a means of attaining satisfaction, it is an 
end in itself; it is directly satisfying. It is not a means to something other than itself, but is 
itself other than itself’.94  Adopting Lacan’s formula of sublimation, Laclau describes the 
moment of becoming ‘other than itself’, the moment at which a partial object becomes the 
whole, as the moment when the former is ‘elevated to the dignity of the Thing’.95 A particular 
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Jacques Lacan Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 112. 
145 
 
object, in other words, transubstantiates into ‘the embodiment of a fullness totally transcending 
it’. Laclau argues that the ‘embodying object is […] the ultimate horizon of what is 
achievable—not because there is an unachievable “beyond”, but because that “beyond”, 
having no entity of its own, can be present only as the phantasmatic excess of an object through 
which satisfaction is achievable’.96 The proposition that a particular hegemonic formation 
articulated around an empty signifier is ‘simply the name that fullness receives within a certain 
historical horizon’ is a corollary of the claim that ‘[t]he only possible totalizing horizon is 
given by a partiality (the hegemonic force) which assumes the representation of a mythical 
totality’.97 Radical investment, as such, is an act of identification with a particular hegemonic 
formation or a political project—a partial object—through which it is made into the 
embodiment of the fullness that is incommensurable with it. On one of its dimensions, radical 
investment will appear to be a ‘pure decision’,98 for which no justification can be offered—
the incommensurability between the partiality of the object and the fullness it is made to 
incarnate—which is also to say: the incommensurability between particularity and 
universality—precludes a relation between the investment and the object that receives the 
investment that can be established on a rational basis. The other dimension, which consists of 
hedges and qualifications that Laclau introduces to evade the accusation of pure decisionism, 
shall be examined in the next chapter.  
Since fullness has no presence (or meaning) beyond the ‘ontic content’ of a particular 
hegemonic process, the process, for the subject—the ‘investor’, so to speak—that has 
identified with it, it becomes ‘the horizon of all there is’, and is no longer ‘an empirically 
achievable second best vis-à-vis an unattainable ultimate fullness’ for which the subject can 
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97 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 116. 
98 Laclau, ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics’, p. 82. 
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only wait in vain.99  According to the theory of radical investment, then, the attempts to 
reconstitute a social order through the pursuit of that project has become identical to the 
attempt to realize the promise of fullness as such—for a particular object to have become the 
object-incarnate of fullness for a subject is to have become the only means by which the subject 
believes fullness can be accessed. This is what turns the object into ‘the rallying point of 
passionate attachment’ rather than an ersatz second-best. 100  These descriptions can be 
understood in terms of the emergence of what has been called a ‘social imaginary’. What the 
notion of fullness as absent suggests is that a social imaginary acquires a dimension of being 
a project toward the actualization of certain possibilities or construction of subject-positions; 
the affective dimension of fullness introduced via psychoanalysis accounts for the grip of a 
social imaginary.  
One suspicion that the theory of radical investment might not have entirely succeeded 
in dispelling is that it tends toward a kind of ex post facto explanation designed to 
accommodate into his theory that which Laclau has already accepted as a fact, namely, that 
there really is passionate attachment to a cause in political movements, the archetype of which 
in his thought is Latin American populism. This is not necessarily a shortcoming, as Laclau 
only needs to provide an account of the possibility of sustained attachment to a cause that does 
not contradict the premise of the impossibility of fullness. As hegemony theory is not a system 
of rational immanence, the assessment its theoretical components, including radical 
investment, will partly depend on its explanatory power and usefulness for analysing concrete 
political movements. Although this thesis does not engage with the more empirically-oriented 
analyses that is reflected in Laclau’s thought, it shall be noted that Laclau believes that his 
account explains a phenomenon that he claims to have ‘seen several times’, namely, how, 
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100 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 116. 
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‘after the fall of an oppressive regime, the most disparate social and political movements 
entering a process of mobilization, living for a short period in the illusion that, because an 
oppressive regime had fallen, what had actually fallen was oppression as such’.101 A repressive 
regime, if it had been ‘seen as incarnating evil or oppression in general’, then its fall ‘always 
liberates forces larger than what the fall, as a concrete event, can master: as the regime was 
seen as a symbol of oppression in general, all oppressed groups in society live for the moment 
in the illusion that all unfulfilled demands—in any domain—are going to be met’.102 These 
remarks lead to one final point concerning the notion of fullness.  
The discussion of the Laclauian subject, fullness, and radical investment in this chapter 
has refrained from contesting Laclau’s appropriation of Lacanian theory. But there is one point 
that merits attention. Although, as noted at the beginning of this section, the concept of fantasy 
does not feature in Laclau’s exposition of his theory, there is a term in Laclau’s own theoretical 
vocabulary that comes close to reflecting an aspect of fantasy, namely, ‘ideology’. Laclau 
writes that ideology ‘[consists] of the non-recognition of the precarious character of any 
positivity, the impossibility of any ultimate suture’. 103  But given this definition, every 
investment in a particularity as the incarnation of fullness must be seen as ideological, since, 
as Maeve Cooke has noted, the ‘cohesive power’ of a hegemonic identity over a chain of 
equivalence between a plurality of groups ‘[depend] on the illusion that a particular 
representation of the universal is adequate to it; without this illusion the chain of equivalence 
would disintegrate’.104 For hegemonic politics to be possible, something particular has to be 
made to be universal and something that is impossible to attain has to be made to appear as 
attainable. With this, Laclau has effectively incorporated one aspect of fantasy in his account 
                                                            
101 Laclau, ‘Glimpsing the Future’, pp. 317–18. 
102 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Power and Social Communication’, Ethical Perspectives, 7.2–3 (2000), 139–45 (p. 92). 
103 Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, p. 92. 
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of radical investment, an aspect that has been succinctly expressed by Žižek. In fantasy, the 
ontologically impossible fullness is transmuted from ‘the impossible into the prohibited. […] 
[T]he real-impossible changes into something possible, i.e., into something that cannot be 
reached, not because of its inherent impossibility but simply because access to it is hindered 
by the external barrier of a prohibition’. 105  The corollary of the Laclauian thesis that a 
particular hegemonic body becomes an object of passionate attachment because it is believed 
to incarnate fullness is that the impossibility of fullness has to be ‘positivized’ into an obstacle 
whose overcoming would appear to be possible for the ‘investors’. If the instance of radical 
investment elevates a certain particularity, some particular cause, into the promise of fullness, 
it simultaneously makes a particular ontic object the incarnation of the obstacle whose 
overcoming will deliver the promise, even though fullness is ontologically impossible. This 
latter particularity too, therefore, becomes something in the order of an empty signifier. 
Neither a political objective to be achieved nor the motivation to achieve it could be 
conceived without incorporating the aspect of fantasy outlined above: the project toward 
fullness, such as the struggle against oppression, will always be directed at a particular enemy 
that is believed to be an incarnation of ‘pure anti-community’ or ‘pure evil’. And because 
radical investment presupposes that a particular struggle to eradicative a particular enemy is 
turned into a universal struggle under a historical circumstance, by Laclau’s own terms, 
ideological misrecognition of a particularity as universal becomes the necessary condition of 
a project of extensive social change. Laclau maintains, in one of his most post-Marxist 
propositions, that an investment in a particularity that renders it universal is a necessary 
illusion, ‘a dimension of society which cannot be suppressed’.106 For Laclau, what classical 
Marxism regards as false consciousness and fetishism not only harmless, but are necessary 
                                                            
105 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 116. 




conditions of any social order and social change. The question of whether it is in fact harmless 
to allow an ideological distortion to orient and sustain political processes toward the institution 
of a new order has elicited responses from several commentators, both positive (such as Maeve 
Cooke) and negative (such as Martin Hägglund). Although some of the critical responses shall 
be outlined in the next chapter, the key issue, in the end, is that of novelty. Antonio Gramsci 
once described a crisis as a historical interregnum during which ‘the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born’.107 Rephrased in terms of hegemony theory, the proliferation of dislocations 
in the existing order would be the characteristic of the ‘old’ that is dying. The institution of a 
different hegemonic formation should, then, correspond to the birth of the ‘new’. However, it 
will be seen that it is unclear whether hegemony theory leaves room for a conceptual 
distinction between processes of modification and processes of transformation that has been 
central to the Badiouian account of change, a distinction without which the novelty of the 
social order that will have been achieved through hegemonic processes may be 
underdetermined.    
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Chapter 4. Repression and novelty in the institution of a different order 
 
4.1 Repression and order 
4.1.1 The totalitarian dimension of hegemony 
In his critical study of post-Marxist theories, Geoff Boucher claims that because 
hegemony theory supposes that every social order is ‘fundamentally constructed upon 
exclusion and marginalization, the real question [in hegemonic politics] becomes one of how 
to swap the leading personnel, rather than whether to transform the social order’.1 A judgement 
broadly in line with Boucher’s is made by Molly Rothenberg, when she claims that the ‘failure’ 
of any hegemony to ‘deliver on its promise […] establishes the conditions of “bad infinity”, 
as one group after another occupies the site of power’.2 It is plausible that the way in which 
the structure of a hegemonic formation is conceived, as always limited and exclusionary, 
should have repercussions on the kind of social change that is thinkable under hegemony 
theory—and whatever change is, it cannot be that of just swapping the ‘leading personnel’. 
This chapter will begin by considering the implications of the thesis that every social order is 
based on exclusion. Subsequent sections will turn to the issue of novelty. Investigations of the 
reasons behind the disagreement between Laclau and Žižek—Badiou shall receive a mention 
as well—apropos the nature and extent of the break between the old and new orders will pave 
the way to the two key claims of this chapter. First, it is a strength of hegemony theory that it 
incorporates into the theorization of social change the fact that a process of change will always 
be partly limited by its situatedness in a particular historical circumstance. Second, having 
broken with the idea that a process of change proceeds from a total break with the existing 
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order, hegemony theory is led to propose that a socially transformative process is always 
conditioned by a kernel of particularity that is ineliminable and whose displacement is limited, 
and that this qualification generates ambiguities concerning the novelty that is achieved in the 
transition between hegemonic formations. 
In his Radical Atheism, Hägglund defends, from a broadly Derridean perspective, the 
thesis of the inescapable corruptibility to which every finite existence is exposed. Hägglund 
commends Laclau for having reflected the political implication of this thesis in his 
‘hyperpolitical thinking’, which affirms that ‘nothing (no set of values, no principles, no 
demands or political struggle) can be posited as good in itself’.3 However, Hägglund proceeds 
to argue that the desire for fullness is incompatible with the desire of democracy as Laclau 
himself had defined it, and that it renders every investment in a political cause totalitarian. It 
is not the tension between democracy and totalitarianism per se that is of interest in this 
chapter—and neither is it for Hägglund, in the end—but the significance of the repressive 
dimension that Hägglund believes that any hegemonic process based on radical investment is 
bound to imply. That, with On Populist Reason, Laclau may have ‘changed his position from 
“radical democracy” to populism’, reducing democracy ‘to the moment of democratic demand 
within the system’ rather than construing it as the process of extensive social transformative 
per se,4 is irrelevant, in so far as the theory of radical investment that underpins both remains 
constant. Hägglund summarizes the rationale behind radical investment as follows: 
Given that a particular finite object cannot answer to what we really desire 
[…], it must be regarded as the incarnation of fullness in order to become an 
object of libidinal investment. Accordingly, there can be no political struggle 
without a radical investment in a particular content or a particular body, 
                                                            
3 Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 
p. 184. 
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which allows it to take on a hegemonic function. As Laclau maintains, 
‘hegemony is nothing more than the investment, in a partial object, of a 
fullness which will always evade us’.5  
A tension emerges because of the definitions of democracy and totalitarianism that Laclau 
offers. As Laclau sees it, democracy ‘involves the institutionalization of its own openness and, 
in that sense, the injunction to identify with its ultimate impossibility’. In contrast to 
democracy, which repudiates ‘the illusion of taking us beyond’ the impossibility of a fully 
reconciled order, totalitarianism is characterized by Laclau as founded on the equation of a 
‘particular content with the fullness of absolute justice’.6 The tension is apparent: the kind of 
equation between particularity and universality that characterizes totalitarianism appears to be 
exactly what occurs in radical investment, which, Hägglund notes, is made because some 
particular project is ‘believed’ by the subjects to ‘restore an infinite fullness to society’.7 In so 
far as radical investment is ‘predicated on the illusion that the political cause is fully universal’, 
Hägglund writes that the ‘radical investor’—the Laclauian subject—must necessarily remain 
oblivious to the fact that the object that has received its investment is particular, ‘finite’, and 
‘contingent’, since, for the investor, the hegemonic body has to become ‘all there is’,8 or, as 
Laclau himself had put it, ‘the ultimate historical horizon, which cannot be split into its two 
dimensions, universal and particular’.9 The outcome that Hägglund regards as unavoidable is 
that someone who is passionately attached to a hegemonic body ‘cannot listen to any 
arguments saying that it exercises illegitimate exclusions or is in need of revision’.10 What 
hegemony theory proposes as the desire that underpins every process of hegemonic 
totalizations is indistinguishable from the totalitarian desire for the closure of the social. 
                                                            
5 Martin Hägglund, ‘Time, Desire, Politics: A Reply to Ernesto Laclau’, Diacritics, 38.1–2 (2008), 190–99 (p. 
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6 Laclau, ‘Structure, History and the Political’, p. 199. 
7 Hägglund, Radical Atheism, p. 192. 
8 Hägglund, Radical Atheism, p. 198. 
9 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 226. 
10 Hägglund, Radical Atheism, p. 198. 
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Hägglund emphasizes that that the solution is not to oppose ‘good’ democratic desire from 
‘bad’ totalitarian desire, which is premised on an essential difference between good and bad—
Hägglund concurs with Laclau that any political struggle, regardless of its normative content, 
is underpinned by a homologous libidinal economy.11 What Hägglund proposes, rather, is that 
political desire as such is not a desire for fullness—a desire for completion and closure—but 
a desire for ‘something temporal’, a desire for a finite body that ‘remain[s] open to its own 
alteration’.12 Only then could a desire for democracy as democratic be conceived.  
A broadly similar point apropos the totalitarian dimension of hegemony is made by 
Rothenberg, who observes, in the course of a broader Lacanian critique of Laclau’s concept 
of the empty signifier, that it is ‘nothing more than a fantasy that the aggregate of the points 
of identification seized upon by each subject cohere as the same object’ that sustains an 
equivalential relation between a plurality of identities in a formation. 13  As a result, the 
Laclauian account of hegemonic totalization harbours the possibility that the ineliminable ‘fact 
of the differences between individuals’ would ‘[give] the repressive authority ammunition for 
discipline and punishment for deviations from the fantasized sameness of the group 
members’.14 An example of the kind of totalitarian implication that Rothenberg brings to 
attention can be drawn from the description of the artistic regime of socialist realism provided 
by Žižek. According to Žižek, the task of art as the officially sanctioned artistic regime of the 
Soviet Union was to ‘depict “typical” heroes in “typical situations’. Writers who presented a 
‘predominantly bleak picture of the Soviet reality were not accused simply of lying—the 
accusation was that they provided a distorted reflection of social reality by focusing on 
phenomena which were not “typical”, which were sad remainders of the past’. 15  In this 
                                                            
11 Hägglund, ‘Time, Desire, Politics’, p. 196.  
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14 Rothenberg, p. 146. 
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example, the meaning of ‘typical’, instead of reflecting plural experiences, is fixed to a 
particular content, and effectively turns into a grounds for repression.  
As the above passages have merely stated only partial elements of the broader 
criticisms and alternative proposals advanced by Hägglund and Rothenberg, the discussion 
below is offered not so much as a direct response to their criticisms than as a clarification of 
the implications of the thesis that every order is founded on exclusion, with the aim of shifting 
the issue from that of repression to that of novelty. Laclau, unlike either Badiou or Rancière, 
does not identify politics per se with emancipatory politics, and it is indeed an internal 
possibility of hegemonic politics for it to be repressive or totalitarian. However, to claim that 
Laclau’s positing of fullness as the objective of any hegemonic politics precludes democracy 
as a real political possibility because hegemony necessarily presupposes a repressive 
dimension would be an overstatement. Laclau’s reflections on the conditions of systematic 
totality have suggested that the closure that is implied in his account of fullness as an 
ideological distortion that is necessary for a project toward social change to emerge. A 
hegemonic process, emancipatory or not, is the actualization of certain possibilities and the 
repression of others, in so far as its task is to institute a new order. That there are possibilities 
that threaten an order cannot be denied without conferring upon that order an immutable being. 
But since the being of a social order is not immutable, that an order needs to repress certain 
possibilities has nothing whatsoever to do with whether that order is democratic or totalitarian, 
but rather with the mere fact that the being of a particular order is contingent, thus inescapably 
exposed to the possibility of its negation. Repression, on those terms, is an ontological 
category, and it would be a mistake to directly infer from the ontological necessity of 
repression in the constitution of any particular order the varying ways repression could be 
manifest concretely. Drawing from repression in the ontological sense the conclusion that a 
given normative order is totalitarian would be possible only if the ‘ontic’ differences between 
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normative orders were neglected. It is possible to discern in the circularity that is involved at 
the moment of institution of a normative order such as deliberative democracy repression in 
the ontological sense. The right to participate as equals in deliberation is a precondition of 
deliberative democracy. Yet, in so far as it is the precondition of deliberation, the right to 
participate as equals cannot itself be the outcome of democratic deliberative procedure. At the 
moment of its institution, a decision to bestow that right on the participations of deliberation 
has to be made. This implies that any attempt to institute deliberative democracy is an attempt 
to institute a particular order that necessarily excludes—‘illegitimately’, by its own normative 
standards—some possibilities. Allowing the actualization of what it ‘illegitimately’ excludes 
as a legitimate option—the denial of the equal right to deliberation, for example—would 
render the order to become other than itself: undemocratic. It can be said that the ‘subject’ of 
deliberative democracy has made a radical investment in elevating deliberative democracy, 
which is a particularity, as universal, when it is in fact both contingent as it can be negated, 
and only partially universal, as it is based on exclusion.  
Laclau states that ‘there is no permanent attachment between the signifier of fullness 
and the various objects incarnating it’.16 Hegemony always establishes an order with a limit, 
for any order maintains itself as such through an exclusion of possibilities that those invested 
in it cannot entertain as an acceptable alternative—at least not until they come to experience 
profound dislocations that place in doubt the demarcation between credible and incredible, 
acceptable and unacceptable, options. But since actual fullness is impossible, every order is 
exposed to the possibility of an encounter with its inherent limit, the real of antagonism, 
irrespective of whether those invested in the order had been willing to ‘listen’—the other 
arrives irrespective of the ethical stance toward alterity that one has taken and the experience 
of undecidability is the inescapable condition of finitude. As seen previously, Laclau suggests 
                                                            
16 Laclau, ‘Glimpsing the Future’, p. 300. 
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that following the success of a hegemonic project against oppression, ‘all oppressed groups in 
society live for the moment in the illusion that all unfulfilled demands—in any domain—are 
going to be met’.17 The illusion ends when some demands fail to be fulfilled even under the 
newly instituted order following the fall of oppression, which then could be articulated into an 
equivalential chain, propelling a renewed political cause—what the ‘content’ of these demands 
will be and how it will be processed is a matter that cannot be determined a priori. If full 
satisfaction—which would be what a permanent attachment of the investor to a particular order 
presupposes—implies an end to any further social change, then disappointment, like 
dislocation that is in the first instance a traumatic experience, is to be seen not solely as a cause 
for cynicism and resignation, but also as the condition of an open-ended future. And it is how 
open the future is that is of question. 
 
4.1.2 Moving toward the question of novelty 
The distinction between democratic and totalitarian orders requires analyses of 
particular orders and their constitution, and the ways in which dislocations are handled and 
the limits are treated, which will always be specific to each order. These, the Laclauian 
approach leaves as matters befitting empirical analysis. This does not mean that the 
aforementioned observations from Hägglund and Rothenberg are entirely misguided. There is 
a kind repression operative in hegemonic processes that is problematic, namely, the continual 
repression of certain possibilities in the transition between hegemonic formations, for this 
concerns the novelty that is achieved in the institution of a new order. The question of novelty 
shall begin to be developed by relating Laclau’s theory to the Badiouian approach. 
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Ed Pluth writes that ‘the name of an event […] is an empty signifier for the inhabitants of the 
situation’ that ‘has no referent as far as the situation is concerned. A subjectivation occurs 
when an inhabitant of a situation starts to bring this name into relation to other multiples in 
the situation, forcing its presence in the situation’.18 Although the term ‘empty signifier’ 
employed by Pluth in this statement does not warrant an immediate equation with the term as 
it features in hegemony theory, it is not the case that there is no relation between the two at all. 
Laclau duly acknowledges that his notion of the empty signifier is based on the Lacanian 
notion of point de capiton, which has in fact been compared to the name of the event by Žižek 
in his reading of the Badiouian text, wherein it is suggested that intervention and evental 
nomination as conceived by Badiou is tantamount to the intervention of the ‘Master’, who, 
‘by producing a new point de capiton, Master-Signifier, reconfigures the symbolic field via 
the reference to the new Event’.19 Finally, Jelica Šumič goes one step further by offering a 
straightforward Badiouian redescription of the Laclauian empty signifier as something that is 
‘offered to all’—as ‘a signifier of the pure cancellation of all difference’—and whose referents 
‘will have been filled’ in a new situation: 
Empty signifier is the name that has no referent in the situation. Such names 
are terms which ‘will have been presented’ in a new situation, in the situation 
considered, hypothetically, as transformed by the hegemonic intervention. 
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The empty signifier is a term which creates its referent. Empty signifiers 
upset established significations, so as to leave the referent empty, in a place 
that will have been filled in a new situation. The production of an empty 
signifier is an absolutely creative moment, a moment with no links to what 
is already established: the transformation of an anonymous, perfectly 
insignificant proper name (say, Perón, to use Laclau’s example) into a 
representative of the Whole.20 
In Badiou’s theory, this new situation is the outcome of forcing a truth, by which a situation 
is extended by multiples that are unrepresentable under its prevailing representative regime. If 
a truth, in its being, is initially an anonymous excrescence none of whose elements are 
presented in the situation but is a representation of situation that is yet to-come, hence 
something akin to a promise, then fullness—the dimension of ‘mythical totality’ that is always 
perceived by the subject as absent—is, as suggested in the previous chapter, its closest 
counterpart in hegemony theory. As the trajectory of the Laclauian subject runs from 
dislocation to the achievement of objective social identities or the production of subject-
positions, it can be said that the referents that ‘what will have been presented’ in a social order 
reconfigured by hegemonic processes are plurality of new subject-positions—this is 
compatible with what has been proposed as an interpretation of the transformative effects of a 
truth as that of adding previously non-constructible multiples to a situation. The question that 
should be directed at hegemony theory is how it conceives the novelty of the reconfigured 
order and the elements that will have been presented in it. In the passage below, Laclau speaks 
of the novelty of a hegemonic formation: 
The passage from one hegemonic formation, or popular configuration, to 
another will always involve a radical break, a creatio ex nihilo. It is not that 
all the elements of an emerging configuration have to be entirely new, but 
rather that the articulating point, the partial object around which the 
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hegemonic formation is reconstituted as a new totality, does not derive its 
central role from any logic already operating within the preceding situation. 
Here we are close to Lacan’s passage à l’acte, which has been central in 
recent discussions concerning the ethics of the Real. As Alenka Zupančič 
claims, ‘the Aktus der Freiheit, the “act of freedom”, the genuine ethical act, 
is always subversive; it is never simply the result of an “improvement” or a 
“reform”.21 
Expressions such as ‘radical break’, ‘creatio ex nihilo’, and ‘act of freedom’ with which he 
describes the transition from one hegemonic formation to another, taken together, may be 
suitable as a characterization of radical investment in one of its dimensions, namely, that it is 
a ‘pure decision’ by which a particular project is affirmed as a universal project that, Laclau 
asserts, is grounded, in the ‘final instance’, on the singularity of the decision alone. That no 
principle according to which a new order would be ordered is necessitated by the previous 
order, hence that the previous order does not determine the elements that will have been 
articulated in a new order, ensures that the transition from the previous order to another will 
be the establishment of an order that is new. And yet, whilst asserting that a decision is in the 
‘final instance’ grounded solely on its singularity, Laclau adds the qualification that ‘social 
agents never act in that final instance’.22 The same kind of qualifications repeatedly surface in 
Laclau’s theorization of the transition between hegemonic formations. Perhaps this is 
indicative of the sober realism of the theorist who has chastised other thinkers—Slavoj Žižek, 
in particular—for their ‘r-r-revolutionary’ pretensions.23 But such qualifications are also the 
source of difficulty for specifying exactly what makes the transition between hegemonic 
formations the emergence of a new order. 
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4.2 The conceptual determination of a process of transformation 
4.2.1 Break and continuity in the transition between different formations 
As seen in the passage quoted above, Laclau maintains that not all elements of a newly 
emerging formation have to be ‘new’ for its emergence to be deemed as a ‘radical break’ from 
the previous formation, as long as the core of the new formation—the hegemonic identity, 
empty signifier, which Šumič has likened to the name of an event—is the recipient of radical 
investment, a decision by which a particular object is elevated into an incarnation of fullness 
with which it its incommensurable. However, when one begins examines the conditions under 
which a particularity is able to become the core of a hegemonic formation and the ways in 
which ‘new’ elements could be distinguished from ‘old’ elements, matters become 
complicated, and what ‘radical break’ actually means for social change under hegemony 
theory becomes unclear. Despite Laclau’s acknowledgement that he bases his theory of radical 
investment on the reading of the Lacanian theory of sublimation by Joan Copjec, there is a 
point at which Laclau must diverge from her reading. The interpretation at which Copjec, who 
tends to emphasize the drive’s indifference to its object, arrives in the end is that the 
satisfaction the subject derives from the object of drive has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
particular quality of the object itself, but depends entirely on the relation between the subject 
and the object.24 Even though satisfaction is sought in the object of drive because fullness is 
absent, the indifference of drive to its object means that an object is able to deliver satisfaction 
irrespective of its particularistic qualities. But this is an interpretation that goes in a direction 
that Laclau cannot follow, for he must attribute some weight on the side of the object and 
allow radical investment to be conditioned by some particular qualities of the object. This is 
because unless the particular qualities of an object had some bearing on its being the object 
with which subjects in fact identify, the strategic activity of presenting particular discourses 
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and political causes as the promise of fullness would be superfluous, and render the place of 
intentional agency, which Laclau prefers to preserve and some regard as an advantage of his 
approach, highly ambiguous. Not every particularity is a live candidate for radical investment. 
And this point, Laclau will indeed confirm. The supposition that any particularity could be a 
hegemonic identity would be tantamount, for all practical purposes, to the supposition that the 
social is a ‘flat’ terrain in which any project toward an alternative order would be as appealing 
to social agents as any other—a view that Laclau rightly rejects, insisting instead that the social 
is an ‘uneven’ terrain shaped by normative frameworks, practices, and power relations, that 
would have achieved varying degrees of sedimentation.  
Expressions such as ‘creatio ex nihilo’, ‘genuine ethical act’, or ‘absolutely creative’ 
describe the transubstantiation of a particularity into an incarnation of fullness that occurs in 
the transition between hegemonic formations. What these expressions do not imply is that 
‘what will have been presented’ or become actualized as a consequence presupposes a total 
break in which nothing in the old constrains the new—and it is precisely the latter point that 
is affirmed by Laclau when he asserts that dislocation does not lead to a ‘psychotic universe’ 
wherein ‘everything becomes possible or that all symbolic frameworks disappear’,25 thereby 
placing a constraint on the extent by which the old is dissolved. Predictably, the result of this 
constraint is a limitation on what a political project can hope to achieve under a given historical 
circumstance. Even though a process of change has to begin with a breakdown in the existing 
order, the extent of this breakdown is always partial, and the possibilities for change that are 
opened up are proportional to the extent of the breakdown. Thus, Laclau writes that the ‘more 
points of dislocation a structure has, the greater the expansion of the field of politics will be’, 
such that the outcome of hegemonic processes will become less determined by the present 
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state of affairs.26 But in so far as the indeterminacy of outcome is insufficient as a conceptual 
determination of the novelty of the ‘elements of an emerging configuration’ that will have 
come to replace the old, it remains to be examined whether hegemony theory provides that 
further determination. In subsequent paragraphs, Laclau’s position will be contrasted with that 
of Slavoj Žižek, who has appealed to the notion of passage á l’acte—to which Laclau had 
alluded in a previously quoted passage—in formulating his account of revolutionary change. 
Žižek’s idea of the revolutionary ‘act’ has been much maligned by his critics. The brief 
discussion of the Žižekian act below is not intended to clarify or defend Žižek’s position, but 
will only serve as a point of contrast between Laclau and Žižek (and, briefly, Badiou), which, 
by highlighting the reasons for Laclau’s rejection of what he perceives to be Žižek’s position, 
lead toward a discussion of the strengths and the difficulties of Laclau’s own position apropos 
his theorization of the novelty of a new hegemonic formation in the next section.27 
In his critique of Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, Žižek insists that a 
distinction has to be maintained between ‘a mere “performative reconfiguration”, a subversive 
displacement which remains within the hegemonic field’—Žižek likens such displacements to 
‘an internal guerrilla war’—and ‘the much more radical act of a thorough reconfiguration of 
the entire field which redefines the very conditions of socially sustained performativity’.28 If 
hegemonic politics that is inspired by the Gramscian image of ‘war of positions’ falls under 
the former, what Žižek proposes to maintain is the idea of a revolutionary, radical ‘act’ of 
‘wiping the slate clean’ for the advent of a new order. Žižek’s notion of the act alludes to a 
distinction made by Lacan between passage á l’acte and ‘acting out’. Although both are 
impulsive and violent actions of the subject, Lacan explains that acting out is still ‘an appeal 
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to the Other’, an attempt to be recognized by the Other (as in a child’s tantrum), whereas 
passage á l’acte amounts to an ‘exit’ from ‘the stage of the Other where man as subject has to 
be constituted’.29 The outcome of passage á l’acte, then, is the dissolution of the subject whose 
social existence is conditional on representation by a signifier in the discourse of the Other. 
The dissolution of the subject, as Zupančič writes, is temporary, as it has an ‘after’: ‘After an 
act, I am “not the same as before”. In the act, the subject is annihilated and subsequently reborn 
[…]; the act involves a kind of temporary eclipse of the subject’.30 About this ‘after’, Lorenzo 
Chiesa explains further: 
[W]hat […] Lacan deems possible on the individual level, and which 
accounts for the extraordinary importance he attaches to the mythical 
examples of symbolic death, is a temporary separation from the Symbolic—
a momentary desubjectivizing permanence in the Real/void-of-the-
Symbolic, an undoing of fantasy—which is logically followed by a new 
symbolic reinscription.31 
Žižek takes these ideas and recasts them in his notion of the radical act. The moment of the 
act is the moment of ‘the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing 
of its links with “reality”’.32 Only by subtracting itself from symbolically mediated reality and 
whatever that passes as objective historical tendencies can the subject be reborn as the bearer 
of a revolutionary project. For Lacan, an act is not the outcome of deliberation or self-
conscious reflection—it is experienced by the ‘enacting’ individual as though it were 
something miraculous that had befallen him. There is some uncertainty regarding the extent 
to which the radical act as proposed by Žižek could be unintentional, but Žižek, in the end, 
seems to incline toward the Lacanian position. What an act definitely is not, in any case, is an 
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outcome of analysis, prediction, or strategy, as evinced by Žižek recommendation that ‘[w]e 
simply have to accept the risk that a blind violent outburst will be followed by its proper 
politicization—there is no short cut here, and no guarantee of a successful outcome either’.33 
As Žižek acknowledges, the radical act shares several affinities with the Badiouian event. Both 
are unpredictable and almost miraculous occurrences that suspend every mechanism that 
regulates the situation, and are unforeseeable in their consequences. Both radically transform 
those that are subjected to it: the human animal has the chance of becoming a subject of a truth 
through its exposure to an event, whilst the subject is reborn in the aftermath of an act. And 
finally, an act is ‘not simply an act of outrage, a word of defiance launched at the Other’ but 
‘also an act of the creation of the Other (a different Other)’. The sense in which the different 
symbolic order that emerges subsequent to an act is new, Zupančič explains, is in fact captured 
by Badiou in his description of the consequences of a truth as that of transforming ‘codes of 
communication’ and ‘rules of opinions’ such that ‘they become other’, rendering previously 
evident judgements no longer sustainable.34 Despite these significant affinities that have led 
some commentators to categorize Badiou and Žižek together as proponents of a ‘politics of 
the real’, in the postscript to Logics of Worlds, Badiou offers a brief remark that hints that 
there is an aspect of the Badiouian account of evental change against which the idea of the 
radical act stands in tension. On Žižek’s thought of the radical act, Badiou remarks that it is 
‘so ephemeral, so brutally punctual, that it is impossible to uphold its consequences’. 
According to Badiou, the ‘effects of this kind of frenzied upsurge are ultimately indiscernible 
from those of scepticism’.35 The aspect in Žižek’s idea of the act that would elicit a response 
such as this from Badiou should be considered, as it both highlights the contribution of 
Badiou’s thought and foreshadows Laclau’s own position apropos the thought of a total break.  
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As Bruno Bosteels has emphasized, Badiou’s concern is ‘not only the ontological 
delimitation of the event in terms of a fulgurating cut, or a punctual encounter of the real, but 
also its logical and topological inscription at the heart of a given situation’.36 In Saint Paul, 
Badiou writes that ‘an event always constitutes its subject in the divided form of a “no…but”’, 
with ‘no’ referring to ‘the potential dissolution of closed particularities (whose name is the 
“law”)’, and the ‘but’ indicating ‘the task, the faithful labour, of which the subjects of the 
process opened by the event […] are co-workers’.37 An event is a beginning of a process, not 
the instant of the wholesale negation of the present, and fidelity is a protracted process that 
takes place in a situation that Badiou affirms is something to be transformed through the 
supplementation of a truth rather than destroyed. In the case of the radical act, it seems that it 
can only be hoped that some gesture that severs the subject from the way that it has hitherto 
been attached to reality will have made it into a revolutionary subject and that it will be 
subsequently followed ‘the emergence of the “New Harmony” sustained by a newly emerged 
Master-Signifier’, that is, by a radically transformed symbolic order.38 But if the new order 
that will have come to be in so far as the act ‘succeeds’ presupposes a total break from the 
preceding order, it is difficult to conceive the connection between an act and the particular 
order that it will have subsequently brought about as anything other than as accidental. Thus, 
from a Badiouian perspective, what is absent in Žižek’s thought is a distinction between a new 
order whose transformation has been effected by a truth, as a process, and new order whose 
emergence is accidental. It may be the case that Žižek is prepared to fully embrace the paradox 
in the idea of radical transformation, that a transformation that is truly radical, by transforming 
the very criteria by which transformation is identified, makes itself unrecognizable. But one 
of the most significant contributions of Badiou’s theorization of truth through the resources of 
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set-theoretical ontology is that it makes radical change intelligible as a process. Even if a truth, 
as such, is, by definition, beyond knowledge, its transformative effects on the situation—such 
as the production of novelty, the reconfiguration of the coordinates of what is deemed possible 
and impossible, sensible and insensible, and so on—are not beyond rigorous conceptualization. 
The rest of this chapter will turn to Laclau’s theorization of the extent of the break between 
the old and the new and the process by which novelty is actually introduced. 
 
4.2.2 The particularity of a hegemonic project 
An act of identification taken by a subject is a creative act, which, Laclau claims, is a 
decision that is ultimately groundlessness. Alluding Kierkegaard, Laclau writes a moment of 
decision is a ‘moment of madness’ that is analogous to ‘impersonating God’, where God is 
understood as that being who does not have to give an ‘account of his actions before any 
tribunal of reason because He is the source of rationality’.39 Thus, it is affirmed that a ‘true 
decision escapes always what any rule can hope to subsume under itself’, that it ‘cannot be 
ultimately grounded in anything external to itself’ and ‘has to be grounded in itself, in its own 
singularity’.40 Statements such as these seem to suggest that Laclau’s position is not far from 
those of Badiou and Žižek in defending the singularity of a decision in radical break. Laclau, 
however, immediately hedges the description of decision with the qualification that the 
madness of human decision always falls short of that of an omnipotent God, thereby distancing 
himself from pure decisionism. Human beings, it is asserted, are ‘mortal gods’ for whom ‘the 
madness of decision is […] a regulated one’.41 In what sense a decision is regulated, firstly, is 
that the range of what is decidable is limited. Because the Laclauian subject is neither an agent 
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of absolute creation nor an omnipotent chooser, ‘the range of what is thinkable and decidable’ 
is always limited in any concrete situation.42 What limits the range of the thinkable and the 
decidable is the background of sedimented values, ideas, and beliefs, from which social agents, 
even in their condition as subjects thrown up by events of dislocation, cannot entirely be freed. 
Without such a background, one would have no reason to choose a particular course of action 
over others. That a decision be able to be presented as reasonable, or as ‘preferable to other 
decisions’,43 is a thesis that Laclau will need to retain if political activity involves, as he 
believes is the case, engagements in a concrete setting, whose means include argumentation 
and persuasion. From this theoretical perspective, it will appear that Žižek has posited the 
possibility of an absolute separation from historical circumstances, the Sittlichkeit of the 
community, that comprise a certain stratum of ‘facticity’ that, though not immutable, is never 
completely subverted. Laclau chastises Žižek for using politics as merely a means to elaborate 
psychoanalytic concepts, and thus failing to offer a ‘truly political reflection’. When Žižek 
does attempt to identify the ‘protagonists of what he sees as true revolutionary action’, it is 
based on ‘grotesquely misinformed’ analyses of social reality that verge on ‘pure delirium’.44 
For he holds that the assertion that ‘everything is contingent’ is one that would ‘only make 
sense for an inhabitant of Mars’, it comes as no surprise when Laclau reprimands Žižek for 
‘waiting for Martians’.45 But if Laclau believes his position is more down to earth, it is exposed 
to its own set of difficulties—one that concerns the conceptual determination of the ‘vertical’ 
dimension. 
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Corollary to the suggestion that a stratum of facticity—deeply sedimented beliefs and 
practices—regulates radical investment is the idea that the emergence and effectivity of a new 
hegemonic formation is conditional on the availability of particular projects as candidates of 
radical investment, as well as their credibility, which ‘will not be granted if [their] proposals 
clash with the basic principles informing the organization of a group’.46 Such conditions for 
the elevation of a particularity into a hegemonic one is described in terms of power: ‘The 
ability of a group to assume a function of universal representation presupposes that it is in a 
better position than other groups to assume this role, so that power is unevenly distributed 
between various organisms and social sectors’.47 In conjunction with the interpretation of 
hegemony theory in the previous chapter, especially of the statement that the ‘constitution of 
a social identity is an act of power’ and that ‘identity as such is power’, it must be concluded 
that the power of a particularity—a particular group, project, or cause—to become hegemonic, 
hence its power to repress certain possibilities whilst actualizing others, derives from the 
sedimented normative frameworks and practices of a social order. If this is the case, it seems 
to follow that, whilst processes by which a social order is reconfigured may result in changes 
in the identity of all of the elements involved, including the element that embodies the 
hegemonic function of universal representation (this much is simply entailed by Laclau’s 
structuralist premise that ‘relations’ and ‘objectivity’ are synonymous), whatever change a 
hegemonic identity may undergo cannot be as extensive as to divest it of what Maeve Cooke 
has described as its ‘cohesive power’ that it acquires from the sedimented background, for this 
would amount to the negation of its ability to continue to remain as the object of political 
desire. Laclau maintains that ‘[t]here is not, on the one hand, a purely empty signifier and, on 
the other, an incorporated one. The two of them are exactly the same’. 48  There is ‘no 
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universality that operates as pure universality’, he asserts, for there is only ‘the relative 
universalization created by expanding the chain of equivalences around a central 
particularistic core’.49 It would be inaccurate, therefore, to say that an empty signifier can be 
‘emptied’ completely even in principle. Accordingly, it is the implications of the 
‘particularistic core’ that is retained in a processes of social change that must be examined.  
Referring to the Polish Solidarność (which, incidentally, is mentioned by Badiou as 
possibly having been an event), Laclau explains that although its particular set of demands 
was the locus of ‘equivalential associations vaster than themselves’, those demands were ‘still 
linked to a certain programmatic content—it was precisely that contact which made it possible 
to maintain a certain coherence between the particularities integrating the chain’.50 In the 
hypothetical case where the ‘empty signifier becomes entirely empty’, hegemonic identity 
would not determine in any way what is articulated into the chain of equivalence that expands 
around itself, and ‘the most contradictory contents’ could be articulated into the chain. Such a 
chain would be ‘extremely fragile’, Laclau claims, as ‘potential antagonism between 
contradictory contents can break out at any moment’.51 It must be inferred that the articulation 
into the chain of heterogeneous positions—as that which is ‘counted’ in a hegemonic 
formation—does not induce an extensive transformation of the chain as a whole, such that 
these positions would have retroactively been made to override their contradictory contents in 
order to maintain the consistency of the hegemonic formation. It only follows, then, in a 
sustainable hegemonic formation (which is the only kind that really matters, after all), ‘once 
a set of core links has been established’, the expansion of the equivalential chain becomes 
limited, as there are some ‘links that would simply be incompatible with the remainders of 
particularity which are already part of the chain’. An empty signifier in this sense becomes 
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‘imprisoned’ by the particularities that it articulates around itself, and ‘is not able to circulate 
freely’, as those ‘remainders of particularity (of the links of the chain) limit its possible 
displacements’.52 It may be conjectured that the trace of particularity that cannot be divested 
from a hegemonic identity in its function as an empty signifier in fact fulfils a crucial 
theoretical requirement that issues from the following premise: if, as Laclau claims, no amount 
of dislocation entails that everything becomes possible, some limit with respect to what can 
be achieved has to be reflected in the transition between hegemonic formations. This is the 
theoretical requirement that is fulfilled by the stipulation that a hegemonic formation that is 
sustainable is not open-ended, in as much as the extent of its universality or inclusivity is 
restrained by some particular content that is the condition of the possibility of its sustainability. 
The account of social change conceived under hegemony theory therefore reflects the 
particularity which is preserved in a newly achieved universality as the necessary marker of 
its having emerged under a certain historical circumstance. This means, conversely, that the 
concept of an empty signifier that completely divests it of its particularity is tantamount to 
detaching it from its condition of emergence, thus from any determinate context. Hegemony 
theory resolves the point of ambiguity that led to questions concerning the transformative 
potential of a truth procedure by embracing the thesis that what is decidable and achievable is 
limited: hegemonic universality is always a ‘socially attainable universality’, and the 
institution of a social order through a hegemonic project, even if it were in some sense ‘more 
inclusive’ than the superseded order, is conditioned by the particularities of the circumstances 
from which it had emerged. 
A hegemonic process is universalizing but—unlike the generic universality that 
Badiou ascribes to a truth procedure—does not break entirely from the particularity that it is. 
Its universality is an always partial universality, hence, it is never, even in principle, ‘offered 
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to all’, as Badiou says of a truth, and Šumič, adopting the Badiouian view, had said of the 
Laclauian empty signifier. What is thereby abandoned in hegemony theory is the aspiration 
that drives the Badiouian theorization of change, namely, the determination of a process of 
change that is situated but whose trajectory is unconstrained by the regulatory mechanisms of 
a situation. There is no reason to regard the attempt in hegemony theory to reflect the limitation 
that processes of social change, which is stipulated to exist in so far as they occur—as they 
always do—in concrete historical situations, as something that weakens its theorization of 
social change. Yet, even if it is conceded that a process of social change can neither begin 
from a point of total exteriority nor realize the ideal of radical inclusivity in so far as it has as 
one of its roles the institution of an order and the order that can actually be instituted is 
conditioned by its situatedness in history, what remains unresolved is the question of the 
novelty of a transformed order that can be achieved under that given historical circumstance.  
 
4.2.3 The novelty of a new order 
The institution of a different order is a process that presupposes investment in some 
project that is already in possession of what might be regarded as its ‘symbolic’ power, which 
it commands due to the sedimented norms and practices at a given time that has made it 
available and convincing for diverse range of social agents. Because the Laclauian subject 
makes a radical investment in a particular project in so far as the latter promises to deliver a 
fullness that is experienced by the subject as lacking, the direction that it will be able to take 
while preserving itself from the possibility of disintegration is constrained by its own 
particularity and the desires, beliefs, or normative framework from which the ‘investors’ it has 
mobilized cannot completely detach themselves. This seems to imply that a hegemonic project 
toward the institution of a new order promotes the exclusion of certain positions or possibilities, 
ones whose repression is the condition, arising from sedimented normative frameworks of the 
172 
 
community, of its becoming hegemonic. This exclusion of certain terms is what ‘particularizes’ 
a hegemonic project, and imposes a restriction on ‘what will have been presented’ in the order 
that it succeeds in instituting. It cannot be denied that a hegemonic project restricted in this 
way would nevertheless result in social change that will ‘solve a variety of partial problems’ 
as Laclau had written,53 and lead to an alternative arrangement that overcomes dislocation and 
lack of identity. What this arrangement will be, and which terms will be included and excluded 
in that arrangement, is not determined by the previous order—and there is no element that is 
such that it will necessarily remain excluded. But what is not precluded even if this point were 
granted is the possibility that certain positions and possibilities will continue to be excluded 
in the new order. It is at this the point that social change as conceived by hegemony theory 
stands at the greatest distance away from the possibility of incorporating the idea that the 
Badiouian theorization of politics as a truth procedure is an attempt to realize. As Sam 
Gillespie has noted, one of the central theoretical objectives of Badiou’s thought is the 
determination of a process through which ‘situations necessarily transform themselves’54—it 
is toward the specification of a transformative process that introduces into the situation 
elements that would have continued to remain excluded if it were not transformed that the 
Badiouian account of change based on the supplementation or extension of a situation by a 
truth built from its void makes its contribution. This theoretical objective is also why, from a 
Badiouian perspective, it is not satisfactory to just say that the outcome of a hegemonic process 
is contingent and not necessitated, not determined, by the existing order. Whilst previously 
excluded elements may come to be included in a new hegemonic formation, this ‘new’ 
formation, given the way in which the transition between formations is theorized by hegemony 
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theory, is not the outcome of a process that necessarily effects the transformation of the 
preceding formation.  
It has been suggested so far that it is unclear how actual outcomes that may be merely 
reflections of the status quo in so far it continues to exclude certain positions and repress 
certain possibilities are to be distinguished from outcomes that introduce something definitely 
new into the situation under the framework of hegemony theory. The more one turns to the 
practical implications of Laclau’s position, the more familiar the problem becomes. One of 
the explanations Laclau offers regarding the possibility of making reasonable arguments for a 
course of action is the following: 
[…] sedimentation of social practices is an existential in the Heideggerian 
sense: it is constitutive of all possible experience. So, to the questions, Why 
prefer a certain normative order to others? Why invest ethically in certain 
practices rather than in different ones? The answer can only be a contextual 
one: Because I live in a world in which people believe in A, B and C, I can 
argue that the course of action D is better than E; but in a totally 
presuppositionless situation in which no system of beliefs exists, the 
question is obviously unanswerable.55 
It is not the case that this sort of contextual argument for a course of action is limited to 
deliberation within an established normative framework. The above passage already indicates 
that the condition of acceptance applies to radical investment (radical investment is 
synonymous with ethical investment). Indeed, Laclau writes that although radical investment 
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Laclau confirms in the sentences that immediately follow the quoted passage that the ‘content’ of the 
particularity that comes to incarnate fullness is also conditioned by sedimentation:  
In the case of the mystic, as we have seen, the contact with divinity as an absolute beyond all 
positive determination is followed by a normative investment that is the source of a militant 
engagement; but it is clear that the particular normative order that is the object of such an 
investment is not dictated by the content of the mystical experience—which has no content—but 




‘looks, on the one side, like a pure decision, on the other, it has to be collectively accepted’.56 
Laclau had claimed that the call for a particular course of action, hence the call to actualize 
certain possibilities, will not be answered if it clashes with the ‘basic principles’ that social 
agents hold.  It is not just the range of what is thinkable and decidable that is limited—the 
range of what will be actually decided is also limited. With the idea of a collective acceptance 
of a decision having been made into an influential factor in orienting the actual trajectory of 
political processes, it is difficult to dispel the suspicion that Laclau’s position has become 
susceptible to the kind of objection that has often been raised against proceduralist theories, 
namely, that a procedure of deliberation does not rule out that the possibility that whatever 
conclusion that is finally validated may merely be a reflection of the status quo. The commonly 
raised problem with proceduralism is—and this is one about which Laclau himself had 
written—that the acceptance of the validity of a procedure by someone will also depend on 
the substantive values that he has already accepted. The theory of radical investment implies 
that there is nothing beyond the particular substantive values in which the subject has invested. 
Oliver Harrison correctly observes that for Laclau, there is no particular normative order or 
discourse that is ‘ethically preferable in-itself, and the only basis for deciding as much is 
through the degree of attachment or “investment” that a people decide to place in it. […] It is 
the subject that decides as to what is both ethical and normative, not the discourse theorist’, 
for whom the ‘the nature of the order chosen’—and this is from Laclau himself—is ‘not 
relevant’.57 How actual political consequences that are thinkable under hegemony theory 
would differ from the consequences foreseeable in proceduralist terms is difficult to see. 
Indeed, Cooke observes that ‘[i]n appealing to the Sittlichkeit of particular communities Laclau 
avoids the accusation of decisionism, but at the price of opening himself to the charge of 
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57 Harrison, pp. 67–68. See: Laclau, ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of 
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conventionalism’—she is not alone in proposing that to avoid such a damning outcome 
Laclauian thought should be complemented by an account of context-transcending validity, 
which she finds in the works of Jürgen Habermas. 58  It is true that Laclau allows that 
sedimented normative frameworks, despite ‘never [disappearing] to the point of requiring an 
act of total refoundation’, may nonetheless undergo ‘deep dislocations requiring drastic 
recompositions’.59  That no sedimentation is irreversible—to deny this would be to deny 
history for Laclau—suggests that a series of dislocations, in time, may eventually reshape the 
exclusionary limit of a social order, even if that limit might appear to have been reproduced 
in the short term. It is also difficult to deny that a proposal that goes against a collectively 
acceptable normative framework is likely to face resistance, marginalization, and incredulous 
stares. But conceding these points does not undermine the claim that the process of social 
change as conceived by hegemony theory is a process in which two processes are intertwined: 
a socially transformative process that makes actual certain possibilities that had been hitherto 
repressed and a socially reproductive process that accounts for the project’s efficacy, which it 
attains by offering a promise of fullness—whose always partial achievement necessarily 
implies repression and exclusion of certain possibilities and positions—that is convincing and 
acceptable for a wide range of social agents whose evaluative criteria are always, at least in 
part, products of the preceding social order. 
The series of qualifications that Laclau has introduced concerning decisions, 
conditions of radical investment, and the extent to which a political process could be 
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universalized, raises a doubt about whether anything of real significance for social change is 
indicated by expressions such as ‘creatio ex nihilo’, ‘radical break’, and ‘Aktus der Freiheit’ 
that supposedly characterize the transition between hegemonic formations or the emergence 
of new formations. It appears that, in reality, the instance of creatio ex nihilo, radical break, 
or act of freedom never actually arrive. There is a reciprocity between the extent to which an 
order will have been transformed and the status quo, such that any process of social change 
that is conceived under hegemony theory implies aspects of both social reproduction and social 
transformation. What hegemony theory leaves unclear, however, is how a process of 
transformation could be distinguished conceptually from a process of reproduction. 
Although Badiou himself has never commented at any length on Laclau’s work, a 
Badiouian assessment of hegemony theory is extractable from his 1982 publication Theory of 
the Subject. One of the claims that Badiou advances in that text is that the consistency of the 
Lacanian subject is dependent upon keeping the ‘raw’ real at a distance—the Lacanian subject 
is as ‘a consistent repetition in which the real ex-ists’.60 It suffices to mention the analogy that 
Badiou draws between the Lacanian theory of subject and a political theory, for which a 
disruption in the social order (the ‘real of the cut that can be found in the impulse of the masses’) 
is something to be avoided, and that advises, if such a disruption occurs, that what is of utmost 
importance is the restoration of order.61 Žižek summarizes the key difference between Badiou 
and Lacan—as elaborated by Bruno Bosteels—as follows:  
The ultimate difference between Badiou and Lacan, therefore, concerns the 
relationship between the shattering encounter with the Real and the ensuing 
arduous work of transforming this explosion of negativity into a new order: 
for Badiou, this new order ‘sublates’ the exploding negativity into a new 
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61 See: Ed Pluth, Signifiers and Acts: Freedom in Lacan’s Theory of the Subject (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 2008), pp. 126–27. 
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consistent truth; while for Lacan, every Truth displays the structure of a 
(symbolic) fiction, that is, it is unable to touch the Real.62 
It is not difficult to infer what Badiou would find objectionable about Laclau’s ‘realist’ account, 
expressed in the most succinct manner below, which starts from the state of profound crisis 
that Laclau has suggested in his critical essay on Badiou is presupposed by radical, extensive 
social change: 
Let us consider the extreme situation of a radical disorganization of the 
social fabric. In such conditions—which are not far away from Hobbes’s 
state of nature—people need an order, and the actual content of it becomes 
a secondary consideration. ‘Order’ as such has no content, because it only 
exists in the various forms in which it is actually realized, but in a situation 
of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an 
empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence. In this sense, various 
political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular 
objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemonize 
something is exactly to carry out this filling function.63   
This Hobbesian passage may not be entirely implausible as an empirical description—there 
are several historical cases where, in elections that are held after a longstanding authoritarian 
leader has been deposed, people have voted for the political party associated with the ousted 
leader. But from a Badiouian perspective, what Laclau does not adequately reflect in his 
approach is the thought that social transformation consists not in the establishment of an order, 
but in establishing a new consistency of the situation through the introduction of something 
that could have been neither produced nor embraced under the previous order. In other words, 
although hegemony theory registers the disruptive effects of dislocation and antagonism—two 
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of the figures in hegemony theory that have been likened to the Lacanian real by both Laclau 
and his readers—in the social, its account of the process through which order is thereafter 
reconfigured provides no conceptual determination of a process that would lead, not just to an 
order, but to a different order. It is this difference, a difference in the ‘content’ of orders, that, 
as Laclau sees it, becomes a ‘secondary consideration’ in the very circumstance where far-
reaching social change is deemed to be possible. But for the discourse theorist who holds as a 
matter of fact that some content will be chosen by historical actors, what that content will be—
or ought to be—is beyond the remit of theory. One surmises that the Badiouian theorization 
of a truth procedure goes in the direction of speculative thinking that Laclau may be unwilling 
to follow. But this unwillingness is maintained at a price: what cannot be determined within 
the theoretical framework of hegemony theory is the conceptual distinction between 
modification or reproduction and transformation. If hegemony theory regards social change 
and political processes to be far more commonplace than Badiou allows, this may only be 
because that distinction, from its perspective, is an imperceptible one. The following judgment 
by Badiou regarding Lacanian psychoanalysis could be cited as a Badiouian assessment of 
what is missing in hegemony theory: ‘the thought of an effective destruction of the old law 
and the observation that what recomposes itself can no longer in any way be the same.’64  
 
                                                            




Chapter 5. The potentials and limitations of synthesizing the two approaches 
 
5.1 Toward an alternative account of social situations 
The examination of hegemony theory has suggested that whilst it reflects the historical 
limitations of socially transformative processes in its theorization of social change, the 
transition between different hegemonic formations is a transition wherein the to-come is 
conditioned by the present to such an extent that the distinction between processes of social 
reproduction or modification and processes of social transformation is blurred. Hegemony 
theory accepts that there is no absolute conceptual distinction between reform and revolution 
or between gradual change and abrupt change. Yet, it is not obvious how the distinction, which 
becomes even more crucial for thinking change once the dichotomy is discarded, between 
socially reproductive aspects and socially transformative aspects of a given process of 
hegemonic articulation could be conceived, for the two processes are effectively conflated in 
his approach into an indeterminate third: not necessarily either. Although the Badiouian 
approach does provide a conceptual determination of a process of transformation, the 
situatedness of that process has been seen to generate a tension. If the situation in which a truth 
unfolds as a process were to be specified, then the generic universality of the truth produced 
therein risks becoming indistinguishable from yet another particularity, since the situation 
would be one of the infinite plurality of situations that may compose a broader social situation. 
But if, conversely, the situation were not specified, then the truth that emerges therefrom 
would be disconnected from a historical context, from a situatedness.  
This chapter will explore whether there is a way in which the theoretical resources 
collected from the works of Badiou and Laclau could be deployed, such that it becomes 




process of transformation toward extensive social change—one that, even while retaining the 
features of the Badiouian truth procedure, cannot be subjected to the deflationary criticism—
advanced in the second chapter. It must be emphasized that the aim of these discussions is 
neither the reduction of one approach to the other, nor the incorporation of the two approaches 
into one ‘system’—there are irreconcilable differences between the two approaches that limit 
the extent of their coherent co-articulation, and it is not the ambition of this chapter to attempt 
to produce a system. The aim here is a modest one: this chapter seeks to explore possibility of 
an alternative account of social situation in which the insights of both Badiouian and Laclauian 
approaches are reflected, and consider what can be gained therefrom. Amongst the 
possibilities this chapter will explore is that of introducing, by drawing from aspects of 
hegemony theory, in the account of social situations a ‘pre-evental’ subjectivity to which the 
construction of particular identities and the force of situation’s inertia could be traced. If this 
could be achieved, it would make further analysis of the internal composition of a social 
situation possible, which in turn allows the thought of a historically imposed limit of 
inclusivity or representability to be reflected in the account of social situation. 
In section 5.2, several points that have been raised in the course of this thesis will be 
retraced, with the aim of showing how incorporating insights of hegemony theory could 
alleviate several ambiguities in the set-theoretical understanding of social situations. Any 
suggestion that an account of social situations and processes of change could draw insights 
simultaneously from two theoretical approaches would immediately invite the objection that 
such an attempt cannot avoid recourse to the unjustifiable assumption that the theoretical 
objects of two different theoretical systems are identical. In the three subsections of 5.3, the 
suppositions that are needed for the two approaches to be co-articulated shall be explored. 
Incorporating the insights of hegemony theory in the construal of the composition of social 




extension of a situation with a generic multiple, may be construed. Although hypothetical and 
tentative, the exploration undertaken in this chapter will not have been in vain if it succeeds 
in pointing toward the possible of specifying a socially transformative process that, due to the 
way the situation in which it unfolds is constituted, can result in extensive social 
transformation. 
 
5.2 The contributions of hegemony theory toward an account of social situations 
The thesis of Being and Event that ontology is itself a situation, and that what 
distinguishes it from other situations is that it is a situation in which presentation as such is 
presented, announces the de-relation of the ontological discourse from any material ‘substrate’ 
of the ontological structure it elaborates. Badiou’s rational ontology, in other words, affirms 
that a structure is indifferent to of what it is a structure. It is on the basis of this indifference 
that set-theoretical ontology can claim to be a perfectly general ontology, a discourse of being-
qua-being. There is a number of seemingly intractable questions that have been directed at set-
theoretical ontology—the problematic relationship between ontological and extraontological 
situations in Badiou’s system has been mentioned. But leaving this matter aside, an 
interpretation of set-theoretical ontology had been developed in the first chapter, applying to 
situations that can be qualified as ‘social’ the Badiouian proposition that it is possible to ‘think 
the ontological structure’ of concrete situations, that there is an ‘ontological schema of the 
situation’ with which extraontological situations can be ‘understood’.1 Distancing himself 
from what he believes to be one of the key premises of linguistic idealism, that ‘language 
constitutes differences’, Badiou asserts that ‘true differences are the differences of the sets 
themselves, of the multiplicities’.2 It seems, then, that one of the things involved in thinking 
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the ontological structure of a situation is the understanding of differences between situations 
and between parts of a situation in terms of extension of multiples, beyond (or beneath) the 
‘predicative diversity’ of language or differences between different discourses or language 
games. Although what this means when applied to an analysis of extraontological situations 
is not immediately obvious, the following illustration perhaps could serve to capture the basic 
idea. Étienne Balibar has proposed a distinction between racism and meta-racism. If the former 
legitimates exclusion of groups of people by asserting the superiority of one race or culture 
over other races and cultures, the latter, as Balibar writes, ‘presents itself as having drawn the 
lessons from the conflict between racism and anti-racism, as a politically operational theory 
of the causes of social aggression’. The ‘insight’ of meta-racism is that what must be discarded 
if one wishes to truly avoid racism is the ‘“abstract” anti-racism which fails to grasp the 
psychological and sociological laws of human population movements’. In lieu of ‘naïve’ anti-
racism, meta-racism advises that ‘tolerance thresholds’ be respected and ‘cultural distances’ 
be maintained.3 The reasons by which exclusion is legitimated differ under each discourse—
racism and meta-racism are different discourses. Each discourse would also describe or refer 
to the disenfranchised groups differently. Arguing that meta-racism is all the more pernicious 
because it poses as non-racist and anti-racist, ‘advocating racist measures as the very means 
of fighting racism’, Renata Salecl concludes that ‘distance between racism and meta-racism is 
void’.4 This non-distance may be construed, under the ontological schema, as indicating that 
the groups and individuals that in fact becomes disenfranchised under the meta-racist 
discourse is the same as those whose disenfranchisement was legitimated by the discourse of 
classical racism. Between all the linguistic difference that may exist between the two 
discourses, those who count-as-one and those who do not remain unchanged—in this respect, 
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the regime of count-as-one remains the same. This section outlines what is missed when social 
situations are understood with the categories of set-theoretical ontology, and the ways in which 
hegemony theory may open alternatives that account for aspects of the social that are missed. 
One of the claims made in the second chapter was that what is inadequately reflected 
in the account of social situations based on set-theoretical ontology is the ‘interplay’ between 
situations. And this is especially problematic if it is possible to think of a social order as 
composed of an infinite number of situations that can be qualified as social because the 
consequences of a truth seems to be confined solely to one situation. What results is an 
ambiguity of the sense in which a truth could be asserted to be universal, addressed to everyone, 
and open to all, which is also to say that the extent of a truth’s transformative effects becomes 
ambiguous. Set-theoretical ontology stipulates that a situation is ‘any presented multiplicity’ 
and that ‘[t]here is nothing apart from situations’,5 while at the same time remaining indifferent 
to the actual existence or non-existence of particular concrete situations. It may simply be 
asserted that relatively ‘global’ situations—for example, the situation of global capital, as 
distinct from the relatively ‘local’ situation of one household—do happen to exist, and that 
transformative processes (such as a truth procedure) acting on those situations will have far-
reaching social consequences. But as these qualifications are not determined by the ontological 
discourse, the series of questions with which Terry Eagleton concludes his review of Badiou’s 
work is unavoidable: ‘What is to count as a situation, and who decides? Are there really any 
“singular situations”, as Badiou seems to imagine? And is there any way of analysing, or even 
identifying one, which does not implicate general categories?’ 6  That the existence of a 
situation—any situation—can be acknowledged is a part of the problem when attempting to 
transpose the insights of Badiouian theory of change in social situations. In as much as 
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something can be thought under the ontological schema, it is a situation, and since the 
ontological schema does not recognize an intrinsic difference between extraontological 
situations except the difference between their regimes of count-as-one, there is no situation 
that is intrinsically more ‘global’, or conversely, more ‘local’, than any other.  But if one could 
speak of some situations as more ‘global’ even in the vague sense that they somehow ‘matter’ 
more than other situations for social change, then it is perhaps not a worthless endeavour to 
seek a way in which that feature that makes them matter for far-reaching social change could 
be reflected in the structure of situations themselves without appealing to preconceived ideas 
about situations that matter for extensive social change, even if this may require taking a 
further distance from the Badiouian theoretical framework.  
Hegemony theory stipulates that the limit of a systematic totality is an exclusionary 
limit, thus positing an outside that is constitutive of the inside as a formation. The obverse of 
any constitution of an order, thus of social identities or the actualization of certain possibilities, 
is the exclusion of other identities or the repression of other possibilities. In the interpretation 
of hegemony theory in the third chapter and the examination in the fourth chapter of the 
ambiguities pertaining to the break between the old and the new that is achieved in the 
transition between hegemonic formations, two points have been affirmed. Firstly, there is a 
particular ‘ontic content’ that must persist in the core of the hegemonic formation—a 
hegemonic identity—as long as it effectively performs its ontological function as a totalizer, 
that is, for it to have a ‘cohesive power’ to sustain a chain of equivalence. Secondly, the 
conditions by which a particularity comes to be the representation of fullness, that is, the 
conditions by which a particularity becomes ‘the horizon of all there is’ and establishes a social 
imaginary, suggests that it is possible to trace what that content is to the sedimented layer of 
values, ideas, and beliefs, that makes certain projects more credible and acceptable for social 




thesis that Balibar had proposed to be the logical outcome of Althusser’s theory of ideology, 
that ‘[i]n the last instance, there is nothing like a dominant ideology of the rulers’, for the 
‘dominant ideology of a given society is a specific universalization of the imaginary of the 
dominated’.7 This thesis contributes toward the understanding of the specificity of different 
social situations. 
It is difficult to deny that a transformative political process is bound to face resistance. 
On the conceptualization of the source of this resistance, Badiouian and Laclauian approaches 
diverge. Badiou pushes the source of resistance to a ‘genuine political event’ onto the 
empirical State—an event provokes the State to reveal its ‘excess of power’ that, in 
Metapolitics, is associated with its repressive police apparatus. It had been proposed in the 
second chapter that Badiou’s claims concerning the State in Metapolitics relies on a leap by 
which the state qua a properly ontological category is overtaken by a referent that should have 
remained a metaphor, the risk of which had been latent from the instant Badiou had nominated 
the ‘state of the situation’ as the name of the representational operation in the situation. The 
State in writings such as Metapolitics (and often in Badiou’s explicitly political interventions, 
of which are legion) is construed as something of an omnipresent enemy against which stands 
a true socially transformative process. But even Badiou does not seem to construe the State 
always negatively—apropos the Palestinian situation, for example, he remarks that the 
‘axiomatic principle’ that applies in the situation, ‘in the end, is “a country and a state for the 
Palestinians”’.8 But with no more specification of the State apart from that it is the force of 
inertia that is resistant to novelty and change, Badiou’s thought may have precluded an 
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articulation of a philosophically salient difference between different types of States. It seems 
that the ontological category of the state of the situation must remain categorically distinct 
from the empirical State to even raise the question of different types of the latter (such as 
totalitarian states and liberal democracies). Moreover—and more relevantly for this thesis—
Badiou’s position makes it difficult to incorporate the role of other social forces that may 
account for that resistance, which, plausibly, are operative internally within a situation rather 
than beyond it, as the State, qua an ‘excrescent’ multiple, is posited to be.  
Hegemony theory is able to construe the resistance that socially transformative 
processes may confront in a different manner, such that if its insights could be assimilated 
with that of set-theoretical ontology in an alternative account of social situations, both the 
conflation of the state qua an ontological category with the empirical State, on the one hand, 
and the elevation of the State into force of inertia per se, on the other, may be avoided. Because 
what sustains a hegemonic formation is the investment of those in the situation but one which 
is limited and conditioned by the Sittlichkeit of the community and ideological distortions, the 
existence of antagonism at certain points, between certain identities or between certain 
attempts to actualize a possibility and the attempts to repress it, is a reflection of the particular 
constitution of that order. To put it analogically: to say that there is a point at which a person’s 
body resists further ingestion of food is to make a trivial point; but when a person experiences 
the limit of his digestive capacity after consuming a certain amount of food, this experience is 
indicative of the physical composition of that particular person. A hegemonic formation is 
constituted through the relations that come to hold between identities. The Indonesian national 
identity is constituted through relations, some of which may be antagonistic, with various other 
identities, such as the ethnic Chinese-Indonesian identity, the LGBT communities, the 
Christian minority, and so on. The ensemble of theses relations constitute ‘Indonesia’ as a 




identities for which their relations to identities that constitute the former in a given historical 
circumstance play little to no constitutive role in determining their respective identities. Later, 
in section 5.3.2, the possibility of defining a (relatively) ‘global’ situation will be explored by 
departing from the set-theoretical account of social situations to incorporate into the account 
the thought that situations are constituted via relations, and that their constitution always is 
accompanied by an exclusion that attests to the limit of the situation’s inclusivity, or a 
restriction on what is representable in a situation. 
None of what has been said so far denies that there is an empirical State and that its 
repressive apparatus may be deployed to thwart transformative political processes. On the 
contrary, Laclau’s discussion of an equivalential chain that may be constructed between 
disparate working-class struggles, not because of an objective unity of their interests but 
because they stand against a common repressive regime, or his characterization of populism 
as an antagonism between an ‘unresponsive power’ and the ‘people’ that emerges from an 
articulation of unfulfilled demands into an equivalential chain, are suggestive of the role that 
governmental institutions may perform as a force of inertia and repression.9 What hegemony 
theory proposes in distinction with Badiouian thought is that the State’s power to repress and 
the specific instances at which it intervenes can be seen as reflections of the constitution of the 
situation and those individuals who inhabit and sustain it under a particular historical 
circumstance. By placing the source of resistance to change back into the situation, hegemony 
theory allows the particularity of the situation as well as its inertia to be reflected in an account 
of social situations, without recourse to the metaphorical leap that makes Badiou’s association 
of the category of the state of the situation with the empirical State problematic. There is no 
need for a hypostatized concept of the State. 
                                                            





5.3 Components of the alternative account of social situations 
5.3.1 Minimizing the distance 
As important a question of what could be gained in terms of theorizing social change 
by incorporating aspects of both Badiouian and Laclauian theories is the question of the 
viability of this attempt. It is undeniable that there is no way to reconcile the fundamental 
differences between set-theoretical ontology and discursive ontology. Set-theoretical ontology 
is, as Geoff Pfeifer has characterized, ‘quasi-structuralist’, to the extent that, for it, ‘it is not 
the relations that do the defining’, but rather, ‘the relations exist insofar as those things which 
count become linked as a result of the count or the law’.10 Set-theoretical ontology holds that 
belonging to a multiple—‘to be an element of’—is the ‘sole possible predicate of existence as 
such’. For set theory, relations between elements of a set have no bearing on the constitution 
of these elements—their objectivity—or their identity, nor on the identity of the set itself (as 
extension is the sole criterion of the identity of a set). This is different from the discursive 
ontology underpinning hegemony theory, which adheres to the premise that an identity of any 
element is determined by its position in a relational system. Since hegemony theory regards a 
social order as constituted through processes that establish and modify relations between 
elements, realizing its possible contributions to the understanding of social situations requires 
a negotiation between two incompatible ontologies. Furthermore, to preserve the possibility 
of incorporating the theorization of an event and truth procedure in the alternative account of 
social situations that incorporates insights of hegemony theory, the critical point raised by 
Laclau concerning the preclusion of something like an organic crisis in the set-theoretical 
approach needs to be circumvented. What occurs in organic crisis, Laclau has contended, is 
the loss of ‘structural abilities’ of counting operations, hence the impossibility of delimiting 
                                                            




what is unrepresentable in the situation—a determination that Laclau believes is required by 
the Badiouian concept of event. Although Laclau may not have based his criticism on a faithful 
rendition of Badiou’s system, defining a place that is akin to an evental site will be necessary 
if the Badiouian account of post-evental transformation is to be incorporated into the 
alternative account. 
Despite the irreducible difference between the two theoretical systems, it is still 
possible to investigate whether there is a condition under which the difference could be 
minimized. Specifically for the purpose of developing an alternative account of social 
situations and socially transformative processes, what needs to be identified is a point of 
greatest isomorphy between social orders as understood by set-theoretical ontology in 
extensional terms and in relational terms by hegemony theory, an isomorphy that also leaves 
open the possibility of locating something like an evental site. Laclau’s remark at the very end 
of his essay on Badiou (the same essay that has been discussed in the third chapter) seems to 
offer a glimpse of hope: 
The huge question that remains is the following: could the ensemble of 
relations that I have described as rhetorical be absorbed and described as a 
special case within the wider categories of set theory, so that the latter would 
retain their ontological priority; or, rather, could set theory itself be 
described as an internal possibility—admittedly an extreme one—within the 
field of a generalized rhetoric [i.e. hegemony]? I am convinced that the right 
answer implies the second alternative, but this demonstration will have to 
wait for another occasion.11 
The occasion for the demonstration in favour of the second alternative has never transpired. 
Nor is there any hint in the essay itself what that ‘extreme’ case, at which the set-theoretical 
approach becomes an internal possibility of Laclau’s theoretical framework, could be. Here is 
                                                            




an opportunity for a conjecture. If the extreme case is where a formation of the social 
conceivable under hegemony theory is structurally isomorphic to the social situation 
conceived in terms of set-theoretical ontology, there is one case thinkable under the framework 
of hegemony theory that would almost satisfy this condition: it is a social order that has a 
clearly defined limit, a clearly defined frontier between inclusion and exclusion (for whether 
an element belongs or does not belong to a set is an all-or-nothing matter, without any middle). 
For Laclau, such an instance is purely hypothetical and cannot be found in reality, as ‘nothing 
is ever fully internal or external’.12 The assertion of absolute separation of the unpresented 
from the presented or the evental from the situational that characterize the Badiouian approach 
cannot, in the end, be made compatible with the approach of Laclau, in which strict 
dichotomies of such kind is rejected. In the present exploration, the complexities will be left 
aside—if this implies that an ‘ontological priority’ is accorded to set-theoretical ontology over 
discursive ontology, it is an implication that shall be admitted.  
The expansion of an equivalential chain is described by Laclau as a process of the 
‘simplification of social space’.13 It is described as simplification, because if the chain of 
equivalence expands toward a limit that must be postulated it will reach at some point, that 
‘something’ that is ‘equally present’ in the elements articulated into the chain will need to be 
defined not in terms of positive qualities but by their exclusionary relation vis-à-vis the outside 
that becomes the negative referent by which their common belonging to the inside is 
established. At the limit of its expansion of an equivalential chain, hence at the point of the 
‘maximal’ simplification of the social space, the social space would be dichotomized into two 
formations or identities that exclude each other. The difference between each formation in this 
dichotomized social space is the closest that hegemony theory can think of differences between 
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formations as purely extensional differences, in the sense that the identity of a formation is 
less determined by the relations within that formation than by its ‘counting’ certain elements 
as belonging whilst excluding others. It remains to be explored how this maximally simplified 
social space may be expressed in terms of the categories of Badiouian ontology such as 
situation and state of a situation. Granted this can be done, the subsequent task would be to 
draw some implications apropos the internal structure of this dichotomized situation and 
determine whether it would be possible to specify a process that would transform the situation, 
which, in this thesis, will be conceived in line with the theory of post-evental truth procedure. 
Neither the contributions that hegemony theory could make toward understanding 
social situations outlined in earlier nor the thought of the dichotomization of a situation as a 
process could be reflected in the alternative account of social situations unless a pre-evental 
subject in the construction and maintenance of social situations were posited. The pertinent 
question is whether the thought of the pre-evental subject is downright disallowed by the 
Badiouian theoretical framework. Christopher Norris explains that the Badiouian subject 
‘inhabits’ a situation just to the extent that she registers what Badiou defines 
as the discrepancy between it and the ‘state of the situation’, or belonging 
and inclusion, or—again—between the dominant count-as-one and those 
multiples which […] exceed, surpass or intrinsically elude its grasp. From 
which it follows that the ‘subject of a truth’, as distinct from the subject in 
the commonplace acceptance of the term, should be thought of always 
according to its role in the furtherance of just those projects or enquiries that 
most strongly define its ‘militant’ vocation.14  
Subjectivation—the creation of a faithful subject of a truth—is said to be ‘a special count, 
distinct from the count-as-one which orders presentation, just as it is from the state's 
reduplication’.15 Subjectivation is the emergence of the operator of fidelity following the 
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interventional nomination of an event, which attempts to construct a generic multiple by 
establishing another mode of discernment, or by counting elements without reference to the 
prevailing regimes of counting or already defined identities and predicates, such as to construct 
a multiple that would be indiscernible and unrepresentable according to the situation’s 
prevailing representational regime. Although truth is impossible without the subject, the 
subject, too, only persists only as long as it incrementally constructs and forces a truth in the 
situation. On this view, there is no subject in a situation unaffected by an event because such 
a situation would be one in which there is no operator of counting that is otherwise than those 
whose remit is to maintain the situation’s consistency, its presentational and representational 
regime, hence no chance for a multiple that is not already represented or representable in the 
situation’s space of representation to come to be discerned and be made representable. It is, 
nonetheless, stipulated that there are operations of counting—prior to the emergence of the 
subject proper through a ‘special count’—that accounts for there being order rather than chaos, 
for there being situations and states. But if the operations of counting prior to an event cannot 
be tied to the subject whose advent is subsequent to an event (and the only subject posited in 
Being and Event is a post-evental subject), then one might ask what these operations—which 
maintain or modify the situation rather than transforming it—are, concretely, in social 
situations. Given some of the examples that Badiou employs to illustrate presentation and 
representation (such as the example of the French registry office), it appears that—as Paul 
Livingston has suggested—it is only natural to assume, at least when the situation under 
consideration is a social situation, that they refer to social or discursive practices that are 
sustained by ‘the behavioural regularities of a specific cultural or language community’.16 
While some rationale has been offered in the first chapter concerning why the project of 
conceptually determining a process that necessarily transforms the situation need not overly 
                                                            




be concerned with the ‘agency’ of those who inhabit social situations, it is one of the purposes 
of the alternative account of social situations to open a way toward conceiving how particular 
social situations and corresponding states come to be shaped and sustained under a historical 
circumstance. Adding slightly more detail to the pre-evental counting operations is therefore 
highly desirable. Perhaps, in the scrupulously neutral stance that Being and Event takes with 
respect to the ‘counter’ of counting operations, there is room for theoretical liberty, in as much 
as what the neutral stance does not outright preclude the thought of a ‘subject’ other than that 
of the subject of social transformation (that is, the subject faithful to a truth) to whose activity 
social reproduction, the regularity of structures as well as their modifications, could be traced.  
In the fourth chapter, the Žižekian radical act has been described as the moment at 
which the subject is reborn as new by breaking from the established order. It is not the case, 
however, that the only kind of subject present in Žižek’s works is the subject of the radical act. 
For, in Žižek’s thought, the momentary self-withdrawal or contraction of subjectivity is 
required precisely because there is a subject prior to the act, the subject that is capable solely 
of reproducing an existing social order. Thus, for Žižek, it is the ‘subject’s own activity that 
serves both as the foundation of stasis and of the possibility of change’.17 As Pfeifer explains: 
Whereas Badiou rejects any notion of a pre-evental subjectivity and instead 
relegates pre-subjective individuals to the status of objects, determined 
simply by the externally imposed counting operation—arguing instead that 
events ‘subjectivize’ individuals—Žižek’s theory requires the pre-act 
existence of the self-limiting subjects for there to be any acts whatsoever 
(and hence any change). This point tracks the Lacanian distinction […] 
between ‘action’ and the ‘act’.18  
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Pfeifer proceeds to contrast the Žižekian position against the Badiouian one, suggesting that 
the subject of ‘action’—as distinct from the radically transformative ‘act’—is that which 
performs the ‘counting’ that structures the pre-evental situation: 
The subject is that point through which, in every quotidian ‘action’, a given 
social structure or conjuncture is ordered and sustained […] insofar as it is 
such a subject that, through the action of self-limiting and limiting the world 
to presuppositions handed over to it, posits—in an ideological form—a 
given conjuncture as Whole. In answer to the question of ‘what does the 
structuring?’, Žižek need not, as Badiou does, posit the existence of a reified, 
abstract, and formal process such as the ‘count-as-one’. It is subjectivity 
itself that does the ‘counting’ here in its reduplication and redeployment of 
the material structures of the community.19 
Taking the cue from Pfeifer, it shall be suggested that the ‘reduplication and redeployment of 
the material structures of the community’ is what the Laclauian subject performs in one of its 
dimensions, in as much as a process of social reproduction (or modification) is implicated in 
the role of the subject as the ‘vanishing operator’, whose acts of identification does reconfigure 
a hegemonic formation but only in a limited manner. During the discussion of hegemony 
theory, it had been stated that a subject-position is a crystallization of the act of the subject—
it is what will have been articulated as an element of a reconfigured hegemonic formation after 
the moment of the subject has passed. A subject-position is different vis-à-vis other positions 
in a hegemonic formation, but equivalent with them, in so far as they belong to the same 
formation. The Laclauian subject is implicated in the operations of ‘counting’ because it, 
through acts of identification, both produces subject-positions as elements to be counted as 
belonging to a formation and modifies the relations between these elements. The counting 
effective in a hegemonic formation is, therefore, not an anonymous operation to which 
individuals are passively subjected. If, as Pfeifer observes, the Badiouian approach ‘relegates 
                                                            




pre-subjective [hence pre-evental] individuals to the status of objects’ whose identities are 
entirely determined by an anonymous count, in the Laclauian approach, one is ‘subjectivized’ 
because he has ‘not achieved constitution as an object’,20 and, in his conditions as a subject, 
both produces and sustains the object that will have come to be counted as belonging to a 
reconfigured formation—objective social identities, or subject-positions—through an act of 
identification. That a dimension of social reproduction is implicated in the operation of the 
Laclauian subject can be supported by referring to the fact that what is decidable and thinkable 
by the subject, hence the ways in which identities are constructed, is limited by a particular 
content or body that becomes ‘the horizon of all there is’,21 which is, in the end, conditioned 
by the Sittlichkeit of the community in a given historical circumstance. Due to the constitutive 
exclusion—the repression of certain positions and possibilities—that ‘accompanies’ every act 
of identification,22 limitless inclusivity is impossible. Accordingly, not all positions can be 
counted as elements of a hegemonic formation. But as hegemonic universality cannot exist 
except through the equivalential chain between particularities, this means, conversely, that the 
equivalential relation between positions that can actually be attained by a hegemonic 
formation is a reflection of ‘the limit of socially attainable universalization’,23 that is, the 
extent of inclusivity that is achievable under a historical circumstance. In other words, the 
positions that are actually produced and counted in a formation are the reflection of the extent 
of a hegemonic universality that, because it is always partial, must exclude certain terms from 
the formation.  
The investigations in the fourth chapter regarding the conditions by which a particular 
hegemonic project becomes effective have tried to show that it is difficult to distinguish 
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processes of transformation and that of reproduction in hegemony theory. In so far as the 
production of subject-positions does not expand this limit to the inclusivity of the hegemonic 
universality that exists because every act of identification is accompanied by constitutive 
exclusion, the changes that are induced thereby are to be seen as modifications. Examining 
whether it is possible to specify a process of transformation is the task of the next two sections. 
It needs to be acknowledged that the set-theoretical account of social situations—on which 
that upcoming endeavour will be based—does not register the distance between dislocation 
and decision that underpins the distinction between the Laclauian subject and the subject-
position. Pre-evental, normalized situations are regarded as atemporal, in the sense that its 
diachronic development is in fact a synchrony in the sense that whatever that is presentable 
has already been represented. The processes that have led to a certain configuration of the 
situation fall beneath what the ontological schema allows to be understood of a concrete 
situation, for it requires, given that it will always posit operations of counting as having been 
performed, that a concrete situation to be already constituted. What the social situation 
conceived in accordance with set-theoretical ontology is nevertheless able to register is the 
outcome of the act of the Laclauian subject by which a formation is reconfigured, in which 
there is no subject but only objective social identities or subject-positions. In so far as the 
outcomes that configure a situation are not operational results of an anonymous operation of 
counting but of acts of identification, however, it becomes possible to further analyse the 
internal composition of the situation.  
 
5.3.2 The composition of a social situation and the limit of inclusivity 
This section outlines how the insights of hegemony theory, when incorporated into the 
account of social situations based on set-theoretical ontology, might allow a historically 




emerge from the relations between elements of the situation, to explore this possibility is also 
to analyse the internal composition of a social situation, which, owing to its being the point of 
greatest compatibility between set-theoretical ontology and hegemony theory, has been 
stipulated to be a situation that is ‘simplified’ through the expansion of the chain of 
equivalence to the point where a situation is dichotomized into two formations or identities.  
Characterizing Spinozian ontology in his own terms in the tenth meditation of Being 
and Event, Badiou contends that Spinoza denies the ‘errant’ unpresented void that haunts a 
situation from within. This denial makes the coincidence of the operations of count-as-one 
(presentation) and count-of-the-count (representation)—or a situation and its state—possible 
in Spinozian ontology. One implication of this coincidence noted by Badiou is ‘that a human 
being, even when he or she belongs to two separable situations, can count as one insofar as 
the state of the two situations is the same’.24 As will be seen below, what is hinted by Badiou’s 
statement—which states that in Spinozian ontology, identity at the level of representation 
establishes identity at the level of presentation—is a way to express the construction of 
hegemonic formation as the construction of one situation from a plurality of situations and 
their elements in terms of set-theoretical terms. That this hint comes by way of Spinozian 
ontology (or Badiou’s characterization of it) in which the gap between presentation and 
representation is denied is unsurprising, for the articulation of a hegemonic formation or 
identity is sustained by the elevation—via the operation of radical investment by subjects in 
search of fullness—of a particular formation or identity as the realization of universal 
representation. Though this elevation may be ‘nothing more than a fantasy that the aggregate 
of the points of identification seized upon by each subject cohere as the same object’,25 it is 
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the operation that underpins the process by which a plurality of social situations and identities 
are related to form a larger whole.  
As Burhanuddin Baki explains, in set-theoretical ontology, the strategy by which the 
wholeness of a situation is secured involves ‘[stepping] outside the situation into some larger 
situation’ wherein the elements presented in the initial situation are ‘fully named, predicated, 
and related together’.26 This larger situation is the power-set, refashioned in the Badiouian text 
as the state of the situation, which has been suggested in this thesis to be the schema for the 
space of representation. If the state of two situations are the same, there must be some kind of 
relationship between those two situations. Under the schema of set-theoretical ontology that 
conceives relations in terms of inclusion and belonging, if the two situations are to share one 
and the same state, they must each be a part of some other situation whose state is precisely 
that one and the same state—the same space of representation—shared by the two situations.  
It can be said that if two situations are different, what differs is their regimes of 
counting—authorized and maintained by their respective states—that can be understood here 
as their criteria of membership. Suppose that the restriction of membership to a school does 
not allow all individuals but only students and teachers to belong to the school. As per the 
illustration of a social situation developed in the first chapter, it may be assumed that, under 
its regime of representation, ‘student’ and ‘teacher’ are two subsets into which every 
individual that belongs to the school situation can be classified. Those individuals that belong 
to the school situation belong to either of the two subsets both presented, as individuals 
belonging to the situation, and represented in the situation, in so far the two subsets of the 
situation are elements of the situation’s state, conceived as a set. A multiple (named ‘student’, 
‘teacher’, and so on) is an identity in a given social situation, in so far as any individual that 
                                                            




belongs to that multiple is both presented and represented. A different situation, a baseball 
team, for example, is a situation that would have as its subsets ‘pitchers’, ‘hitters’, and 
‘catchers’. If the baseball team and the school situations were totally unrelated, it must be 
assumed that there is no instance in which one and the same individual could be both a baseball 
player and a student. However, if one and the same individual could simultaneously be a 
baseball player and a student, a common space of representation—a state—shared by the 
baseball team and the school must be posited. But if a state is posited, then it is implied that 
there is another situation for which that state is its state. At this point, it would not be 
unjustifiable to employ the language of set-theoretical ontology and speak of the situations of 
baseball and school as ‘included’ in that other situation. And any individual who belongs to 
the two initial situations that are included in the other situation is both presented and 
represented in the other situation. The state of the other situation will have as its elements all 
the multiples, that is, social identities, which belonged to the states of the two initial situations. 
All the identities in the two initial situations, which are, by definition, representations in those 
situations, will also be representations in the ‘larger’ situation.  
One and the same individual belongs to multiple situations and therefore is able to 
possess a plurality of identities. But—drawing here on the implications of the statement that 
‘a human being, even when he or she belongs to two separable situations, can count as one 
insofar as the state of the two situations is the same’ in terms of a hegemonic construction of 
a situation—if that individual is to be one and the same individual, another situation in which 
the multiple situations are included must exist. This another situation is a situation that shall 
be qualified as relatively ‘global’ with respect to the multiple situations that are included 
therein. It is not possible to determine a priori how different situations and identities will 
actually be related, as this is a matter of the outcomes of certain identificatory acts—




However, based on the thought that elements articulated into a hegemonic formation are both 
presented and represented, ‘in the sense that their identity is always split between their 
particularity and the hegemonic universality that counts them as one’,27 it shall be said that the 
identity of each individual is split between a particularistic identity (being a batter or a student 
or a catcher, for example) and another one, which is acquired by virtue of there being a relation 
between situations, ensured by the common space of representation whose existence implies 
the inclusion of a plurality of situations in another situation, one to which that individual also 
belongs. The other identity that results from the relations that have been established between 
situations and identities—in whose construction the states of those situations are implicated—
points toward a way to conceive of something akin to a hegemonic identity, as distinct from 
other, particularistic identities.  
What needs to be considered in further analysing the composition of a relatively global 
situation is not so much the ‘content’ of identities or which empirical individuals are 
represented by certain identities—rather, what needs to be brought into the account is the idea 
that the articulation of identities will be constrained in some way, that a hegemonic 
universality cannot count every social element as belonging to a situation and that a hegemonic 
identity is not representative of every identity that could be constructed in the situation. To 
assimilate this point in the composition of a relatively global situation is to assimilate the thesis 
that ‘the affirmation of all identity’ is ‘accompanied’ by a constitutive exclusion of an 
outside.28 For a situation S whose elements are human individuals, the construction of any 
identity, X, Y, Z, in that situation implies the constitutive exclusion of certain identities, A, B, 
C. Suppose, then, that X, Y, Z are collected in the set α and A, B, C, in the set β. About the 
identity of α, it can be said that it is constituted by the exclusion of β. It is not merely the case 
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that α has not yet extended itself to count amongst it elements of β but has to exclude β in 
order to constitute its identity. A maximally simplified situation can now be understood as 
denoting a situation S, all of whose elements and parts could be classified as either α or β.  
As an example, let it be supposed that α is the extensional equivalent of an identity 
named ‘Indonesian’. The extension of α is not individuals living in the Indonesian archipelago. 
Nor should it simply be supposed that it is coextensive with the set of individuals holding an 
Indonesian passport. The example needs to be one in which the Indonesian situation is riven 
by antagonism, but the illustration of antagonistic relation—which presupposes a constitutive 
exclusion rather than merely an externality—would be somewhat difficult if elements of α 
were to be identified as all those who live in the Indonesian archipelago or hold an Indonesian 
passport. Those individuals, for the sake of exposition, may be supposed to be elements of S, 
but only after noting an underlying layer of complexity implied by the fact that S is a social 
situation. In so far as ‘Indonesian’ is not—and can never be—a fully self-identical object, its 
determination cannot be left to objective facts such as that of living in a certain geographic 
location or of possessing a certain passport. Laclauian social ontology insists on the 
ontological impossibility of α being identical to S. What the supposition in the present example 
that the extension of S is those who live in the Indonesian archipelago or hold an Indonesian 
passport actually implies, then, is that geography and formal nationality are not subjected to 
processes of hegemonic articulation, hence that they are part of the sedimented background 
on which the articulation of Indonesian identity takes place. Nevertheless, S should be 
regarded as a social situation, for, though they may be mundane facts in most cases, living in 
a certain geographic location and holding a certain passport are part of one’s identity, and as 
such, they cannot deprived of the possibility of becoming elements that, in a process of radical 
rearticulation of social identity, are invested with meanings that are irreducible to merely 




identity in relation to separatist movements in Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor, geography 
and formal nationality would have an entirely different status. The layer of complexity, 
therefore, is needed for the alternative account being developed here to remain faithful to the 
idea that the beginning and end of a social situation—including the one denoted by S in the 
present example—are contingent but are not arbitrary resultants of an entirely anonymous 
counting operation, to the extent that what is to count as a situation is ultimately determined 
by processes of articulation or acts of identification, even if the contingency of a particular 
determination had been forgotten and the boundaries of the situation have become sedimented.  
With these considerations in the background, it shall be said that the property shared 
by all individuals that belong to α is being Indonesian in that emphatic sense—and this is one 
thing that is implied by α≠S, the non-identity of α and S—irreducible to objective facts, a sense 
that is evoked by that nebulous expression, ‘Indonesian culture’. Being Indonesian is a 
property that is shared not because these individuals possessed this property prior to the 
construction of α, but by their ‘factually being together’—or their having identified with a 
signifier without a proper meaning—as a result of articulatory or identificatory processes, 
attributable to pre-evental subjectivity, that have led to a particular constitution of this multiple 
under a given historical circumstance. As is the case with any social identity, the relation to 
an outside is constitutive to the determination of ‘Indonesian’. That set of elements that the 
constitution and maintenance of Indonesian identity excludes shall be designated β. If α were 
seen as the extension of a hegemonic universality, then, A, B, C would not be representations 
in α, since the elements that belong to β do not belong to α—they are not counted-as-one by 
α. But despite being excluded from the Indonesian national identity, it cannot be said that β is 
in any sense an evental site. For one, α and β could be seen as competing constructions of 
hegemonic identities or rival hegemonic formations, in which case the attribution of a 




supposed to be the extension of Indonesian national identity, it might be possible that what is 
included in β are identities that the Indonesian national identity constitutively excludes—the 
ethnic Chinese-Indonesians and the LGBT people, for example.29 This would be the case in 
which a project to impose a particular Indonesian national identity over the social space would 
have placed ethnic Chinese individuals and sexual minorities in a marginalized position—in 
other words, β would represent the underdogs in the situation S. And yet, although the 
marginalization of certain groups by others is indicative of uneven power relations, the 
alternative does not present a case that is conceptually different from the case where β is a 
rival hegemonic formation. The most straightforward way in which a distinction between pure 
outside and constitutive outside that is crucial for determining the limit of a particular social 
order according to hegemony theory can be reflected in set-theoretical terms is to regard α and 
β as subsets of the situation S (which, as noted earlier, is the sedimented background is not 
being redrawn), with which neither α nor β is extensionally equivalent. To express things 
simply, presented elements of S are individuals that are also members of either α or β but 
cannot belong to both simultaneously. However, if this approach is adopted, both α and β, as 
subsets of S, would be representations and therefore be elements of ℘(S), the state of the 
situation S. This implies that elements of α will share a common space of representation with 
elements that belong to β, hence that elements of α and β are both presented and represented 
in S. But this means that in the situation S, neither α nor β conform to the definition of evental 
site as a presented multiple none of whose elements are represented. To elaborate on this point 
and explore the possibility of incorporating the notion of evental site and event, it is instructive 
to return to one of the discussions in the second chapter. Oliver Feltham had suggested that 
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the evental site ‘consists of an encounter between heterogeneous situations’.30 The resources 
of hegemony theory has provided a way of thinking the internal composition of a situation that 
reflects the limitation to the positions that can be represented under a historical circumstance, 
as well as a way of thinking the coming to be of such a situation through the interaction 
between situations and their respective states. It is an appropriate time to return to this 
suggestion and consider how an evental site may be located in the social situation, reconceived 
via the incorporation of aspects of hegemony theory. 
An evental site is defined as a presented multiple that belongs to the situation, but none 
of whose elements belong to the situation. In the interpretation of Badiou’s system, the 
elements of an evental site have been suggested to be radically unrepresentable—although this 
is not how Badiou describes the evental site, it is nevertheless compatible with the claim that 
nothing of what is in the evental site can be known, since knowable implies representable. 
Feltham argues, however, that it is implausible to claim that the sans-papiers constitute a 
‘point of total ignorance’ if the sans-papiers form an evental site in the situation of French 
society: the French State will need to claim to know something about them in order to 
legitimate their marginalization. The relevant passage in which Feltham diverges from 
Badiou’s claim shall be quoted in full: 
In the eyes of the French state, illegal immigrants are excessive in their 
number, criminal tendencies, their weight upon French society; in turn, they 
are deficient according to every measure of French social integration […]. 
However, if the sans-papiers form an evental-site in French politics, it is 
inaccurate to say that they constitute a point of ignorance for the state: how 
could they, being its favourite scapegoat? The question is how much 
knowledge, and of what kind, is necessary to construct a fantasy. It is the 
phantasmatic figure of the illegal immigrant as parasite that justifies the 
proud exercise of the state’s repressive capacities. The real ignorance of the 
                                                            




state concerns rather the social and political capacities of these particular 
people. These capacities, however, are no mystery; in fact, they form a part 
of other situations and their states, whether it be the situation of Mali 
expatriates, or the situation of civil associations that help illegal immigrants. 
Every evental site is on the edge of the void, as Badiou says, from the 
perspective of the state of the initial situation. However, from within the 
evental site itself, its multiple is made up of an intersection between 
situations, an intersection between post-colonial Mali and the situation of 
the French economy […]. In a materialist ontology, heterogeneous elements 
have to come from somewhere: the evental-site can thus be defined as a non-
recognized intersection between situations; a disqualified mix which appears, 
at the level of the state, as a pure disjunction—the French state is not 
responsible for citizens of Mali […]. For so long the left have been dismissed 
as idealists but here activists along with the sans-papiers are calling for a 
dose of realism: the state needs to exit its fantasy and enter the real world; 
in other words, the level of presentation and its expansion via intersecting 
populations.31 
Because Feltham considers Badiou’s claim that the composition of the evental site is strictly 
unknowable difficult to uphold in concrete social situations, in the alternative he proposes, 
there is something of the sans-papiers that is known to the inhabitant of the French situation—
it is only that they do not know well enough, and do not know that they do not know well 
enough. In Feltham’s claim that the actual ‘capacities [of the sans-papiers] are no mystery’ 
because ‘in fact, they form a part of other situations and their states’, what is again affirmed is 
that void-ness is a relative property in extraontological situations, and that a multiple that is 
an evental site for one situation may not be in others. Although this is perfectly reasonable as 
an account of the French situation and the marginalization of the sans-papiers, the premises 
of the alternative account of social situations being developed in this chapter makes it difficult 
to directly incorporate Feltham’s account and conclude that the sans-papiers form an evental 
                                                            




site. Difficulty arises because, firstly, the alternative account of social situations fixes the sense 
of the term ‘state’ strictly to mean a space of representation and, secondly, accepts the 
interpretation proposed in the first chapter that every social identity is, in the end, an 
underrepresentation.  
On the first point: if the sans-papiers appear ‘deficient according to every measure of 
French social integration’, it can only be the case that the situation of French society is one in 
which the sans-papiers is discerned as deficient people—the sans-papiers form a multiple that 
is not only presented, but also represented, represented as deficient people. This is not to deny 
the thought that is implied in the long passage quoted previously, namely, that the 
representation of sans-papiers as deficient or incompetent is one that is unfairly imposed, and 
what the inhabitants of the situation does ‘know’ of the sans-papiers is nothing but a testament 
to their ignorance of the actual capacities of the sans-papiers as individuals, or their failure to 
see the sans-papiers as more than an indistinct group of people who are ‘not French’. Still, in 
so far as ‘deficiency’ indicates the alterity of the sans-papiers vis-à-vis ‘French’ identity, there 
is a relation between the two terms, ‘sans-papiers’ and ‘French’. But two terms that are related 
need a space wherein they can be related as different, and this space can only be a common 
space of representation. Thus, if the identity of ‘French’ requires it to be differentiated from 
what it is not, then that against which it is differentiated necessarily has an access to the space 
of representation of the French situation as a whole (this is a point to which the discussion of 
the Laclauian category of the ‘socially heterogeneous’ later will return). On the second point: 
adapting Badiou’s definition of a historical situation as a situation wherein there is an 
omnipresence of singular multiples, it had been suggested that every social identity is a 
singular multiple that can be described alternatively as an underrepresentation, in the sense 
that in concrete social situations governed by a particular regime of counting, individuals are 




interpretation, a strict distinction between sans-papiers and other social identities that may be 
represented in the French situation becomes difficult to maintain. 
 The possibility of a slippage from radically unrepresentable to underrepresented or 
misrepresented—which, on the alternative account, is the characteristic of all social 
identities—is one that had been latent in the premise that in extraontological situations, void-
ness, and by extension, the event-ness of an event, are relative properties. It is this slippage 
that needs to be avoided if the thought of an event as the singular point of origin for a process 
of extensive social transformation, which shall be defined as a process whose transformative 
effects do not range over just any one social situation, but over a situation that reflects the limit 
of inclusivity and representability that is achievable under a historical circumstance. The risk 
of slippage between underrepresented and unrepresentable persists because set-theoretical 
ontology does not prohibit the thought of there being a situation that would have as its subsets 
the situation of France and the situation of Mali expatriates. In that ‘larger’ situation, with its 
more expansive representational regime, the sans-papiers and the French citizens, strictly 
under the definitions of the ontological discourse, may well be presented and represented. This 
‘upward’ delineation of situations, hence the a priori indefinite expansion of a space of 
representation, is not intrinsically prohibited in the discourse of set-theoretical ontology—the 
examination that followed from the caricature of Italian football in the second chapter has 
explored the ambiguities that ensue from this. Indeed, for set-theoretical ontology, it must be 
the case that such a ‘larger’, more ‘inclusive’, situation is thinkable. It is the thinkability of 
such a situation that allows a situation-to-come supplemented by a truth as well as the forcing 
of a truth to be thinkable, since what happens in forcing is that the subject of a truth approaches 
the situation via the hypothesis of a situation-to-come, what will have been presented therein 
if those who are not even counted-as-one will have come to belong in the same way as those 




of representation that regulates a concrete social situation could be transformed or expanded 
by thinking alone. The contribution of hegemony theory at this point is that it is able to propose 
the following: although the limit to what can be represented cannot be posited a priori, that 
limit is nonetheless necessary if the beginning and end of a particular social order is to be 
determined, and that such a limit is constituted and reinforced by relations of equivalence, 
difference, and constitutive exclusion between social identities that are established in the order. 
It proposes, in other words, that the limit is one that is imposed historically. On this view, the 
exclusionary relation between ‘French’ and ‘sans-papiers’ is irreconcilable because the actual 
realization of a more inclusive, larger situation is thwarted by the particular ways in which the 
identity of ‘French’ is constituted and sustained. It can also be surmised what a socially 
transformative process must be in one of its dimensions (in its ‘vertical’ dimension): the 
realization of that inclusive situation, which abolishes the established relation—one that is 
exclusionary—between identities that blocks the expansion of the space of representation, so 
as to allow a plurality of previously unrepresentable, hence non-constructible, multiples to 
have a chance of becoming representable in a new situation. The remaining task is to see how 
the dichotomized situation as construed so far could incorporate the idea of a momentary 
interruption of presentational and representational structure at which the possibility of a 
situation beyond the restrictions of the regimes of counting that currently regulate the situation 
is glimpsed.  
 
5.3.3 An outline of a process of transformation 
In line with his refusal to valorise the position of ‘total exteriority vis-à-vis the present 
situation’ as the only position from which a socially transformative process can initiate, Laclau 




in a Badiouian perspective but not in mine’.32  Despite this, with the introduction of the 
category of ‘heterogeneity’ or the ‘socially heterogeneous’ in On Populist Reason, Laclau 
defines a class of elements that are located at the point of greatest exteriority conceivable in 
his approach. The role of heterogeneity in the construction of hegemonic formations and 
antagonistic divisions is complex, and will not be treated in full detail, as the complexity is 
not relevant in so far as the alternative account presupposes the ‘extreme’ case in which there 
are clearly defined relations between identities, as either antagonistic or non-antagonistic. It 
shall be suggested that the category of heterogeneity can be connected to the evental site in 
Badiou’s theory, in that it denotes elements in a social order that are not merely 
underrepresented, but radically unrepresentable, and whose ‘emergence’—presentation—
would dislocate the regime of representation. 
The basic motivation for the introduction of the category of heterogeneity in the theory 
of hegemony is not difficult to summarize. Without an exclusion that is radically 
unrepresentable in the representational space as such, the maximal simplification of the social 
space—that is, the division of society into two irreconcilable formations or identities—would 
result in 
a saturated space within which all social entities can be located. We have, it 
is true, an antagonistic frontier, but one which cannot include, within its own 
logic, its own displacement in any direction. The reason for this is clear: if 
the excluded other is the condition of my own identity, persisting in my 
identity also requires the positing of the antagonistic other.33  
Such a ‘saturated space’ would be a social order wherein all identities are locatable within 
either of the two hegemonic formations that dichotomize a social order—or, to refer to the 
account of the simplification of the social space developed earlier, a situation S in which every 
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element can be classified as belonging to either α or β. In Laclau’s view, the sole effect of 
antagonism in this case is the stabilization of identities. The shifting or displacement of the 
boundary between formations cannot be deduced from their difference in so far as the 
boundary is what constitutes them as different—hence, a ‘pure inside/outside opposition 
would presuppose an immobile frontier’. 34  To uphold the possibility of breaking this 
immobility, Laclau postulates that there will be an ‘irreducible remainder’ or a ‘residue’ that 
is unassimilable to any existing formation, in which the possibility of dislocating any particular 
construction of identity and of social space is retained. Laclau describes heterogeneity at one 
point by employing a Lacanian vocabulary, as the ‘Real’ that ‘resists symbolic integration’—
this captures the thought that heterogeneity is the ‘kind of outside’ that is ‘not only an 
exteriority to something within a space of representation, but to the space of representation as 
such’.35 As has been suggesting earlier, ‘two entities, in order to be different, need a space 
within which that difference is representable’. Heterogeneity, then, cannot mean difference, 
as it ‘presupposes the absence of that common space’.36 By introducing a slight alteration to 
the diagram employed in the third chapter, heterogeneity can be indicated as follows37: 
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S1 and A represent two hegemonic identities in an antagonistic, exclusionary, relation that 
have dichotomized the social space. In an antagonistic relation, the outside is constitutive of 
the inside, the identities of the inside define themselves in relation to the other. Thus, the 
‘other’, A in the diagram above, is represented in a common space of representation as S1, as 
its negative reference. The elements m and n, however, are heterogeneous in the sense that 
they are unrepresentable in any of the formations—they are not counted-as-one by any of the 
hegemonic universalities that dichotomize the social situation. The formulation of 
heterogeneity as the ‘residue’ or ‘irreducible remainder’ of the constitution of an order that 
cannot be integrated into any formation and has no access to the space of representation, it 
might be suggested, makes heterogeneity the closest Laclauian equivalent of the elements that 
compose an evental site, located at the edge of a situation’s void. From the perspective of the 
situation, there is nothing in the evental site to be discerned to make its elements enter into the 
composition of multiples in the situation. In the first chapter, this has been explained by saying 
that the only ‘property’ that the elements that compose an evental site possesses is a non-
property according to the situation’s prevailing regime of representation, and that, as a result, 
this ‘property’ cannot be the basis on which a social identity is constructed, as a representable 
multiple, in the situation. Laclau writes: ‘in the case of an outside which is opposed to the 
inside just because it does not have access to the space of representation “opposition” means 
simply “leaving aside” and, as such, it does not in any sense shape the identity of what is 
inside’.38 As heterogeneity is not a difference and thus excised from the relationality that 
constitute identities, it could be likened to elements composing an evental site, which cannot 
be related to elements that belong to that situation under the situation’s prevailing 
presentational and representational regime. Heterogeneity is comparable to the evental site in 
this respect. But it can now be added that its ‘evental’ quality is constituted—has come to be—
                                                            




in the process of equivalential articulation of a plurality of identities to establish a social order. 
The question, then, is how heterogeneity can come to have actual transformative effects. On 
the ‘emergence’ of heterogeneity, Harrison summarizes Laclau’s position as follows and raises 
pertinent questions: 
All we can really know [about the socially heterogeneous] is: (a) that their 
emergence cannot be explained dialectically; (b) strictly speaking they do 
not have a name (or identity); and (c) that they are the ‘residue’ of the 
construction of a previous ‘people’ [or a hegemonic identity, in the present 
context]. Hence whilst crucial for Laclau’s theory on a whole a number of 
unanswered questions remain: do the socially heterogeneous have to be a 
collective subjectivity? What is the logic of their emergence?39 
In a similar vein, Balibar has remarked that in Laclau’s theory, heterogeneity is ‘[pushed] back 
beneath the properly political construction or formalization […]. About this heterogeneity, and 
thus about this demand for equality and freedom, without which there would be no initial 
“shock” for politics, […] we can say nothing except that it must exist’.40 These readers are 
right to note that Laclau does not proceed much further beyond the postulation of 
heterogeneity as the necessary condition for preventing the permanency of established 
identities and antagonistic divisions—that heterogeneity will emerge as ‘the outsiders of the 
system, the underdogs’ is one of the few things that can be said about its emergence.41 
However, with the affinities between heterogeneity and evental site that have been listed so 
far, and given the suggestion in the first chapter that an event in Badiou’s theoretical 
architecture is the moment of impossible passage from the unrepresentable to the representable, 
it would not be unjustified to propose that the emergence of heterogeneity is comparable to an 
event, whose occurrence is not an effect of structure—its occurrence is unexplainable from 
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the perspective of the situation—but is a presentation that occurs in violation of the regimes 
of counting that governs the situation. 
One last observation apropos the category of heterogeneity shall be made. Laclau 
regards the socially heterogeneous to be in possession of a lumpenproletariat-like status, that 
is, the status that the lumpenproletariat has within the classic Marxist discourse of the relations 
of production and of class struggle between two camps that emerges therefrom. In the orthodox 
Marxist discourse, the expulsion of the lumpenproletariat from ‘the field of historicity’ is ‘the 
very condition of possibility for a pure interiority, of a history with a coherent structure’, based 
on the ascription of an ‘a priori central role’ to the proletariat as the ‘necessary agent of 
historical development’.42 Belonging neither to the proletariat, nor to what is antagonistically 
opposed to it, namely, the bourgeoisie, Laclau believes that the lumpenproletariat is reduced 
to a ‘peoples without history’ in this discourse. Laclau is led to postulate the lumpenproletariat-
like status of the socially heterogeneous as that which subverts a final determination of an 
antagonistic relation (it should be noted that the attribution of transformative potential to the 
lumpenproletariat is not without precedence—Laclau himself mentions Frantz Fanon). This is 
partly motivated by his view that an antagonistic relation cannot be a priori deduced—it is 
likely that, to Laclau, the characterization found in Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of the 
superficial revolutionary activities of the lumpenproletariat as ‘masquerades’ of true 
revolutionary activity would appear as nothing but an attempt to salvage the idea that ‘true’ 
antagonism can be deduced from something that is beyond political construction—the 
economic substructure, for example. Yet, the distinction between the lumpenproletariat and 
the proletariat has been drawn by some authors as two modalities of political subjectivity, 
without reference to economic determinism. Vladimir Safatle—to name just one author—
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explains that whereas the activities of the lumpenproletariat are oriented toward self-
preservation and motivated by a desire to return to order, the proletariat, devoid of property 
and detached from ‘traditional modes of living’ or ‘established social normativities’, is capable 
of turning ‘its destitution into a political force to radically transform existing forms of life’.43 
A theory that posits the neutralization of dislocation and thus the recuperation of an order as 
the sufficient condition of social change requires neither an account of social change other 
than as conceived as the overcoming of the lack of order, nor a concept of subject other than 
as lacking, whose attempt to remedy that lack through investing in a particular project that it 
believes would restore an order wherein it will have attained self-identity. However, if the 
processes of instituting an order does not necessarily imply social transformation, the 
conceptual determination of social transformation requires, at least, an additional distinction 
between processes that are sustained by the continual marginalization or exclusion of certain 
positions or possibilities and processes that do not—a distinction that is corollary to that 
between a subject for whom the objective is the attainment of fullness (a reconciled society) 
as such and a kind of subject whose trajectory could be specified differently. The explorations 
of this chapter have so far suggested that the incorporation of aspects of hegemony theory in 
the account of social situation should allow the thought of pre-evental subjectivity, the 
articulation of equivalential relations, or the construction of hegemonic formations and 
identities under certain historical conditions. To think the ‘vertical’ dimension of transcending 
the situation shaped by those ‘horizontal’ processes, however, what is needed is precisely the 
abovementioned distinction. If the emergence of the socially heterogeneous could be seen as 
‘evental’, it should be followed by a process that could definitely be regarded as one that is 
akin to the process of extending the situation with a truth. 
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Not all the details of the Badiouian categories of event, intervention, subject, and truth 
procedure will be reiterated here and the co-articulation of hegemony theory and Badiouian 
theory shall not be pushed beyond the point of showing that in the account of social situations 
developed in this chapter, the supplementation of the situation with previously non-
constructible multiples constitutes a process of extensive social transformation. For the sake 
of exposition, Rosa Parks shall serve as an example, granting that her refusal to give up her 
seat was an event and that the American situation in which this event occurred has the structure 
of a maximally simplified situation, that, in this case, is a situation dichotomized by two 
irreconcilable identities, namely, ‘black’ and ‘white’. Bypassing the details and judgements 
pertaining to actual history, what is outlined below is how a socially transformative process 
that unfolds the consequences of the ‘event’ of Rosa Parks might be understood. 
The particular situation in which the incident involving Rosa Parks occurred was that 
of a bus in Montgomery, Alabama. As there had never been a shortage of buses in mid-
twentieth century United States, it must be said that it was a perfectly ordinary situation. It is 
not the case that there were no other resistances against segregation, including refusals to give 
up seats, prior to a day in 1955. But, as Todd May explains, ‘[w]hat makes the refusal of Rosa 
Parks an event is ‘the fidelity to her act by other committed activists’—it is ‘only in retrospect 
that we realize that hers was an event while the previous refusals were not’, which were 
‘interventions [that failed] to catalyse an event’ for the situation.44 On illustrating what makes 
a situation as ordinary as that of a bus an evental site of the American situation and that the 
affirmation of an event that had occurred therein initiates a transformative process on that 
situation, the alternative account shall rely on a thought that is broadly related to Rancière’s 
formulation of subjectivation as the emergence of a ‘figure’ that is constituted through ‘a 
                                                            




crossing of identities’ as an exception—in Rancière’s own term, ‘supernumerary’—to the 
‘calculated number of groups, places, and functions in a society’.45 In the alternative account, 
it will be said that an evental site is composed of ‘figures’ that are not representable in the 
situation—they are not identities, strictly speaking—because they do not constitute themselves 
with reference to the exclusionary relation that is constitutive of any identity in that situation. 
This is to say that if the refusal of Rosa Parks to give up her seat is an event, it is because the 
figure of Rosa Parks that it presents belongs nowhere in the set of all social identities 
constructible in accordance with the representational regime that governs the American 
situation as a whole. In Rancière’s account, subjectivation, by definition, involves an 
egalitarian declaration, which Badiou suggests is, ‘for Rancière, the event itself’. 46  The 
alternative account accepts that the presentation of an unrepresentable figure is an event and 
that what makes the figure unrepresentable is that it is a kind of ‘crossing’ of identities. 
However, it stays closer to Badiou in holding that whilst it is an event that makes the 
production of a truth (or egalitarian) consequences possible, an event is not in itself their 
realization, which depends entirely on the continuation of a process that comes after the event.  
One of the conditions for unfolding the consequences of an event is that any attempt 
to dissimulate it, to reduce an event to a non-event, has to be resisted. It will always be easier 
for the inhabitants of the situation to explain away an anomalous figure by conferring an 
already-representable identity on it. The inhabitants of the situation possess the resources to 
do so, for it is, in fact, part of the situation’s knowledge that Rosa Parks is a passenger, a black 
woman, and so on. An illustration from Jodi Dean outlines how the event of Rosa Parks may 
be dissimulated: 
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One can imagine what could have occurred should the therapeutic and 
particularized practices of institutionalized identity politics have been in 
place: Rosa Parks would have discussed her feelings about being 
discriminated against; the bus driver would have dealt with his racism, 
explaining that he had been brought up that way; and perhaps there would 
have been a settlement enabling Parks to ride at a discounted fare on 
weekends and holidays. Maybe the two would have appeared together on a 
television talk show, the host urging each to understand and respect the 
opinion of the other. Ultimately, the entire situation would have been seen 
as about Parks’ specific experience rather than about legalized segregation 
more generally. It would not have been political; it would have been policed 
(to use terminology from Jacques Rancière).47 
The passage above indicates negatively what drawing the transformative consequences of the 
event of Rosa Parks would require: to recognize that there had been a crossing of the division 
between ‘black’ and ‘white’ and to affirm that figures like Rosa Parks, which currently would 
compose a multiple unrepresentable under the prevailing regime of representation, belong to 
the American situation and will have become representable if the situation’s representational 
regime were transformed. Those who have decided positively on these propositions can be 
said to be the subject of the event of Rosa Parks. 
The process of transformation itself can be conceived in terms of a truth procedure, or, 
more specifically, the forcing of a truth, described in the first chapter as the process of 
extending the situation with non-constructible, hitherto unrepresentable, multiples. Paul 
declared that ‘[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither 
male nor female’.48 If it were supposed that the regime of representation were such that ‘Jew’ 
and ‘Greek’ excluded each other, the radicalism of Paul’s declaration—his subject-language—
might lie in its occultation of a situation in which the exclusionary relation no longer restricts 
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the construction of multiples. Following from the account of the dichotomization of social 
situation, the composition of the American situation is assumed to be such that every 
represented, hence constructible, identities in the situation are defined by their exclusion of 
either ‘white’ or ‘black’. A socially transformative process, far from reinforcing what ‘black’ 
identity had hitherto been, must consist in the radical transformation of that identity. But as 
‘white’ identity is constituted by its exclusionary relation to ‘black’ identity, the 
transformation of the latter also implies the transformation of the former. In fact, the extent of 
their transformation should be such that the distinction is finally abolished: in the American 
situation in which ‘black’ and ‘white’ marks every identity that is represented therein, what 
the transformation of the situation will need to produce is a multiple that is not marked as such. 
This multiple will have supplemented the American situation and transformed its regime of 
representation when a whole variety of previously non-constructible, unrepresentable 
multiples would have come to belong to the situation as representable multiples. For example, 
one could imagine that in a transformed situation, a social role that had previously been 
reserved for one race will have become a multiple whose membership criterion is no longer 
restricted in that manner. The way in which the dichotomization of a social situation and the 
restrictions on social identities that are constructed therein have been conceived also allows 
the following description of fidelity to the event of Rosa Parks: since any identity representable 
according to the representational regime of the American situation is simultaneously a part of 
some other ‘local’ situation in the American situation, the unfolding of the consequences of 
the event will consist in interventions in those local situations, discerning the traces of racial 
divide therein and abolishing them. By abolishing the restrictions on the identities that can be 
represented in the situation, the historically imposed limitation on the expansion of the space 




inclusive because, as a result of that process, the construction of identities of its inhabitants 
will no longer be constrained in the way that it had been previously.  
 
5.4 Recapitulation and remaining issues 
The alternative account of social situations outlined in this chapter have sought to 
specify, by incorporating the idea of the simplification of social space and the construction of 
social identities from hegemony theory, a situation that would reflect the extent of the 
universality or inclusivity that is achievable in a historical circumstance. The composition of 
that situation, it has been suggested, is such that the realization of a more inclusive situation 
is blocked by the ways in which identities are constructed therein. Subsequently, a process of 
transformation tasked with the abolition of the restrictions on the construction of identities 
have been outlined by drawing from the Badiouian account of post-evental transformation. 
The transformative effect of this process is the expansion of the space of representation, which 
renders representable multiples—social identities—that had previously been unrepresentable. 
This process can be said to be a process of extensive social change, because its transformative 
effects do not range over just any one social situation, but over a situation whose internal 
composition reflects the limit of inclusivity that is achievable in a historical circumstance. 
From this result, then, the following statement might be drawn regarding the relationship 
between the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ axes: the vertical process by which something radically 
new is introduced is most easily determinable conceptually when it involves breaking through 
the limit of inclusivity attained via horizontal processes. However, it must be admitted—as 
Rancière and Laclau have, but against, perhaps, Badiou—that in practice, the two processes 
will be intertwined in a way that an indistinction between the two is retained, partly because 
it is questionable whether concrete social situations could ever be so radically simplified or 




new in the situation. Although rooted in the post-Marxist theory of Laclau, the paradigmatic 
instance of a socially transformative process the alternative account depicts seems to be closer 
to that which is depicted by classical Marxism. 
To conclude this study, a limitation of the construal of the two axes that has been 
reached here shall be considered by returning to the ‘practico-ethical’ question. In the second 
chapter, the practico-ethical line of criticism raised against the Badiouian approach had been 
set aside, on the grounds that the issues that it raises concerning event and fidelity are 
practically relevant in so far as a truth procedure is really a process of substantial change. If it 
is granted that this chapter has pointed toward the possibility of specifying a process of 
extensive social transformation by drawing from the theoretical resources of Badiou and 
Laclau, the practico-ethical issue gains relevance. Yet, on this matter, there are, unfortunately, 
more questions to be raised than answers to be provided.  
It might be questioned whether, in the alternative account, social transformation as 
such becomes an objective, without a clear answer to the question of why any particular 
process of social transformation should be affirmed. One could argue that both Badiouian and 
Laclauian approaches contain the seeds of this outcome. Christopher Watkin’s observation 
points to the issue in the Badiouian approach. The universality and egalitarian dimensions 
attributed to a truth, Watkin writes, ‘can only be justified in terms of the inconsistent 
multiplicity that is retrojected from the counting-as-one of any situation, counting-as-one that 
introduces hierarchies, relations and divisions foreign to the void’.49 By undoing hierarchies, 
relations, and divisions that governs a situation, a truth ‘brings into being a new universal 
category […] that counts as one in a way more faithful to the retroactively apprehended non-
hierarchized inconsistent multiplicity’.50 Although Being and Event may have succeeded in 
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demonstrating that a truth procedure is a process that necessarily effects transformation and 
produces novelty in any given situation, since every historical situation has a specific void, it 
seems perfectly reasonable to ask whether there is any other justification for challenging 
prevailing regimes of counting in any particular situation. Not unexpectedly, a justification 
for supporting any particular change cannot be derived from ontology—Watkin is led to 
conclude that ‘[t]here can only be one reason for preferring truth and subjecthood over 
animality and the “get rich!” maxim: inconsistent multiplicity is eo ipso Good’.51 Although 
this may be a slightly hasty conclusion to draw when dealing with extraontological situations, 
it seems true nonetheless that whether Badiou’s philosophy has offered the sought justification 
remains unclear. As for Laclau, Harrison’s remark shall be quoted again: 
According to [Laclau] no particular normative order is ethically preferable 
in-itself, and the only basis for deciding as much is through the degree of 
attachment or ‘investment’ that a people decide to place in it. Hence, for 
Laclau the varying degrees of ‘unevenness’ between differential discourses 
cannot be explained by the relative merits of a particular order […]. It is the 
subject that decides as to what is both ethical and normative, not the 
discourse theorist.52 
 While the impossibility of instituting a self-identical society necessitates hegemonic 
processes and an investment in a particular normative order by historical actors, the evaluation 
of the ‘content’ of the normative order chosen is beyond the remit of hegemony theory. What 
is important for hegemony theory is for subjects to invest in some order.  
One can only respond to someone who asks why social change is desirable in the first 
place by congratulating him for finding satisfaction in the world as it is. But even if one were 
committed to the desirability of social change, this entails neither the affirmation of change in 
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any direction nor that it is desirable to change any particular social situation. Thus, in practice, 
some means of justifying a particular course of action appears to be in need. And here, the 
difficulty of integrating the vertical and horizontal axes resurfaces at a very practical level. 
Badiou observes that any scientific revolution worthy of its name is first received with 
scepticism, ‘lovers’ babble is dismissed as infantile foolishness’, and that revolutionary 
politics is deemed to ‘maintain a utopian (or non-realistic) discourse’ by ‘external witnesses’, 
for whom the statements a faithful subject makes about a situation-to-come appear to ‘make 
up an arbitrary and content-free language’.53 The statements that are initially meaningless for 
the inhabitants of the situation will have become meaningful once the initial situation is 
extended by a truth—as it has been stated in the first chapter, it is an effect of a truth that ‘the 
codes of communication’ and ‘the regime of opinions’ in the situation changes, such that 
‘formerly obvious judgements are no longer defensible, that others become necessary’.54 But 
this points toward a practical problem concerning the efficacy of a socially transformative 
process. The problem is not so much that of solipsism, or the exclusion of other perspectives 
from fidelity that, from the outside, may appear to proceed with the Pelagian ‘certainty that 
perfection lies wherever it leads’.55 Rather, the worry is that in denying the meaningfulness of 
subject-language in a situation that has not yet been transformed by a truth and to those who 
are not yet a faithful subject, there is a danger of making the actual accommodation of a truth 
by the situation (and its inhabitants) as something that results from purely contingent reasons 
(this is a worry that has been expressed by Peter Dews56). 
Émile Benveniste—whose work has been influential for Pierre Bourdieu’s work on the 
concept of symbolic power—had written: ‘Anybody can shout in the public square, “I decree 
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a general mobilization,” and as it cannot be an act because the requisite authority is lacking, 
such an utterance is no more than words; it reduces itself to futile clamour, childishness, or 
lunacy.’ 57  If such utterances that are perceived by bystanders as ‘noise’ resemble the 
characteristic that Badiou attributes to subject-language, Laclau, in spite of everything that he 
says about the incommensurability of the particular and the universal, partial object and 
fullness, and the irreducibility of decision, nonetheless affirms that the actual efficacy of a 
political project depends on its availability, credibility, and acceptability to a diverse range of 
social agents. It can be said that these conditions correspond to the ‘authority’ that makes a 
certain project (or discourse) to be more than noise. If Badiou embraces the impossibility of 
evaluating—or even comprehending—the statements made by faithful subjects from the 
outside, Laclau goes in the opposite direction. But in appealing to the Sittlichkeit of the 
community, his position risks diluting the specificity of a transformative process that, from a 
Badiouan perspective, must be a process that introduces something new and unexpected in the 
situation. The difficulty of integrating the vertical and the horizontal axes returns at this point: 
the more one tries to provide justification or good reasons for a particular course of action, the 
more likely it becomes that the extent of transformation achieved will be limited by the 
normative framework of the prevailing order—and yet, without being able to offer reasons 
and justifications that elicit broad acceptance, political practice risks becoming the work of 
the few that is easily dismissed by society at large. 
 From the theoretical resources of Badiou and Laclau, it is possible to elaborate the 
formal ontological conditions that makes radical transformation of a social order thinkable, 
and conceptually determine what a process of social transformation is—it is hoped that this 
study has at least shown this much. But the persistence of the difficulty of integrating the two 
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axes at a practical level suggests that actually moving toward social transformation of that sort 
in practice is another matter, the elaboration of which, plausibly, will need to draw from 
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